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Abstract
Using narrative research study founded in social constructionism, I explored the
lived experiences of thirty Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, to
discover how they experienced the war on terror. Ten participants were individually
interviewed and their stories, personal experiences, perceptions, and voices have been
presented in this study. I also facilitated a focus group of twenty Afghan NGO directors,
and their views are echoed in the study. The participants represented a diversity of
different humanitarian service specialties that cater to Afghan individuals, communities,
and government agencies in areas such as education, human rights and good governance,
food and shelter, to building bridges and infrastructural development. Based on a critical
review of existing literature, the interviews addressed significant issues that affect
humanitarian aid workers in complex political emergencies. I investigated the
sociocultural contexts and structural conditions that enable and inform the personal
narratives. There were six main themes that emerged from the participants’ narratives and
each main theme had an average of three sub-themes. The resulting themes were:
Security/Insecurity; Funding; Trust; Abandonment; Achievement; and Interventionism.
From the analysis of the storied narratives of thirty Afghan humanitarian aid
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, this study was able to create better understanding of how
conditions from the war on terror create high-risk environments that expose humanitarian
aid workers to kidnappings and violent attacks.

ix
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Topic Overview
In 1998, a radical group known as the World Islamic Council co-authored a fatwa,
declaring an ideology-based statement of terrorism translated into action on September
11, 2001. The fatwa called for the “killing of Americans and their allies—civilians and
military” and to “launch the raid in Satan’s U.S. troops and Devil’s supporters allying
with them” (Bodansky, 2001, pp. 226-227).
Terrorism has different meanings for some people—for many it is an offensive
act, for others it is “an activity assigned by God,” for some “a distinctive act of
maintaining power pride,” for many “a justified action against oppression,” still for others
“an attack on the peace and security,” and for some “a quest for identity” (Lazare, 2002,
pp. 216-219).
The act of terrorism that struck New York City, Arlington, Virginia, and
Shanksville, Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 has significantly and, many believe,
has permanently affected the way Americans view themselves and the rest of the world.
Since the attack of September 11, 2001, there have been several changes in the daily lives
of ordinary Americans, largely due to many changes in the U.S. government’s domestic
and foreign policies. Many of these changes have continued to affect aspects of American
culture, both internal and external politics, and the media.
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America, the United Nations
Security Council issued Resolution 1368 condemning the terrorist attacks, and called for
other nations to “work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers
and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding,
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supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these attacks will
be held accountable” (as cited in Acharya, 2009, p. 667). Acharya posits that this attack
created an opportunity for the UN Security Council to issue a clearer definition of
terrorism as “an act of war,” instead the council chose to define terrorism as “a crime for
which the perpetrator of such acts must be brought to justice” (2009, p. 667). Acharya
argues that the war on terror is a “convenient and expedient” way for “powerful states to
use against another state in self-defense” (2009, p. 670).
On September 20, 2001, former U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the
Joint Session of Congress, declaring the war on terror:
We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy,
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the destruction and to the
defeat of the global terror network.… We will starve terrorists of funding, turn
them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge
or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us,
or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime. (Bush, 2001, para. 28, 30)
The United States and NATO allies invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been involved in two wars and several other conflicts
as well as a lot of covert anti-terrorist activities around the world in pursuit of Al-Qaeda
and other affiliated terrorist groups. The new Bush doctrine created a new world order
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that has given rise to a new phenomenon in complex political emergencies, and created
conditions that cause risks and insecurities for humanitarian aid workers in such insecure
environments. In this study, I used narrative analysis of face-to-face interviews and focus
group discussion to investigate the effects of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian
aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan; to explore how they perceived and ascribed meaning
to their lived experiences of the war on terror, their roles with different stakeholders in
the conflict, and the conditions that exposed them to risks of insecurities; and to better
understand the effects of military conflicts in the new post 9/11 world.
The Present Study
This study was focused on understanding how Afghan humanitarian aid workers
experienced the war on terror through the narrative analysis of their stories from face-toface interviews of ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers and a focus group discussion
panel of twenty Afghan aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also, I set out to discover the
effects of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian aid workers, and how they ascribed
meaning to the risks and challenges from the war on terror in the delivery of
humanitarian aid. Consequently, one of my main objectives of this study was to give
voice to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul—men and women who risk their
lives in very insecure environments every day, and often under pressure to align and
interact with different groups in the conflict, which exposed them to risks of danger and
insecurities. This study helps to bring their storied narratives to the forefront and lead to
real, effective change that will give rise to constructive processes to better protect
humanitarian aid workers in insecure environments. Lastly, this study sought to develop
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better understanding of Afghan readiness and the potential consequences of the U.S. and
NATO drawdown of military forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.
As Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Wardak, Zaman, and Taylor (2008) posit, the NGOs
are now under pressure from the “communities to deliver without jeopardizing security”;
they are under pressure from the host government to “implement national programmes”;
under pressure from the “politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to
align with hearts and minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed
opposition groups (AOGs) who threaten their safety” (2008, p. 4).
From the review of existing literature, research findings point to an alarming
increase in violence against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan since 2002.
Stoddard, Harmer, & DiDomenico, (2009) assert that criminal forces are in collusion
with the political elites and conclude that such conditions in complex political
emergencies like Afghanistan, create limited alternatives for humanitarian aid workers. In
light of these and emerging themes from the literature reviews, I developed the following
research questions to facilitate the face-to-face interview discussions and the focus group
dialogue with humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan: What meaning do Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul ascribe to the war on terror in Afghanistan? What
roles expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to insecurities as a result of their
interactions in the war on terror? How do Afghan aid workers in Afghanistan perceive
and describe their relationships with local Afghan communities? How do Afghan aid
workers perceive and assess Afghan readiness for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign
troops in 2014? How do Afghan aid workers perceive and describe their interactions with
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the international communities, the U.S. military forces, and the international military
forces in Afghanistan?
With the escalation of uncertainties in many parts of the third world and
developing nations, the war on terror has become the new framework for international
conflicts. Since the start of the war on terror, the rise of civil unrest in many parts of the
Middle East and Africa has been witnessed—the overthrow of Sadam Hussein in Iraq, the
uprisings in Egypt and Libya, conflicts in North and South Sudan, Somalia, and the civil
war in Syria. All of these conflicts allude to some form of terrorism, real or imagined.
This narrative study of the experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers reveals that
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul were exposed to great risks of danger as a
result of their humanitarian and civil society roles in an insecure environment “where
there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from an internal or external
conflict” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999, p.
6). As a student of conflict resolution, I believe that this research study will enable
scholars of conflict studies to begin to ask the right questions on the indirect costs and
consequences of the war on terror, the shrinking humanitarian space, and the rise in
security threats to men and women who risk their lives every day to provide desperately
needed help and services to vulnerable children, women, and the old. Through their
storied narratives, voice is given to many who had become voiceless.
Theoretical Perspectives
Narrative research methodology advanced by Riessman (1990a, 1990b, 1993, and
2000) was used as the theoretical framework for this research study of the lived
experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul and how they ascribe meaning
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to their experiences. Narrative research is receptive to interviewees’ ways and manner of
experiencing their world, as opposed to developing theories for generalizations or
predicting phenomena (Crist & Tanner, 2003). It is holistic and inductive. Narrative
analysis provided me with the techniques to investigate the intricacies and the complex
nature of my participants’ lived experiences—grounded in their individuality, their social
interactions, and cultural density.
A key subtext of this research study was to echo the voices of Afghan
humanitarian aid workers—men and women who are pressured into high risk roles in
their day to day interactions with different groups in the war on terror as they seek to
provide humanitarian aid to very deprived beneficiaries and communities in insecure and
violent environments. To this end, it was essential that their voices and points of view
drive this study. Two other theoretical viewpoints were used to form this study: first by
building foundational framework on social constructionism, and secondly by inductively
advancing a fundamental theoretical model, grounded in the basic human needs theory
(Burton, 1972, 1990, 1997).
Social constructionism has significant theoretical influences that guide and inform
the basic human needs theory. Social constructionism theory is based on the idea that
reality is a construct created through human activities and interactions as individuals seek
to create meaning and understanding of their world by developing “subjective meanings
of their experiences” (Creswell, 2007, p. 20). This process of meaning making is often
negotiated through interactions with other individuals across historical, social, and
cultural norms (Andrews, 2012; Creswell, 2007; Prawat & Floden, 1994). Social
constructionism has a focus on what is considered prevailing narratives or objective truth,
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which is formed through social interactions between individuals in society, and not
discovered from nature or based on ontological fact. Therefore, social constructionism
argues that prevailing narratives are not created without bias and cannot exist without
social interaction. The narratives become so dominant that they are perceived to be the
norm with cultural and historical realities as individuals in society accept them to be the
normal and customary truth (Espin & Gawelek, 1992). Therefore, my participants’
dominant narratives and ascribed meanings were negotiated and formed through
interactions grounded in the social, historical, cultural, and political context of Kabul,
Afghanistan. To better understand how the context (Kabul, Afghanistan) impacts on the
dominant narratives, I borrowed a contextual framework from Lawrence-Lightfoot and
Davis’s The Art and Science of Portraiture (1997) for setting up the physical location of
my study, giving authenticity to the context from which my participants’ storied
narratives and meaning emanate. Portraitists view human experiences as framed and
shaped by the setting such that the conditions and the context work together to shape the
experiences of individuals (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997). According to LawrenceLightfoot and Davis, “The context is not only a frame for the action, it is also a rich
resource for the researcher’s interpretations of the actor’s thoughts, feelings, and
behavior” (1997, p. 59), and allows the reader to conceive vivid contextual setting of my
participants’ environment that shaped their dominant narratives. I have used context in
this research to place my participants and their storied narratives in their time and space
to better understand the meanings they ascribe to their experiences. I began by describing
the physicality of my participants’ environment (Kabul) and then revealed the historical
background or “the origins and evolutions of the organization and the values that shape
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its structure and purpose” (1997, p. 52). This idea of meaning making illuminates the
core focus of social constructionism that dominant narratives are formed in contexts of
historical, social, and cultural norms as individuals navigate and interact with each other
(Creswell, 2007).
I used Burton’s human needs model (1972, 1990, 1997) to critically understand
the structural conditions in my participants’ contextual environment that impact and
shape their experiences and the meanings they ascribe to these experiences. Burton’s
model postulates that innate human needs are at the core of most conflicts, and they must
be addressed and satisfied if society is to find peaceful resolution satisfactory to all the
parties (1972). In this research study, I developed an analytic understanding of how
Afghan humanitarian aid workers have experienced the war on terror from the face-toface interview conversations and focus group discussions with Afghan aid workers, and
attended to their storied narratives to affirm that I fully captured their experiences in
order to echo and give voice to their viewpoint.
In the existing literature, there are several dominant narratives about Kabul,
Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan that may not be situated in the social context
of the nation from which the violent attacks of September 11, 2001 were launched. The
prevailing portrait speaks to terrorism, insurgency, and jihadist doctrines; however, the
dominant narratives from my participants contradict these notions. To give meaning and
better understand these conflicting narratives, I use Burton’s basic human needs model
with particular reference to his assertions on terrorism that “[t]he perception we have of
‘terrorists’ is that of persons who are abnormal and disturbed and who need to be
removed from society” (1997, p. 27). Rather he argues that the appropriate policy “must
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be to uproot the causes of terrorism by putting an end to oppression of classes, nations,
and ethnic communities” (Rubenstein, 1987, as cited in Burton, 1997, p. 27).
Method of Inquiry
In conjunction with the political and historical analysis of existing literature on
the war on terror and its impact on humanitarian space in complex political emergencies
since September 11, 2001, I used a qualitative research method, specifically narrative
inquiry and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013), to facilitate my interviews
and discussions with Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. According
to Daiute and Lightfoot (2004),
Narrative [research] is a mode of inquiry based in narrative as a root metaphor, a
genre, and discourse…narrative analysis relies on themes, mostly drawn from
literary theory, to explain the vicissitudes in the drama of interpreted lives,
including

time,

truth,

beauty,

character

and

conflict.

Narratives

are

also…culturally developed ways of organizing experience and knowledge. (p. xi)
As Riessman (2005) purports, “investigators collect many stories and inductively
create conceptual groupings from the data” and construct a “typology of narratives
organized by theme” (p. 2). She argues that narratives allow “storytellers a way to reimagine life”—that narratives do not accurately depict the past, however, they “forge
among past, present, and future” (p. 6). Riessman (2000) asserts that narrative inquiry is
“relevant for the study of disruptive life events…studies of social movements, political
change, and macro-level phenomena” (p. 3), such as the core tenets of this study, to
understand how the war on terror has impacted and been “disruptive” to Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Riessman argues that grounded theory
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does not portray the stories of participants accurately; instead, it rips apart the data as
presented by the interviewees, thereby impeding on deeper understanding of participants’
perceptions and points of view (1990a).
Narrative inquiry has allowed me to explore the lived experiences of Afghan
humanitarian aid workers extensively in the social, cultural, political, and historical
context of the war on terror. This is in line with the theoretical tenets of social
constructionism and Burton’s basic human needs model. By contrasting the prevailing
narratives from existing literature about the war on terror, Afghanistan, and terrorism
with the storied narratives of Afghan humanitarian aid workers who participated in this
research study, deep divergences and paradoxes emerged. This density was as a result of
lived experiences grounded and presented through the narratives of Afghan humanitarian
aid workers in Kabul. The themes that emerged from the narrative interviews and focus
group with my participants are not represented in the existing literature, but they are
important to my participants and became the driving force that compelled this study.
The meaning and significance that individuals ascribe to their experiences are
dependent on their own interrelationships with the world, which in itself exists as a result
of the meaning the individual assigns to it (Valle & King, 1978). According to Clandinin
and Cornelly (2000), narrative investigation allows the interviewees’ stories to navigate
the internal and external world across time and space. This process of telling the stories
gives voice to how the individual constructs meaning from the system of identity, values,
attitudes, and beliefs—this has relevance and is quite transforming for the interviewee
and the researcher who together create knowledge (Etherington, 2009).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature review is intended to situate my research study with the framework
of current body of investigation. It is by no means exhaustive; however, my goal was to
show the scope of knowledge and points of view that are in existing literature about the
conflict in Afghanistan—particularly how the war on terror is seen from a humanitarian
perspective. The literature review is structured around sub-headings that illustrate the
topic of discussion.
Complex Political Emergency
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines Complex Political
Emergency as:
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or
considerable breakdown of authority resulting from an internal or external conflict
and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or
capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country
programs. (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
1999, p. 6)
Stoddard et al. (2009), in their study of trends in providing aid in insecure
environments, note that Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia were the most violent insecure
contexts for local and international aid workers. At the same time, their study showed that
most of the attacks were politically motivated. They argue that even though the findings
point to a declining number of attacks and killings of aid workers from 2.7 victims per
10,000 to 2.4 from 2006 to 2008, they attribute this decline to better security
consciousness amongst humanitarian aid workers. However, they assert that the numbers
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in Afghanistan tell a different story—the attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan
increased as criminal forces have “colluded with political forces” (2009, p. 4). They
conclude that aid workers in complex political emergencies have very limited
alternatives: “It boils down to reducing or withdrawing essential aids from needy
population, or running intolerable risks to the lives of staff and partners” (p. 10). And
they concur with humanitarian aid workers who advocate for separation from the military
and political players, and argue that by maintaining humanitarian principles of neutrality
and independence, aid workers are able to improve their overall security and maintain the
trust and good standing they have always enjoyed in the communities that they serve (p.
10).
Humanitarian Principles
Egeland, Hamer, and Stoddard (2011) believe that by actively promoting
humanitarian principles, aid worker security was significantly improved. Their study
showed that the “lack of respect for principles was the third-largest contributor to
insecurity,” while the “lack of experience and cultural awareness” was seen to be the
number one reason for aid worker insecurity, followed by “incompetence” and “taking
unnecessary risk” (2011, p. 18). According to the authors, NGOs have conveniently
“compromised a principled approach in their own conduct by closely aligning with
political and military activities and actors” (2011, p. 19). They argue that many of the
alignments were motivated by funding needs.
According to accounts presented in the Aid Worker Security Report by Stoddard,
Harmer, and Haver (2011) in their study that interviewed international NGO staff, the
respondents believed that local and national NGO employees lacked proper training and
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expertise on conduct and humanitarian principles, and questioned their ability to handle
difficult and often life threatening situations in complex political environments. Teuten’s
(2009) address to the NGO Military Contact Group (NMCG) was significant as it echoed
the 1994 Red Cross Code of Conduct:
We will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow ourselves, or our
employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or
economically sensitive nature for government or other bodies that may serve
purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian. (Teuten, 2009, p. 5)
As noted in the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) policy
brief (Schirch, 2010), NGOs expressed concern that the use of military capacity to deliver
aid and nation building assistance will “prematurely deflect attention from Afghanistan’s
deteriorating security situation and also engage in a range of activities for which others
are better suited” (p. 1). Comparing NGOs to the military, the report posits that NGOs are
dedicated to the humanitarian principles of “humanity, impartiality, independence and
neutrality” (p. 1). The report notes that aid decisions are solely based on need without
prejudice or regard to political agenda or pressures from donors. Their main focus is to
provide aid to the people who need it.
Civil-Military Collaboration
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam and colleagues (2008) posit that the military and the
humanitarian aid communities have very divergent interests and objectives in the delivery
of aid to people in need. They allege that the military is driven by the “Winning Hearts
and Minds (WHAM) theory” which they (military) perceive as a “charity paradigm” and
categorize those who need and receive aid as “deserving poor” (2008, p. 7). On the other
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hand, they claim NGOs have spent several years building understanding and service
dedicated to eradicating the “handout mentality” and working to bring “ownership,
involvement, and empowerment” to the Afghan people (p. 7). They argue that the
military should be cognizant of how their “charitable acts can undermine NGO activities”
(p. 7).
Stoddard and associates (2009) affirm the belief that continued involvement with
state officials and members of the military creates significant security problems for NGO
employees and agents; however, they note that studies reveal that even NGOs who have
taken significant measures to protect their employees and remain neutral have not
completely escaped from these unfortunate attacks and killings of innocent men and
women. They posit that “aid organizations are being attacked not just because they are
perceived to be cooperating with Western political actors, but because they are perceived
as wholly a part of the Western agendas” (2009, p. 6).
According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) Quarterly Data Report
(2010), their recommendation was very firm in discouraging NGOs from engagement in
any form of civil-military coordination, noting that:
NGO have nothing (sic) to gain and much to lose by interacting with the IMF who
are only interested in leveraging advantage from your activities. Second, we
recommend a policy driven engagement with all Afghan parties to the conflict
where such can be concluded safely and legally. NGO (sic) must develop and
apply deliberate communication strategies to ensure that all current and future
powerbrokers understand the purpose, and independence, of your activities.
(ANSO, 2010, p. 1).
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According to a report exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations by
Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key issues from the Winning Hearts and
Minds program is the frustration from local NGOs—that their input is not sought-out in
the civil-military debate. They believe that there should be an “Afghanisation” of the
civil-military process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5), and complain that often
local Afghan NGOs are underfunded unlike the international NGOs. The authors
compared the struggle between the NGOs and the military with being “engaged in a
complex dance with shadowy partners whose moves are increasingly unpredictable and
deadly” (p. 74). They call for a better, more cultural look at human security issues in
Afghanistan, claiming that the Afghan government is seeking objectives that are likely to
“jeopardize” humanitarian space (p. 74).
Several studies and reports have pointed to violent trends and sharp increases in
attacks, kidnapping, and killings of humanitarian aid workers in complex political
emergencies such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan (Darfur) since 2003. The number
of attacks on international NGO staff rose from 48 in 2001 to 143 in 2010, and the
number of attacks on Local NGO and RCS staff increased from two in 2001 to 45 in
2010 (Stoddard et al., 2011). As Stoddard et al. (2009) purport, since 2006, attacks on aid
workers in the field increased by 61% and in the year 2008 alone, over 260 violent
attacks against humanitarian aid workers were reported, making it the highest year of
such report in their twelve year study (p. 1). In Afghanistan alone, there were 30 attacks
on aid workers reported in 2008, 26 in 2009, and 59 in 2010—an increase of 97%
(Stoddard et al., 2011).
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Strand (2007) in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan Trust” posed these
questions:
Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined
compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s? Why were people not coming
out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past? (9,
11).
A recommendation was made regarding the desire by Afghans for local
ownership in their nation building and they applaud NGOs for encouraging Afghans to
own and become part of building their country, and condemned the PRT for what they
referred to as “PRT ineptitude in awarding contracts” (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., p.
75). The final recommendation asserts a very strong warning for NGOs for a better
understanding of the dynamics and nuances of Afghan communities—they warn that
“growing military presence will not compensate for this”—but a mutual understanding of
Afghan and international communities and their “realities” (p. 77). The report exploring
Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations stresses the need for humanitarian
principles to be “understood and made relevant to Afghan social, cultural and religious
norms” (p. 77).
According to Niland (2011), the Afghan people are now experiencing four
decades of military conflict, “making it one of the most protracted conflicts in recent
history” (p. 4). She noted that since the beginning of hostilities in 1979, “adequate
measures to protect civilians” (p. 5) had not been taken. Referencing an ICRC survey
from 2009, she stated that:
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almost all Afghans - 96% - have been directly or indirectly affected as a result of
the immediate or wider consequences of war; nearly half (45%) of those
interviewed had seen a family member killed and a third (35%) have been
wounded in fighting. (2011, p. 4)
According to Niland (2011), data from an Afghan electronic database shows over 40% of
those killed in 2008 were civilians – of which 39% of the dead were attributed to the
government and its foreign military allies (p. 5). The numbers from the 2010 Annual
Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan give a similar and
horrific narrative:
Between 01 January and 31 December 2010, 5,446 civilian casualties were
attributed to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), representing 76 per cent of the
total number of civilian casualties for the year. AGEs were linked to 2,080
civilian deaths and 3,366 civilian injuries, (75 per cent and 78 per cent
respectively of the total number of civilians killed and injured in 2010). IEDs,
suicide attacks, assassinations and executions, abductions, intimidation and
harassment were the dominant tactics used by AGEs to wage conflict. These
tactics appeared aimed at undermining support for the Government of
Afghanistan and its international military allies, and at spreading terror and fear
among the civilian population as a means of control. (UNAMA, 2011, p. i)
Remote Management Strategy
In Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of
Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas, Stoddard, Harmer, and Renouf (2010),
assert that when humanitarian NGOs implement remote management strategies,
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management is accepting that there is a problem with the core humanitarian principles of
neutrality, independence, and impartiality. They are no longer able to rely on these
humanitarian principles that have protected them for many years (2010, p. 7). They
define remote management strategy as “adaptation to insecurity, and an aberration from
normal programming practice” (p. 11), and assert that remote strategies are not meant to
be a permanent or standard situation; however, several international NGOs rely on local
and national aid workers to maintain their presence and continue their aid activities in
local communities, while the international NGO staff oversee operations from a safer
environment. They question the morality and effectiveness of how the remote
management strategy is implemented, and wonder if the “levels of sophistication and
quality of programme activities will slip, often dramatically, when an operation ‘goes
remote’” (p. 8).
Basic Human Needs Theory
According to Burton (1997), “past compliance systems led to alienation and antisocial behaviours” because people would only tolerate so much, and “conform to elitesponsored institutions and norms” (p. 19). He postulates that when people are unable to
meet their basic needs as a result of conditions in the system referred to as structural
violence (Galtung, 1964), that frustrates and denies individuals their basic human needs.
The unmet fundamental basic needs “will be pursued in one way or another” (Burton,
1997, p. 19), and accordingly, these unmet needs would be perceived to be more
fundamental to their survival than food and shelter (1997). Burton argues that individuals
deprived and frustrated from attaining their fundamental basic needs are “prepared to go
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to extreme lengths to defy systems in order to pursue their deeply felt needs, even death
by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (p. 19).
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Chapter 3: Methodology
In this chapter, I provide a step-by-step description of the research study design,
covering the purpose and justification of the study, research procedure, face-to-face
interview and focus group discussions, participant recruitment, research question,
informed consent, transcription, data analysis, data validation, and ethics and reflexivity
section, which focuses on authenticity, consistency, and faithfulness of my study.
Qualitative Narrative Research Study
The primary goal of this study is to better understand the lived experiences of
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the conditions that give rise
to perceived insecurities that expose them to risk of violence. I used open-ended, in-depth
face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions to explore the dominant narratives
about how Afghan aid workers in Kabul experience the war on terror. Six relevant
research questions were used to investigate and understand the storied narratives and
contextual conditions that framed and shaped the dominant narratives that emerged from
this study.
With the narrative research method, “practical acts of living are accessed through
“narrative” (interviews and observations) to reveal meaning” (Crist & Tanner, 2003, p.
202), with focus on ‘making meaning’ and this process occurred and continued all
through the investigation instead of beginning after interviews and focus group
discussions (Gehart, Tarragona, and Bava, 2007). I was able to make meaning through
co-construction with my participants (2007) by listening attentively, asking follow-up
questions, and using email communication for clarification (Riessman, 1993, 2008). The
focus in this narrative analysis was on the cognitive and emotional situations of my
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participants’ stories (Riessman, 1990a) and also paying particular attention to the context.
I used a qualitative research method, specifically narrative inquiry and thematic analysis
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013), to facilitate my interviews and discussions with Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. The process of analysis comprised of
six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006): familiarization with data, coding,
searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and writing up my
findings.
The representations and boundaries that I chose to structure the narrative section
of my analysis were strongly influenced by social constructionism theory and Burton’s
basic human needs model, my disciplinary preferences, and my six research questions
(Riessman, 2000). Recognizing my theoretical assumptions and predispositions, I used
daily research journals and field notes that I made after each day of my interviews for
bracketing and maintaining perspectives, so that the next day, I could listen to my
participants’ narratives actively. Active listening allowed me to be fully immersed in the
emotions and attentive to the nuances of my participants’ stories (Creswell, 2007;
Holstein & Gubrium, 2012).
The research analysis has cultural (religious), historical, social, and political
contexts with detailed descriptions of ten face-to-face interviews and a focus group
discussion with twenty participants, with particular attention to the location of my
fieldwork (Kabul, Afghanistan) (Polkinghorne, 1995). My goal was to provide “a
palpable picture that allows the reader to see, feel, smell, and touch the scene”
(Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997, p. 59). I borrowed a contextual framework from The
Art and Science of Portraiture (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997), so as to give
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authenticity to the context from which my participants’ storied narratives and meanings
emanated.
As part of reflexivity in qualitative research, I would like to acknowledge my
beliefs and feelings regarding this research study. The research topic, the research design,
the research objectives, and the research questions were developed by me, and I am quite
cognizant of how my personal biases may have affected my participants in this research
study. Even though I may not share much in common with my participants, we still share
our common humanity. I am of Nigerian heritage from the Christian South. My political
and religious ideologies are quite liberal. I do not share a lot with Islamic militancy;
however, having grown up in post-colonial Africa and having lived in the U.S. for over
30 years as a minority class, I understand and sympathize with structural violence that
denies individuals their basic human needs of identity, self-worth, and equal protection
under the law (security). To that extent, I do share some solidarity with the people of
Afghanistan and their struggle for national identity. Unlike most developing countries, I
found during my earlier research that Afghanistan had many indigenously owned NGOs,
which are referred to as National NGOs or Local NGOs. I believe that this was the
beginning of my curiosity and the desire to investigate the lived experiences of this core
group of humanitarian aid workers who provide services in their country to their own
country’s men, women, and children. I became particularly interested in the fact that they
were Afghan aid workers, providing services to Afghans (their people) and yet having to
face the risk of violent attacks from Afghan communities. This paradox lead to my asking
the following questions: Why are they being attacked? And who is responsible for the
attacks?
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As a narrative researcher, my goal was not to do away with my own researcher’s
filters, experiences, values, preconceived notions, and biases that I bring to this study, but
I was very cognizant of my presence and the influences that I had on my participants. It is
my hope that my later section on ethics and reflexivity will address and bring to light how
my experiences and beliefs have informed and given depth to my data analysis
(Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, & Miller, 2002). I also wish to acknowledge that I have been
quite enlightened and my perspectives have broadened as a result of my face-to-face
interviews and focus group discussion experiences. The storied narratives that I share in
this study have been co-constructed with my participants. Even though I have made
significant efforts to seek higher levels of rigor and accuracy in interpreting my
participants’ narratives in this study, I was not completely unfettered of my personal
biases and prejudices. Narrative analysis asserts that objectivity does not exist, nor should
a researcher strive to attain objectivity; rather, research should be “checked” in process
with the participants. Hence, research is not neutral or objective, but verified through
dialog (Riessman, 2005, pp. 1-7). Occasional check-ins with my participants were used to
validate some of my values and thoughts. Over time, I have become personally attached
and impacted by the emotions and distresses of this study as a consequence of being
immersed in my research topic. The above noted acknowledgements may lead to
presumptions of possible drawbacks with regard to this research study; nonetheless, I
maintain that the purpose of this research is to give voice to the storied narratives of
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan.
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Research Questions
The research questions that this investigation seeks to address are:
Research question 1: What meaning do Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul
ascribe to the war on terror in Afghanistan?
Research question 2: What roles expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to insecurities
as a result of the war on terror?
Research question 3: How do Afghan aid workers in Afghanistan perceive and describe
their relationships with local Afghan communities?
Research question 4: How do Afghan aid workers perceive and assess Afghan readiness
for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops in 2014?
Research question 5: How do Afghan aid workers perceive and describe their
interactions with the international communities, the U.S. military
forces, and the international military forces in Afghanistan?
Proposition:

Humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, are exposed to
conditions which give rise to risks of insecurities and violent attacks as a
result of their interactions with different parties in the war on terror.

Justification
The primary goal of this study is to better understand through the narrative
analysis of stories from face-to-face interviews of a group of humanitarian aid workers in
Kabul, Afghanistan how they experience the ‘War on Terror’. A secondary goal of this
study is to discover the effects of the ‘War on Terror’ on this group of humanitarian aid
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and how they ascribe meaning to the risks and challenges
that they face in the delivery of humanitarian aid to beneficiaries in insecure
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communities. The third goal of this study is to give voice to the stories of humanitarian
aid workers—young men and women who are often under pressure from different parties
in the conflict, and many are attacked, abducted, raped, and killed—with the hope that the
analysis of their stories will start a dialog to create real, effective change, and
constructive processes to better protect humanitarian aid workers in insecure
environments. It is the final goal of this study that through better understanding, more
constructive interactions with the different actors from the military, political,
international, and community will develop, allowing policymakers a bona fide
understanding and assessment of Afghan readiness for the 2014 drawdown of U.S. and
international forces.
According to Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), NGOs are now under
pressure from the “communities to deliver without jeopardizing security”; they are under
pressure from the host government to “implement national programmes”; under pressure
from the “politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to align with
hearts and minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition
groups (AOGs) who threaten their safety” (p. 4).
Galtung (1964) asked the questions of who are the individuals responsible for
structural violence, as he sought to discover the forces that cause and give rise to
structural violence in society. Galtung’s search gave birth to the idea of “conflict
resolution processes” (Burton, 1997). According to Burton, “Needs theory became a
short-hand way of describing the problems created by structural violence and pointed
more directly to ways in which they could be tackled” (1997, p. 35). It soon became
evident that the responsibility for structural violence laid on those who controlled the
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system, and that the people with power and influence have much to lose if structural
violence were allowed to continue unchecked (1997). Today, with the war on terror and
all the different ethnic, sectarian, and ideological conflicts around the world, the only
“constructive option” is “problem-solving through conflict resolution processes in which
all parties affected must play a part” (1997, p. 35).
Research findings point to an alarming increase in violence against humanitarian
aid workers in Afghanistan since 2002. As noted earlier, “Criminality has colluded with
political forces pursuing national (and in the case of Al-Qaeda, global) aims” (Stoddard et
al., 2009, p. 4). In light of these, the following research questions were central to this
investigation.
How do Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan experience and assign
meaning to the war on terror?
For many of my participants, the war on terror is simply a war between the super
powers for the control of oil and resources, and for the control of central Asia. They
claim that insecurities have increased since the war on terror (the arrival of the U.S. and
NATO troops), and insist that Afghans are not terrorists, and that terrorism is brought
into Afghanistan from outside its borders, and blamed on its neighbors, particularly
Pakistan and Iran for funding Islamic fundamentalism and propagating jihadist
propaganda.
How do humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan perceive and describe their
interactions with the U.S. military, and other international military forces in
Afghanistan?
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Many of my participants described the Afghan humanitarian aid worker as a
“bridge” between the local Afghan communities and the U.S. and the international
military forces in Afghanistan. However, some participants argued that the role of
“bridge” between the parties, exposed Afghan humanitarian aid workers to risks of
suspicion, which gave rise to distrust and violent attacks.
How do humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan describe their relationship with
the local Afghan people, the Afghan authorities, the insurgents, and the Taliban?
The dominant narrative is that the Afghan humanitarian aid workers have trusting
relationships with the local Afghan communities. They believe that the Afghan people
trust them as “implementer” of desperately needed humanitarian aid programs for the
local communities, and because they enjoy such working relationships with the Afghan
communities while providing rural communities with essential humanitarian needs, the
Taliban allow them to provide services to the people.
How do Afghan aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan ascribe meaning and assess Afghan
readiness for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014?
The consensus is that the U.S. should not abandon Afghanistan like it did after the
Soviets war in the 1990s. They maintain that such abandonment would lead to
Afghanistan becoming a haven for terror as it was pre -September 11, 2001, and say that
the U.S. should “put out the fire” before withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.
With the escalation of uncertainties in many parts of the third world and
developing nations, the war on terror has become the new framework for international
conflicts. As a student of conflict resolution, I believe that this study will enable scholars
and practitioners of conflict resolution to seek deeper meanings and begin to ask
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questions of this new phenomenon called war on terror and its tendencies to create
insecure conditions, which give rise to structural violence that expose humanitarian aid
workers to danger and violent attacks—men and women who risk their lives every day to
bring desperately needed help to some of the world’s most vulnerable children, women,
and the old. Since September 11, 2001, many nations have erupted into civil and political
unrest, sectarian conflicts, and jihadist militancy fueled by Islamic fundamentalism as the
rich and powerful nations dominate and impose their will on less powerful and vulnerable
populations around the world. This phenomenon—the war on terror—has become a
pretext for suppressing voices for change, insurrections, as well as social and political
conflicts around the world. It is the hope of this narrative study that through the stories of
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, voice will be given to many
who have become voiceless and marginalized.
From among the research traditions, I have chosen a qualitative narrative research
methodology advanced by Riessman (1990a, 1993, 2000). This narrative research
methodology in collaboration with social constructionism provided a viable methodology
to explore my participants’ ways and manners of experiencing their world by focusing on
their voices and dominant narratives as opposed to developing theories for
generalizations or predicting phenomena (Crist & Tanner, 2003). The methodology is
holistic and allowed for themes grounded in participants’ stories to inductively emerge.
Narrative analysis provided me with the techniques to investigate the intricacies and the
complex nature of my participants’ lived experiences—grounded in their individuality,
their social interactions, and cultural density.
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I particularly found narrative inquiry most suitable for this research study to
explore and understand the impacts of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian aid
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and how they assign meaning to the conditions that
expose them to risks of insecurities. I used the narrative inquiry to develop the framework
for this study and the narrative analysis method to encapsulate and understand the
complexities of the dominant themes in the stories of the lived experiences of my
participants (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004). The outcome of this study and its contribution to
knowledge were founded on the lived experiences of my participants: Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004). My goal is
and always was to remain faithful to the core tenets of this research study by giving voice
to the storied narratives of my participants.
Research Procedure
Step 1: Data Collection
I used three different forms of data collection methods: ten face-to-face
interviews, a focus group discussion with twenty participants, and a collection of written
entries by focus group participants prior to the start of the focus discussions. This data
collection method allowed for data confirming and validation (Creswell, 2007; Willis,
2007).
Step 2: Transcription
I used a transcription service to transcribe all recorded interviews and focus group
discussions using a verbatim transcription method with sighs, emotions, or force of
speech included in the transcript (Riessman, 2005).

30
Step 3: Analyze and interpret data
My data analysis was done by analyzing data from two different sources, which
were analyzed separately using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013). In my
interpretation section I used quotations from participants to give voice to their narratives
and provide deeper meaning and understanding of their experiences (Riessman, 2000,
2005).
Step 4: Member Checking
I sent interview transcripts via email to each interview participant that expressed
interest in being contacted to review and provide any corrections or amendments as
desired. Three participants returned amendments that were immediately made on the
research transcript. Member checking is used in qualitative research as a form of
validating the data (Creswell, 2007; Willis, 2007).
Research Sample
Participant Profile:


Afghan humanitarian aid workers who are Afghan nationals



Men and women over 18 years of age



Have lived experiences of the war on terror in Kabul or anywhere in Afghanistan



Able to travel to Kabul to participate in study



Civilian humanitarian aid worker working in Kabul and other vicinities
I had two groups of participants in this study. The first group of participants was

the face-to-face interview participants, and the second group of participants was the focus
group discussion participants. Both participant groups were Afghan humanitarian aid
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workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. All the participants were associated with local Afghan
NGOs in Kabul.
Interview participants. My initial attempt at recruiting interview participants for
this study was in June 2012, from a list of local Afghan NGOs published on the website
of the Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau1 (ANCB). The site listed email and contact
information for local Afghan NGOs. I sent email to 118 contacts and received 25
responses; however, four were located outside the city of Kabul so they were not able to
participate due my decision to limit my interviews to participants in the city of Kabul. Of
the 25 responses, 20 were interested in participating in the study. I informed them that I
was in the process of an IRB review and would contact them upon receiving IRB
approval.
In January of 2013, upon receiving IRB approval, I contacted my 20 potential
participants to begin arrangements for my travel to Kabul Afghanistan in May 2013. Of
the 20 contacts, 14 responded; 10 would participate, two did not respond, and two were
no longer able to participate. Prior to leaving the U.S. for Kabul on May 17, 2013, I had
ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers committed to participating in the study.
Before leaving for Kabul, Afghanistan, I sent my list of potential participants to
my contact in Kabul, Mr. Anayattulla Niazi at WADAN (local Afghan NGO). Mr. Niazi
contacted my prospects and scheduled interview dates, times, and locations for all ten
participants of the study. According to Creswell (2007), snowball or chain sampling
technique is a form of sampling technique used frequently in qualitative research to

1

http://www.ancb.org/
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identify “people who know people” and allowing them to identify potential participants
who are “information rich” for the study (p. 127).
Focus group participants. The focus group had twenty participants. All
participants were employees of local Afghan NGOs in Kabul, Afghanistan. Most of the
participants introduced themselves as NGO or Civil Society Organization (CSO)
directors. The Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau (ANCB) sent out notices to its
members informing them of my plans to hold the focus group, and those interested in
participating were to contact Mr. Niazi at WADAN. Mr. Niazi coordinated the two-hour
focus group, which was sponsored by WADAN and took place in a conference room at
WADAN’s home office building in Kabul, Afghanistan.
A majority of the participants were men, four of the focus group participants were
females, and three of the face-to-face interview participants were females.
Face-to-Face Interviews and Focus Group Discussions
Upon receiving approval from the Nova Southeastern University Institutional
Review Board for research with human subjects in January of 2013, I made arrangements
to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan, to conduct face-to-face interviews with Afghan
humanitarian aid workers and facilitate a two-hour focus group of 20 Afghan
humanitarian aid workers. Prior to traveling to Kabul, I was corresponding with several
Afghan NGOs (humanitarian aid workers) via email in English; little did I know that
most of the Afghans I was communicating with via email did not speak English. Upon
arrival to Kabul, I discovered that the email communications in English were mostly
written by staff members. Fortunately, my host had the wisdom to anticipate most of the
problems I would encounter, so prior to my arrival, he had arranged for my interpreter, a
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vehicle, and a driver that drove me and my interpreter to all my interviews. All the
interviews took place at my participants’ offices, except for one interview with a female
participant, which took place in a meeting room at WADAN, a national Afghan NGO
with home offices in Kabul. The focus group session was arranged and hosted by
WADAN in a company conference room.
The face-to-face interviews and focus group participants were contacted and
scheduled by my contact at WADAN. He was responsible for organizing the two-hour
session, which started with tea and Afghan pastries at about 10:00 AM and a traditional
hot lunch for all participants and WADAN staff at about 1:00 PM. All interview and
focus group participants were given time to review the consent forms (see Appendix D),
and presented with a signed copy prior to commencing with the face-to-face interviews
and focus group discussions.
The primary data collection for this research study was audio recordings of
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan: nine face-to-face interviews and
a focus group of twenty participants. Please see a later section for discussion on the
research sampling. All audio recordings were done using a Marantz professional audio
recorder, which stored all data recordings on CompactFlash. The CompactFlash is a safe
and durable method of storing audio and maintaining integrity of the original recording.
The face-to-face interviews were approximately one hour to two hours long and the focus
group lasted about two hours long.
I used the open-ended questions and pre-specified questions (Appendix A) to
prompt participants for more narratives, using interviewing technique drawn from
Søderberg (2006) which allowed me, the researcher, to become participant and co-author
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during the interviews. This method of interviewing was found to be conducive to the
theoretical framework of this study, the social constructionism theory, which is based on
co-construction of narratives, between the participants and the researcher who together
create knowledge (Etherington, 2009).
Transcription
All transcriptions were done by Synergy Transcription Services, Ltd., 1761 West
Edger Road, Linden, NY 07036. The transcription service transcribed all recorded
interviews and focus group discussions using verbatim a transcription method with sighs,
emotions, or force of speech included in the transcripts (Riessman, 2005). Participants’
initials were used to denote the interview narrators, and MS (Male Speaker) and FS
(Female Speaker) to denote focus group narrators so as to maintain anonymity and
confidentiality of the narrators. This method used to denote my research participants is
consistent with my Nova Southeastern University Institutional Research Board approval
(January 2013). All audio recordings are stored in a securely locked cabinet in my home
office. Transcripts are also stored in my home office and in my personal, password
protected computer.
Data Analysis
I used Braun and Clarke’s (2006, 2013) thematic analysis to analyze the storied
narrative from my face-to-face interviews and my focus group discussions. I paid
particular attention to my participants’ spoken and unspoken communication, to my
interpretation of the narrative being told, and the reader’s reconstruction (Riessman,
2008). This method thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013) allows for
flexibility, clarity, and detail, with specific stages and guidelines for conducting rigorous
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qualitative analysis. In addition to being a widely accessible and acceptable tool for data
analysis, it also aligned properly with the guiding theoretical perspectives of this study:
the narrative theoretical framework advanced by Riessman (2008) and social
constructionism (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
In this study, thematic analysis provided six phases for investigating and
analyzing the patterns and themes that emerged from the storied narratives and focus
group discussions of my participants. My literature review section highlighted themes
from the experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers, and I used thematic analysis to
compare, contrast, and understand the themes from existing literature with the themes
that emerged from the storied narratives and the focus group discussions in this study.
Using theoretical, thematic analysis, I was able to focus on exhaustive and nuanced
accounts of particular themes, some of which overlapped and diverged from the themes
noted in my literature review. Also using a social constructionist epistemology as noted
in chapter one, I investigated the sociocultural contexts and structural conditions that give
rise to the narratives and perceptions of my participants. I used Burton’s basic human
needs theory to explore the structural violence endemic in the systems that influence my
participants’ narratives. A great deal of attention was placed on the dominant themes,
which were the fundamental presuppositions, ideas, and concepts that framed, shaped,
and informed the semantic content of the data. To adequately understand my participants’
dominant narratives, the social, historical, and cultural contexts were given significant
attention (Riessman, 2008; Lightfoot & Davis, 1997).
The following are six phases of thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke (2006,
2013).
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Familiarizing with the data. Since thematic analysis is an evolving process
where ideas, descriptions, or figures of speech progressively form into themes (Riessman,
2008), the first phase of data analysis was very important. I immersed myself in the data
that I collected from my face-to-face interviews and the focus group discussions. Prior to
receiving the transcript from Synergy Transcription Services, Ltd. in New York, I
listened to the audio recordings several times, and made notes of my impressions. Upon
receiving the electronic transcripts, I made hard copies, and bound them in a three-hole
binder in two sections: face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. Each section
was read about four times to become familiar with the data, and I noted any observations
on the pages. I also used highlighters to note any comments that addressed research
objectives or research questions.
Coding/themes. In phase two, I used open coding from Riessman (2005), but
borrowed the “lean coding” method informed by Creswell (2007, p. 153) to begin the
coding process. Lean coding allowed me to structure my coding process towards the
objectives of my research, yet gave me the freedom of the open coding to seek and
recognize new emerging themes from my data. I began coding with a short list developed
from my research questions and guided by my literature review. However, I was very
careful not to become restricted by the pre-determined code structure, rather than the
open coding method, which is more fitting to narrative analysis (Riessman, 2005). I
remained open to codes that emerged from my data during data analysis, and developed
six themes from my interviews, and seven themes from the focus group discussions. Each
theme has an average of four sub-themes.

37
Review themes. In phase four, I began to review the themes by looking for
relevance and relationship with the data. I also looked to make sure that the themes
related to and enhanced the meaning of the quotations from the transcripts. I continued to
monitor the data to make sure that the themes were homogeneous and well developed.
When they contradicted, I sought to determine the reason for the contradiction; if
necessary, the contradiction was used to enhance the analysis and presented as a different
point of view, or maybe there was need for adjustment. In some instances it was
necessary to re-evaluate a theme or pattern, and possibly drop and begin the process
again. My rule of thumb was not to exclude any contradictory data; however, I made sure
that the contradiction had meaning, and not just a lone standing voice that did not add to
the meaning making. To avoid over simplification, I documented inconsistencies or any
points of diversion, and all are organized together with the narratives as themes (Zaal,
Salah, & Fine, 2007).
Name and define themes. In phase five, I named and defined the themes by
concentrating on the core tenet of each theme and paying particular attention to the
ascribed meanings from my participants. This was where, I believe, my interpretation of
the essences of my participants’ stories were crucial and needed to be faithful to their
points of view and their voices. I framed and shaped this phase to reflect on my research
questions and the voices of my participants—Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul,
Afghanistan.
Discussions and interpretations. In phase six, I completed the report with
discussions and implications found in chapter five. I used my research questions to
structure a thematic discussion that addressed the relevance and significance of my
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dominant themes to the research questions, and sometimes used quotations from
participants to give clarity and depth to the understanding and meaning.
Member Checking
I sent individual interview summaries to seven interview participants who
expressed interest in being contacted for summary reviews via email attachments for
validation and accuracy checks to make sure their thoughts were accurately represented
on the transcript. As part of my IRB Protocol, face-to-face interview participants were
given the option to complete a request for summary review form, and seven participants
completed the form with contact information. Of the seven summaries sent for review, I
received four responses from participants who expressed agreement with their
summaries, and three responded with request for amendments.
AB noted three corrections: to change number of girls now attending school from
100,000 to 1,000,000; change mind to mine; change “The organization operates in
sixteen Afghan provinces and provides bicycles for amputees, and has been active since
the 1990s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan” to “The organization operates in
sixteen Afghan provinces and provides different services for people with disability and
other vulnerable groups, and has been active since the 1990s during the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.” Lastly AB changed “Otherwise, I think there will be another disaster in
this county” to “Otherwise, I think there will be another disaster in this country.”
SP noted two corrections: to change “SP posits that during the Taliban regime,
her organization and other women’s groups were forced underground, but they continued
to work for the rights of women” to “our organization was working secretly during the
Mujahedin and Taliban regime and we were forced underground but we could
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successfully continue our fight which was for women rights, and after the fall of Taliban
regime women got access to their relative rights and freedom from which one of them is
women equality with men according to Afghanistan constitution and also positive
discrimination in Parliamentary elections, women participation in election and different
governmental section. Until 2005 women had good achievements in different area
specially in reducing violence against women but after 2005 violence increased against
women and currently also violence, insecurity and corruption is on its highest level which
causes the women activity limited.” SP also changed “The Ibrahimi benefited the
fundamentalist organizations who were working against women’s rights. Majority of the
international aid went to the war lords, and little was given to the women’s groups.
International aid, infrastructure needs were neglected” to “Azhar Ibrahimi Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General played positive role in the empowerment of
Mujahedin (fundamentalist) and in their participation in power.”
RMD noted corrections to change MSP (used two instances) to NSP—National
Solidarity Program. All stipulated changes were made to text as requested by the
participants.
Peer/Expert Review
I recruited two distinguished scholars and practitioners with very strong
backgrounds in peace building, conflict management, and social justice to review my
themes and my data analysis. Dr. Alison Milofsky is Director of Curriculum and Training
Design for International Conflict Management and Peace Building at the United States
Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, and Dr. Mark G. Brimhall-Vargas is Deputy Chief
Diversity Officer at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. I met both of
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them when I attended a United Stated Institute of Peace program on Facilitation in
Conflict Environment; both were co-instructors for the one week long workshop. I left for
Afghanistan a few months after the workshop. Upon completing my second draft, I sent
to each of them via email, the complete dissertation draft and sections of the thematic
analysis of my themes and sub-themes, plus the data analysis of all 10 face-to-face
interviews and focus group discussions. They reviewed my data for approximately three
weeks. Both were traveling outside the U.S. at the time of the review; Dr. Milofsky was
on assignment in Rwanda and Jordan. They reviewed my data separately and provided
me with excellent feedback and suggestions for improvement. There was a high degree of
agreement with both reviews on the need for more interpretations in analyzing the subthemes. Dr. Milofsky felt that the introduction chapter was “extremely engaging,” while
Dr. Brimhall felt that my description of the context of Kabul was “excellent.” Other very
valuable comments have been integrated into my analysis and several of their comments
have been incorporated into the discussions of my themes and sub-themes.
Trustworthiness, Credibility, Authenticity, Utility, and Faithfulness to Data
Using a narrative qualitative research foundation grounded in social
constructionism and basic human needs model, this study does not make any claims of
truth, but strives to echo and give voice to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul
who risk their lives daily to bring desperately needed help to vulnerable Afghan
communities. Their storied narratives are retold in this study through their personal
experiences of the war on terror. In this narrative qualitative research study, the notions
of validity and reliability were not paramount; instead, my study is measured for its
utility, authenticity, consistency, and faithfulness to the data. In order to be faithful to the
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storied narratives of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, and how they make
meaning of their lived experience, I recruited two expert reviewers with expertise and
backgrounds in international conflicts, facilitating in conflict environments, and dealing
with issues of social justice to review and evaluate the transcripts and the themes that
were generated from this study. They were asked to review the data for consistency and
for perceived bias. Both experts were in agreement with my evaluation and assessment of
the data. I also sought feedback from my participants for reviews of their summaries and
assessments. Their suggestions, recommendations, and revisions have been incorporated
into the findings of this study. According to Creswell (2009), the use of member checking
in qualitative research, is a way to ensure that my interpretations are faithful to the storied
narratives of my participants.
Throughout this study, I have maintained reflexivity and fairness in echoing the
diverse voices from my participants’ interviews and focus group discussions. I followed
specific guidelines espoused by Lincoln and Guba (2000), on the criteria for authenticity.
In addition, the use of expert reviews and member checking allowed for a report that was
true to my participants’ storied narratives.
One of my goals in this research study was to shed light on the conditions in my
participants’ environment that exposed them to risk and harm. I believe that I was able to
maintain this objective throughout this investigation by making sure that I brought
attention to the conditions and experiences that have informed and framed my
perspectives, my participants, and their context. To this end, my research design provided
an active atmosphere that was conducive for learning. I have come out of this process a
more educated person with better understanding of my participants’ experiences of the
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war on terror, and the conditions that continue to give rise to insecurities and conflicts
around the world. It is my hope that this research study is catalytic in its ability to shape
future interventions in the war on terror, as nations seek ways to destroy cells which
threaten and pose danger to their ways of life and national security.
As I have always maintained throughout this research study, the utility of this
investigation emanates not from its universally significant results, but rather simply by
giving voice to the storied narratives of my Afghan humanitarian aid participants—this
utility is enriched by their individual experiences and the existing literature about their
violent context, their history of invasions and political unrest and their role in launching
the U.S. attacks of September 11, 2001. I hope that by echoing their voices, this study
creates better understanding of the challenges and the conditions that give rise to
insecurities, which continue to expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to risks of
violent attacks.
Ethics and Reflexivity
In this section I focus on my obligation to the men and women who chose to
participate in my research study. I affirm that neither harm nor wrong was done to any
participant of this study. This study adhered to ethical standards and did not involve any
form of deception in content or to any participant of the study. Prior to recording the
interviews and focus group discussions, all participants were provided with the informed
consent indicating that their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to
withdraw from the study or decline to answer any questions (see Appendix D). All faceto-face interview participants were also given the option to review their summaries and
participate in data validation.
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Participation in this research study was voluntary. My goal was always to be
faithful to the personal narratives of my participants in my interpretations of their storied
narratives and to give voice to their personal stories. As expected of all research studies, I
am aware that my idiosyncrasies, my opinions, my personal experiences, and personal
politics have influenced the outcome of this research study. However, my hope is that
their stories will lead to better understanding of the conditions in insecure complex
political environments that expose humanitarian aid workers to high risks of danger,
harm, and violent attacks.
As Mauthner et al. (2002) purport that transparency in all aspects of research is
the best way of building and maintaining ethical responsibility and reliability in research.
They note that the researcher must decide how much of themselves, their pre-conceived
biases must be revealed, such as “issues of honesty, transparency, and overall
accountability in research” (p. 125).
For this study, I made sure that my personal values and beliefs do not impede on
my participants’ voices, but help enrich my understanding and interpretations of their
storied narratives. I was quite cognizant of how my personal values, beliefs,
acquaintances, and interests influenced this research study. Therefore, I chose to reveal
the following.
In a world where resources are becoming more scarce, the population is
increasing exponentially, the balance of power is shifting, and religiosity is becoming the
prism from which national leaders view their actions or lack thereof. We live in a very
dangerous world; the wealthy nations continue to seek more, and waste more, while the
poor nations get poorer as they fuel the needs and wants of the rich nations, whilst their
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populations suffer and die in poverty and degradation. We live in a world where nations
that attempt to express their nationhood or independence are silenced by violent
overthrow or occupation, and in a world that is festering with anger and breeding
hopelessness by destroying the voices of freedom, insurrection, insurgency and hope, and
tagging and classifying them as terrorists.
I have often argued that neither a super-power, nor one known for their
superiority over others, should ever use power or force against those considered to be
inferior in the pursuit of conflict resolution. I argue that pompous power used is influence
lost. Growing up in a small Ibo village in Nigeria, West Africa, I often sat under a big
umbrella-like tree that formed a canopy over the village chief’s home, listening as I
watched the elders of the village resolve disputes ranging from domestic to crimes
against the clan. The village chief was emphatic and intolerant of the use of force by
anyone perceived to be superior to their adversaries. He rebuked men for using force
against their wives to resolve domestic quarrels. He would say that when a strong head of
the family uses force in his home, he loses respect. A man who is truly superior and
revered by his peers does not need to use force to be heard, he simply uses his advantage
to mediate a resolution through mutual respect. By giving a little, one will gain more in
return, he preached. He would say that a man with three heads does not need to be
announced to get attention. Once he enters the room, all eyes will follow him. He
demands attention. In the same token, a strong man does not need to flex his muscles to
get respect. If he is truly strong, he would not need to flex his muscles because his
strength comes not from his arrogant display of brute force, but from his humility. Once a
man from a nearby village challenged the chief, saying, “Chief, sometimes we have no
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choice; we have to use force so that they will know that we are serious, and we mean
business!” The chief took a good look at the man who was a healthy, strong and muscular
fellow, stoutly built with an unshaken center of gravity. The chief said to him, “If you
unleash the weapons you have on a man and he survives, not only have you made a fool
of yourself, but you have helped build up that man. Now you will have to fight many men
waiting for their turns with you.”
Over the years, I have come to the realization that force can never be used to
bring peace. One who possesses overwhelming force should never employ force to
mediate peace. The chief often said that any time victory seemed guaranteed, force must
never be used. He would say, “It is better to lose gracefully than to win arrogantly.” We
must stand up for those who cannot defend themselves, not because they do not try hard
enough, but because they are not capable of defending themselves against enemies who
possess overwhelming force.
When I look at the world today, and all the conflicts around the globe, I wonder
what the wise chief would have said about the Israeli/Palestinian situation that continues
to question and prod our humanity, as well as the two Sudanese States, the Congo, the
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Syria, and now Ukraine. Are
we doing all that we can to achieve peace? Are we treating all people the same way we
want to be treated? I believe that we can no longer afford not to be our brothers’ and
sisters’ keepers.
As the world converges into a global citizenry, where national boundaries erode,
and the information superhighway connects people around the globe and feeds images of
war and destruction in unprecedented speed and proportion, the citizens of the world have
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become more aware of the imbalances in the new world order, and in turn more ready to
reject the first world order. War can no longer be the answer in the new world order.
Power and influence must not continue to be measured by a nation’s military prowess,
war machines, drones, and weapons of mass destruction. What is needed is a global
citizenry that will redefine the role of the United Nations and its abilities to mediate
between nations by utilizing comprehensive conflict analysis and resolution strategies.
The recent United Nations report on climate change (2014) suggests the likelihood of
violent conflicts over land and limited resources, as climate change might give rise to
insecure conditions “by exacerbating well-established drivers of these conflicts such as
poverty and economic shocks” (Gillis, 2014, para. 11). If we continue this trajectory, it
won’t be long before the real SHOCK AND AWE!
In consideration for the above noted factors, since objectivity is not an ideal to
strive for in narrative analysis research methodology, most significant was my ability to
occasionally check in with my participants, by verifying and validating some of my past
experiences, values, and thoughts during my face-to-face interviews and focus group
discussions (Riessman, 2005). I maintained reflexivity by being conscious of these biases
during all phases of this research study, so as not to misrepresent or misinterpret
participants’ narratives, but to enhance understanding and deep appreciation of
participants’ storied narratives. I made attempts to consult via email with my participants
for clarification and to make any changes they desired to their interview summaries.
I recognize ethical issues with regards to relationships with all public parties in
the research process—not only an obligation to the participants, but also the institution
(NSU), DCAR, and the larger constituents who may read and interpret data and findings
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from this study (Mauthner et al., 2002). The issues of transparency continue to be of great
importance to me throughout this study. I made certain that every phase of this
investigation was clearly defined and documented so it can be easily evaluated and
replicated (2002).
I am quite cognizant of the need for confidentiality, particularly with using
narrative analysis methodology, and of the intimate nature of the personal stories told
during the interviews. As a result, it is important that all collected data are securely stored
and that the identities of participants are not displayed but kept anonymous at all times.
To maintain confidentiality, participants’ identities were not disclosed on the transcripts,
or in any part of this research document. Interview participants were identified by initials,
while the focus group participants by notes as FS (Female Speaker) or MS (Male
Speaker). All ethical considerations for this study complied with the stipulations set forth
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Nova Southeastern University. Participants
were provided with approved informed consent for their perusal and authorization. Since
interviews and focus group discussions were recorded using digital audio, participants
were required to sign consent forms allowing permission to be recorded, and copies of
signed consents were presented to each participant (see Appendix D). To this effect, I
upheld ethical standards in interviewing, gathering information, and audio recording.
Creswell posits that researchers have a responsibility to make sure that their prejudices
and pre-conceived beliefs and ideologies do not impede on the voices of participants
(2007). He maintains that the researcher must challenge participants to seek deeper
revelations and understanding of their lived experiences (2007). This research study was
committed to maintaining and upholding the dignity and trust of participants and
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contributors to the research, and the integrity of the DCAR and NSU. This research study
was submitted for the Institutional Review Board of Nova Southeastern University, with
the title: War on Terror – Experiences of Aid Workers in Afghanistan; Research Protocol
No. 07111208 Exp., and received IRB approval on January 25, 2013.
During this research process, all notes and compact disc recordings were stored in
a locked filing cabinet in my home office, to which only the researcher had access. All
notes and compact disc recordings will be destroyed three months following the
completion of this research study.
According to Riessman (1993) and Lieblich, Tuval-Mishiach, and Zilber (1998),
one of the best ways for narrative validation is by the “sharing of one’s views and
conclusions and making sense in the eyes of a community of researchers and interested,
informed individuals” (Riessman, 1993, p. 173). I recruited two reviewers who reviewed
most of the dissertation with particular attention to the data analysis and the analysis of
my major themes and sub-themes (see section on Peer/Expert Review). Individual
interview summaries were sent via email to participants for their review and
amendments. Three amendments were returned and others concurred with my summary
(see Participant Data Validation). The completed study will also be made available to
students and faculty at West Virginia University at Parkersburg and other interested
parties within the humanitarian community.
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Presentation
In this chapter, I present the outcomes of 10 face-to-face interviews and a focus
group panel of 20 participants I conducted with Afghan humanitarian aid workers in
Kabul, Afghanistan. The goal of this chapter is to present a contextual analysis of the
experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan through their
voices and their storied narratives, with the hope that through the grounding of their
complex storied narratives in the different corresponding interactions that affect them,
such as interactions with the U.S. Military Forces, the International Military Forces,
NATO forces, Taliban, non-military international communities, Afghan governments,
and the Afghan communities. I used thematic analysis to explore the common themes and
the contrasts among the experiences and perceptions of my participants. With an
analytical framework informed by social constructivism and role theory, I investigated
how my participants’ storied narratives are formed by their sociopolitical contexts, with
focus on conditions, which affect their exposure to risk in complex political emergencies.
This chapter brings to focus the different sections that give meaning to the shared
process of conducting this study. I listened to understand the experiences of my
participants, and present the analysis of their storied narratives, using the themes that best
represent their experiences. In the preceding chapter, I summarize the interpretation of
this study, using the framework of Burton’s human needs theory to understand the
conditions that enable and shape the themes. I use initials of participant’s names to
denote the narrator for face-to-face interviews, and FS (Female Speaker) and MS (Male
Speaker) to denote focus group participants to protect the privacy of the participants of
this research study.
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I begin this section by exploring the context where the storied narratives of my
participants emanate. This step is borrowed from Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997)
about “framing the terrain” in portraiture research methodology:
Like all researchers working in the phenomenological framework, portraitists find
context crucial to their documentation of human experience and organizational
culture. By context, I mean the setting—physical, geographic, temporal,
historical, cultural, aesthetic—within which the action takes place. Context
becomes the framework, the reference point, the map, the ecological sphere; it is
used to place people and action in time and space and as a resource for
understanding what they say and do. The context is rich in clues for interpreting
the experience of actors in the setting… Portraitists, then, view human experience
as being framed and shaped by the setting. (p. 43)
Research Study Context
As my plane from Dubai hovered over Kabul and negotiated landing, I was
reminded of the reason for traveling over nineteen flight hours to a place I may have little
or nothing in common with except for our shared humanity. I was met at the airport by a
male voice that called out my name: Imanuel, he said, welcoming me to Afghanistan as
he took my luggage and led me out of the airport. I’m able to park close, he informed me,
I know a lot of the police people that work here, so I didn’t park where everybody is
expected to park their cars—pointing into the direction that we are heading, as he pushed
the cart that secured my luggage…he was giving me my first lesson on how to navigate
Kabul.
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Kabul is the seat of power for Afghanistan, a Central Asian country, north and
west of Pakistan, east of Iran, and with southern borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan—a nation with stories of wars, invasions, and civil unrest. It was invaded by
the Soviet Union in 1979, but forced to withdraw after ten years of war with the
Mujahedeen forces aided by the United States. After the collapse of the communist
regime in Kabul in 1992, devastating civil war erupted among the different war lords and
factions of the Mujahedeen, destroying most of Kabul and opening the path that ushered
the Taliban to power in 1996.
We drove down a newly built modern highway from the airport. This road, he
said, was built by the Americans, pointing out some of the new developments along the
drive since the arrival of the Americans, also letting me know that “they” (the
Americans) built big projects but left them no guide, no method or rule of law to navigate
the unanticipated madness that now engulfs the streets of Kabul. I saw modern-day
highways with no traffic signs or traffic lights, cars converging at different speeds from
different directions, and drivers nudge their vehicles into traffic positions with no rules of
engagement or anyone to enforce them. There is no traffic or driving rule apparent, just
instincts and guesses of other drivers’ intentions. You just have the feeling for when the
other car is going to stop…they told me… Even pedestrians have to joggle for their right
of way as drivers dare them into traffic. Check points were manned by security officers
carrying machine guns. Vehicles bounced and were thrown up and down by the depths of
the pot holes that pave the dusty streets.
The hills of this ancient city stand as testament to its rugged history and the harsh
realities of its destitute population. Impoverished communities were built on hills with no
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electricity, no water, or basic sanitation. According to aid workers, one of these hillside
communities known as Tapaye Zanabad was built by Afghan women. They were widows
of war who came as a last resort and built their mud homes on the hill with their bare
hands.
My Afghan escort brings me to a street—he grew up not far from here and
remembers seeing bodies of men, women, and children on the streets—casualties of war,
he said. He was just a little boy from the other side of town, but he knew most of the kids
on this side of town. He said Kabul was totally destroyed during the Mujahedeen war. He
said before the war between the warlords and the Mujahedeen was the Soviet invasion,
and now, the Americans with the war on terror.
Alongside the ruins of war, new structures of development bring promise to a
people whose hope will not die. The streets and markets buzzed with the hustle as people
of all ages and gender strived to make an afghani (Afghan currency). Little beggar boys
and girls beseeched me for their daily bread. Stores displayed their wares from huge
metal structures that gate and secure the homes of the wealthy and powerful, to lavish
furnishings and tailored clothing that comfort the privileged, to bread shops that bake
daily bread, broken daily at meals served on plastic tablecloths spread on floors for
families and friends to share their meals.
The men mostly wear lose traditional attire with a vest over, while the women
mostly cover their bodies and wear head scarves. This is a culture of deep loyalty, where
people trust each other and everyone knows their place. The women sit in designated
areas of restaurants and public places. Married couples sit in designated areas reserved
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for women to keep other men from gazing at their wives. Most interactions are within the
sexes—there are very little to no cross-gender interactions outside the immediate family.
Young university men and women sit-out their grievances on the pavement of the
Parliament building in hunger strike to remove a university administrator. Even with the
appearance of normalcy, Kabul remains an insecure environment marred by frequent
outbreaks of planned military strikes and attacks, which continue to take the lives of
innocent civilians and humanitarian aid workers. The following was a warning (Figure 1).
THREAT WARNING - ANSO CENTRAL - COMPLEX ATTACK (KABUL)
As of 17:45 hours it has become evident that both the APPF and IO compounds in the area
received elements of the attack, with AOG operatives still engaged in fire-fights with ANSF at
the APPF compound at this time. While the IO compound was also directly hit with at least
one grenade or RPG – and casualties are reported – at this point it remains unclear to what
extent it was involved in the attack (collaterally, as a main objective, or as a means to attack
the nearby APPF compound). ANSF has surrounded the area, and significant fighting is still
ongoing. As such, the below advisory remains in effect, and ANSO Central will continue to
monitor the situation and issue further updates as more information becomes available.
(Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2013, transmitted to me by WADAN)

Figure 1. ANSO alert, 2013.
I was reminded from time to time that Kabul was still an insecure environment.
This terrorist attack took place two compounds from where I had interviewed a
participant one day prior to the attack. The Taliban later took credit for these attacks. The
purpose of this context description was to illustrate the structural conditions that informed
and framed my participants’ storied narratives.
Interview Participants
Participant SD:
I met with SD in a colorful corporate building of WADAN—an Afghan NGO
with over fifteen office locations around Afghanistan. This was my first visit to
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WADAN’s home office, and I was quite impressed by the structure, a massive brightly
colored building with columns that fortify ornate architectural design facing a beautiful
landscape that separates the building from the high Iron Gate that secures the fenced
compound. SD was casually dressed in slacks and blouse with a veil over her hair.
Initially, she informed me of her time constraint through my interpreter, but as the
interview progressed, she seemed less in a hurry, and when the interview ended, she
stayed around in conversation with my interpreter.
SD is a young woman in her late thirties to mid-forties and has worked with
clinics in very remote areas that she said were:
“Hard to go to through the paths, and most of the time we need to supply these
clinics through Tajikistan.”
The lack of funding was one key problem that SD stressed throughout the
interview. She shared:
“I set up a kindergarten for children in Kabul on my own personal funds and I
was able to run the kindergarten for one year through my own personal expenses.
Most of the Afghan women who have children; kids, babies, they go to work so
there is no one to take care of their children. But unfortunately no one helped, no
organization assisted to fund this kindergarten and so I lost the kindergarten…”
When asked if there was any help from the U.S. and the Allied Forces, or the
international communities in Afghanistan, SD’s response was critical:
“I’ve sent proposals to some organizations, but no reply, and they do not pay any
attention to this pressing problem.”
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On what she considers the most pressing challenge facing Afghanistan, insecurity
ranked number one:
“The biggest challenge is the security, the suicide attacks. Because of this suicide
attacks this has almost paralyzed the life, especially the life of the organizations
that run projects in areas which are not secure. It is very, very hard to carry on
our activities in remote areas of the country… This was kind of intensive
education for women because we wanted the women to be educated as soon as
possible, and this school was running very well. It was the first one in that area.
The area was insecure; the Taliban presence was much more in that area. But
unfortunately it was not only the Taliban but most of the parents were also not
willing to send their girls and their sisters and daughters to the school, and for
this reason the school was stopped which I’m very, very disappointed. Until now I
still feel disappointed.”
When asked if she was hopeful that things would get better, she answered with a
prayer for peace after the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014:
“I pray to God that after 2014 Afghanistan will be peaceful and secure, and we
pray for peace and security in the country. A number of people would want them
to leave, but the majority of the people are not prepared and do not want the
international troops to leave the country.”
Her message to U.S. President Obama is to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but
most importantly, to provide economic support to Afghans, especially to the women. She
calls for the unity of all Afghans, and to be considerate of the Afghan people. She wants
the opposition to:
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“Stop violence and stop fighting and killing innocent people… You know most of
the Afghan people are not afraid of terrorists because the people are innocent,
they are a proud people, they are brave, and so they have no fear of terror.”
Participant AB:
I met AB, a 49-year-old medical doctor by training, in his office. He was quite
hospitable and provided me and my interpreter with tea and refreshments. He was well
dressed in Western attire: dress slacks and a long sleeve shirt. AB spoke English well—
he said that he was educated in Pakistan and worked several years in Pakistan while in
exile from Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation.
“For me being a doctor, I used to work in a busy trauma hospital in Pakistan, and
every day many trauma cases were brought from Afghanistan to the hospital in
Pakistan… many who lost their limbs and wondered if they will be able to move
or walk again.”
His organization rehabilitates individuals who lost their limbs, polio victims, and cerebral
palsy patients, and he shared:
“We treat them with physical rehabilitation education, mine awareness, AIDS
awareness, and drug awareness…”
The organization operates in sixteen Afghan provinces and provides different
services for people with disability and other vulnerable groups, and has been active since
the 1990s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. AB spoke proudly of the role his
organization played in persuading the Afghan government to sign the Ottawa Treaty in
2003 to ban landmines. He said the first U.S. bomb was dropped on Afghanistan on
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October 7, 2001, and the U.S. forces came to Afghanistan in 2002. He claimed that the
war on terror brought many developments to Afghanistan:
“Our activities and opportunities increased and there was a difference in the
funding after 9/11. During 2001, all the other organizations were in terrible
situation like in 1999 and 2000 and most of the aid workers were facing financial
challenges. After 2002, many actors entered into Afghanistan, new actors and old
actors, so to some extents, the funding situation became very good. In terms of
reconstruction of the country, many things had happened.”
AB told the story that he told to a group during a visit to the United States:
“We trained some disabled people in Jalalabad. The only paved road we had was
three kilometers that they could run by bicycle. When I told the story in United
States, the people did not believe it and said this is the 21st century and you have
only three kilometers paved road? And I said, yeah. There was paved road, but it
was potholes from Jalalabad to Torkham. It was paved road by name only. Potholes by dropping bomb or blowing mines and things like that. The only paved
roads that the boys could practice were three kilometers. But nowadays, these are
the positive changes - we have thousands, hundreds kilometers paved roads
now.”
Asked if there has been any downside to the development since the war on terror,
AB said the suicide attacks increased a lot:
“The terror increased day by day, the road side mines increased, there is a
special word that the aid community uses BBIVED something like that those who
want to explode themselves.”
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AB expressed his frustration with having to wait hours, sometimes two or three
hours, for military convoys to pass; he said that often meant missing important
appointments. Referring to how military incursions into Afghan communities affect
perception of aid workers in Afghan communities, AB stated,
“We are very close with the communities, we are working with the communities,
and so the people that their houses are searched during nights, they’re not happy
about that.”
AB recounted a personal experience with war:
“I lost almost sixteen of my relatives and even my brother who was a PhD holder
from Oxford University of England and he got killed before 9/11; during the war
with the Russians. You know he was an asset, not only for our family but for the
whole country. PhD holder from Oxford University in Afghan, that's really an
asset, but he was assassinated because of this political… bullshits.”
He argued the evils of war, and purported the human cost of wars to Afghan families:
“I have very bad memories of war, it’s not only me, every family has lost two or
three persons from their family. Especially those very important people that were
breadwinner for the families - they lost them; so war is something that should be
avoided and should be stopped.”
Asked what led him into humanitarian work, AB told the story of when he was on
exile in Pakistan:
“I used to work in a hospital, very busy trauma hospital located in Pakistan, and
every day there were many cases of trauma brought to the hospital. I was in exile
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during the Russian invasion. The family members used to just cry when they see
their sons and brothers. One day they had eyes and the other day they lost it. One
day they had limbs, but the other day they lost it. And they have arm and lost it.
It’s really a difficult situation and when their relatives came to the hospital, they
cried and were worried of what happened to him and how will his future be. And
this was kind of igniting me that something should be done for these people. I
talked to our director of the hospital at that time that there should be an
orthopedic workshop for us to make artificial limbs and it was approved, I thank
my director. And we had a very good orthopedic workshop there for making
artificial limbs. Realizing that only limbs cannot solve all the problems and the
fact that they sacrificed their limbs for their country and for their religion, so I
thought why not bicycles? I remember when I was a kid and I got a bicycle, it felt
as if I had the whole world with me. So finally I was satisfied that bicycle is the
perfect thing. So just like you are doing your research, I brought my bicycle from
home to the hospital and I was encouraging two of my patients. At first I made the
bicycle stationary - so no legs; don’t need it, you don’t need legs, just come on the
cycle and use the handle to turn the wheel around, and maintain your balance,
and by the third week, they were able to keep their balance and run the cycle
themselves. And then I presented this case to other orthopedic doctors and they
liked the idea very much. Some friends from the United States used to come to
Peshawar to help us and I shared the idea with them. They said, doctor, go ahead
with this, this is the perfect idea and they encourage me a lot. And then I shared
this with the Afghan aid communities and they said, go ahead with it. So the first
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time we got funding was from Afghan Refugees Fund based in London and we got
$40,000 from them to start in Jalalabad.”
Asked how this project has progressed, the doctor noted that:
“For the last 2 years, there has been no bicycle program because of funding. We
could not raise fund to run the program - sometimes donors only want to fund
their own initiatives…not that crazy Afghan idea, you know… I shared those ideas
in Jalalabad; I presented a case and the impact of the program. There were
ministers and people from foreign affairs, almost 160 countries present in
Jalalabad. I don’t know why we never got funding, because we graduated
thousands of people from this program - more than 5,000 people. They are freely
mobile now and they can work, they can have a job, they can complete their
schools and so I’m satisfied. I’m quite happy for them.”
On his experiences with the U.S. Military and the allied forces in Afghanistan,
AB conveys his disagreement with the formation of the PRTs. He argued that the Afghan
aid community has trusting relationship with the Afghan people:
“We are in this country, we expect that the military forces will leave one day, and
then there will be a very bad image on the aid communities that we were with
those people who were bombing the villages. That was our fear and we opposed
it, we raised our voices when they started activities of the PRTs and I think
they’re folding it now or they have stopped it in many provinces. I heard some
news, which I liked; good news that there will be no PRTs anymore in the
provinces, which is a very good idea.”
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According to AB, the argument from the foreign military and international
community was unacceptable. He said,
“We are building a bridge for you - and it means they will go to that village and
do their work or their development or whatever… the aid communities were not
happy, it was a matter of neutrality.”
He went on to assert that:
“In Afghanistan, people, ordinary people, I’m talking, not the politicians, the
people are not in favour of the military people - not only the Americans, Russians
were here in this country and before the Russians, the British were here. They
invaded. The general image of these super powers is not so good in the minds of
the people here in this country.”
On his feelings about the U.S. plan to drawdown military forces in 2014, AB
asserted that he is not worried by the U.S. plan to withdraw forces due to Afghanistan’s
past experiences with the transfer of power:
“I don’t have any fear because we have already past two such transfers of power
and things like that; in 1992, we had Mujahidin come into power and in 1996,
Taliban came. In 2001, this new government, so 2014, it’s not, I think a big
issue.”
One area of concern according to AB is with Afghanistan’s neighbors and noted that:
“One thing that the people are afraid of is our neighbors, Afghanistan neighbors
will definitely show themselves strong, and bring their puppets again in power.
That’s one thing people are expecting to happen.”
When asked which Afghan neighbors he was referring to, his response was direct:
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“Pakistan and Iran, they will increase their support to the groups in terms of
money, in terms of weapon, in terms of everything.”
Asked if this would be a potential problem for Afghanistan—again, quite
emphatically, he asserted:
“Of course, problems! Even right now, even though we are one year before 2014,
there is a tremendous downfall in funding - funding has diminished … decreased!
In most of our projects right now, we have problems. The only hope is for funding
to be kept in the same level like it was two or three years ago. The joblessness and
unequal distribution of the revenues, these were the main things that caused past
skirmishes and fighting. If I have a job and I can feed my children, I will not be
going to join any group. Who would want to go at night and blow themselves up
in roadside bombing? If they have a decent life, I think nobody will choose to do
that. Besides, there is also some very strict training by some elements in our
neighborhood; they’re explaining that this is like a holy war. If they kill
themselves, they will be going to Janna. So those kinds of propagandas,
joblessness and all these things together will create problems.”
AB’s advice to the United States of America is to channel the money that will be
spent to drawdown the U.S. Military forces from Afghanistan into assisting local civilian
projects in Afghanistan. He argued that:
“They are using a lot of money on the military drawdown. If they use it in civil
affairs, there will be no fighting. I can guarantee this myself. Just, let us say, just
10% of the cost that they were using on militaries. If they use it on the civil, there
will be no fighting.”
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On his message to President Barack Obama, AB said,
“I just would like to thank him for his decision to withdraw the troops. That’s his
good step, also not to cut off funding for Afghanistan. Otherwise, I think there will
be another disaster in this country. That’s what we are expecting. In 1994 and
’95, Kabul was destroyed. Why? Because the American government made a very
big mistake. When Mujahidin came to Afghanistan, the Americans thought, Oh!
We defeated the Russians so time to leave; however, Afghanistan still needed their
support, but they left. I know money was coming from Saudi and the Gulf states
and so that was a big mistake they did at that time. That is why Afghanistan
turned to those kinds of things like a place to train terrorists.”
Asked if he thought that the mistakes of the 1990s could be repeated, he asserted that:
“They’re already doing the same. They’re already committing it like when they,
you see, cut off the funding. Like, we are a small organization. I was in a meeting
two weeks ago and about 3,560 de-miners are on standby positions. That is a
clear indication of what could happen to those young de-miners when they cannot
support their families. So definitely, there will be some groups out there waiting
to recruit them in exchange for some bread for their children.”
His message to the American people is to help the people of Afghanistan develop
their own economy and help them build their infrastructure:
“Not in terms of military force, we want their financial support, their technical
supports, and to support the military of our country. If our national police and the
military are supported, it will be much cheaper and it will be much easier, for the
whole world.”
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AB’s message to Afghan’s people is to:
“Stay calm so we do not lose all that was achieved. Like 1,000,000 girls who are
now going to schools and more boys are going to schools and colleges. Now we
have paved roads, keep it intact. Now we have schools. Do not ruin them. Keep it
intact and maybe your future generation, a knowledgeable generation, not like the
generation of our age. I grew up in this situation; I was 17 when the Russians
invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is war.”
On the source of terrorism, AB believes that America knows the true source of
terrorism. He argued that:
“The main thing is to work close with those countries that have the seeds of
terror. If they work with them, I think this problem will be solved. If they make it
inactive, not to grow, once something is grown then the control is difficult. But if
something is inactivated in the seed form of it, then I think there will be no
problem. We will have all peaceful villages and this is the necessity of the time.”
When asked which countries he considers to have the seeds of terror, he hesitated,
as if unsure if it was alright to say it, then reluctantly, he sighed:
“Everybody knows that the cow is black, but the milk is white…where Osama bin
Laden got killed.”
After our interview ended, and I thanked him for the opportunity to talk with him,
our conversation continued. He talked about the Durand Line as a factor in Afghan
relationship with its neighbors:

65
“To me, that’s the basic reason why our neighbors are not good with us. More
than 100 years ago, this Durand Line, some people called it Imaginary Durand
Line. However, some Afghan scholars did not find any written documents about
this Durand Line and even it was not signed by the Amir Abdur Rahman who was
the king of Afghanistan that time. They did not find in any museum, in any caliphs.
Since there is no written document or proof, no Afghan government has accepted
this. This is the main reason why the neighbors are trying to make Afghanistan as
weak as they can. Another issue is India. President Karzai was recently asked by
a reporter why India was allowed to have a consulate in Afghanistan. My main
point is that they should not make Afghanistan the base of war for their issues. If
they have problems with India, there are many channels to deal with their
problems. Diplomatic channels or military channels, whichever option they
choose, just keep their conflict away from Afghanistan.”
Participant SP:
SP was the first participant I interviewed; we met in her heavily fortified homeoffice. After many failed attempts to operate my Marantz professional recorder, I had to
make a decision to proceed with my first interview without a recorder and rely on only
hand written notes for the interview.
SP is an interesting woman known for her strong political viewpoints. She has a
reputation for being quite outspoken and unwavering on her points of view. We sat in her
living room with my interpreter. She welcomed me to her office and to Afghanistan,
saying,
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“The war is very harsh; it’s been unfair to the people of this country. For the past
thirty-five to forty years, wars in Afghanistan have been imposed on the people of
this country. Our geography has made it easy for wars. Afghanistan has been a
victim of wars between super powers. Our people’s backwardness has been due to
the super powers not wanting this country to prosper. Rival groups have
disrupted developments.”
She said that since 1965, she has been fighting for the rights of women—for
democratic organizations to fight for the rights of Afghan women:
“Our efforts have allowed Afghan women to become members of Parliament –
opposed by fundamentalists who have fought against equal rights for women. Due
to our efforts, Parliament was forced to withdraw from past positions and allow
women equal rights – equal protection under the law, and freedom of speech.”
SP posited that during the Taliban regime, her organization and other women’s
groups were forced underground, but they continued to work for the rights of women.
“Our organization was working secretly during the Mujahedin and Taliban
regime and we were forced underground but we could successfully continued to
our fight for women’s rights. After the fall of Taliban regime, women got access to
their relative rights and freedom for equality with men; according to Afghanistan
constitution, and the rights of women to vote, participate in Parliamentary
elections, and seek employment in different governmental sectors.
Until 2005, women had good achievements in different area; especially in
reducing violence against women, but after 2005 violence increased against
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women and currently, violence, insecurity and corruption are on their highest
level, which has affected activities.
“The Taliban brought us catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the
world; cruelty, violence, barbarism, rape, group rape, kidnappings, cutting
women’s breasts, and openly forcing women naked and killing their husbands in
front of them. Total dehumanization of women and the women are forced to marry
them.”
Asked how the war on terror affected her ability to continue to work for women’s
rights, SP noted that:
“After 2002, opportunities for Afghan women to seek more rights; go to school,
and get an education increased. Hope was created among women and all Afghans
– liberation from the fundamentalists. We had new constitution, and good things
started to happen, until 2005 when everything started to change. The U.S. and
their allies changed their support for the fundamentalists. Azhar Ebrahimi,
Special Representative of the UN Secretary Genera, played positive role in
empowerment of Mujahedin (fundamentalist.) and in their participation in power
and benefited the fundamentalist organizations who were working against
women’s rights. Majority of the international aid went to the war lords, and little
was given to the women’s groups. International aid, infrastructure needs were
neglected.”
When asked if she was hopeful, she responded by asserting that Afghanistan
needs development, not war. She argued that:
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“If people have no opportunities for their future, they turn to terror. From the
beginning I called for more humanitarian aid. The source of terror was never in
Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, but since Pakistan is an ally of the U.S.”
Her hope is that the borders are protected against terrorism after the U.S. drawdown in
2014.
On Afghan readiness for U.S. drawdown in 2014, SP asserted that Afghanistan
can make the changes needed by:
“Dismantling human rights violators and bring fundamental change to
government.”
She posited that the country has made several achievements since the U.S. invasion:
“For three years, law on violence against women.”
SP is hopeful that the drawdown could become a positive outcome for Afghanistan, if the
U.S. and the international communities will:
“Repair economic lives, enforce laws, and eliminate war lords; this will give hope
to the people – they must support the civilians – the Afghan people. Yes there is
hope…”
Asked what she perceived to be the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, she
responded that:
“The biggest challenge is to completely leave us alone; we cannot establish peace
militarily.”
Her message to President Obama is that the
“Amount of money being spent on removing U.S. troops, if spent on social
services, security, and civil society could make the most to weaken and dismantle
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the sources of terror, abuse of human rights and women’s rights and freedom,
and not allow Afghanistan to become centre of terrorism again.”
SP’s message to the American people:
“Help Afghan people, especially Afghan women, but ask for accountability from
Afghan government and any group receiving assistance. Afghan people are very
grateful for the generous support – please don’t stop now…”
Her message to the people of Afghanistan was motherly and direct:
“Be vigilant; don’t be abused or deceived by fundamentalists and criminals
against democracy who operate under the name of religion. The enemy of
Afghanistan is Pakistan. Respect the women of Afghanistan, who are your
mothers, sisters and daughters – they want to work shoulder to shoulder for the
prosperity of Afghanistan.
She ended the interview with the words: “Just Peace!”
Participant AG:
When AG first came to Kabul in 1992, he had just been promoted to Company
Representative in the Kabul branch office; however, sixteen days after his arrival to
Kabul, he said that war started in Kabul City. This unforeseen situation forced him to
change focus, and he started distributing food and providing shelter to people displaced
by the war. Many Afghans had to be moved to shelters in mosques around Kabul:
“We distributed food to both sides; food to opposition and to government people.
This was the civil war; argument between people and different organization. We
completely lost our buildings…Kabul city was completely destroyed”
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AG went on to assert that the civil war cleared the way for the Taliban to come to power,
but in a rather peculiar way, he seemed to be arguing with himself that the Taliban were
not terrorist, and went as far to say that their regime was very good:
“We did not say that the Taliban are not good people or terrorists, we do not say
this. The Taliban also was very good, they performed their regime and the time of
their government was very good. We didn’t say that these people are terrorists or
something else.”
AG decided to define terrorist activities:
“Terrorist activities are activities that want to weaken or try to destroy the
government of Afghanistan; the political system, the government system and other
economic or social sectors of the country. They try to destroy and weaken the
people’s spirit. This is called a terrorist activity. Terrorists took over Kabul and
different big cities of Afghanistan and they spread fear among Afghans and this
had a negative effect on our Afghan government and made Afghan government
weak.”
AG asserted that a lot has been achieved since the U.S. and the international
forces came to Afghanistan; however, he cautioned that a lot still needs to be done—he
was one of the representatives that went to Japan to participate in the Afghan
Reconstruction Program. This was an appeal to the international community; he shared:
“Donors pledged 41.5 billion dollars in funds for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks from different negative organizations tried to
weaken the implementation of many programs, but we see positive evidence in
different schools and rehabilitation sectors. A different change came to
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Afghanistan, but we can’t say that’s enough because Afghanistan was completely
destroyed and this kind of fund is much less for it.”
Asked what he considers the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, his response
was swift:
“The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is the security problem, there is no peace
and the people are not safe.”
AG argued that terrorism is not in the culture of Afghan people:
“International sources bring their terrorists to participate and start activity in
Afghanistan, this is not the culture of our people, and Afghan people were never
terrorists. International terrorists come to Afghanistan and set-up offices and
organizations. The terrorists and Taliban attacked many people who lived in
cities and many people who spent their lives in rural areas and villages, they are
uneducated, and so when the Taliban got in government, they took advantage of
those people who were uneducated.”
He asserted that:
“Afghan people are honest Muslim people and kind people; terrorists take
advantage of their kindness and they start different terrorism activities such as the
one that destroyed the World Trade Center in America. These activities are
international terrorism activities, not Afghan local terrorist activity.”
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However, AG insisted that the Taliban is not a terrorist organization, emphatically
noting:
“I’ll repeat again, Taliban are not terrorists, they are a good organization, good
people and they are just opposite of the system, and we want peace in Afghanistan
and also want Taliban to participate in the system. We hope that the Afghan
government and the U.S. government will support and cooperate with them and
try to bring peace - the Taliban should be allowed to participate in Afghan
government and political system.”
AG is hopeful that after the U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, international
communities should assist Afghanistan to rebuild and maintain a stable and peaceful
nation:
“International community should support Afghanistan and its different sectors,
and they should not leave Afghanistan alone so that the situation in 2001 is not
repeated. We hope they will support us and the NGO sector will be able to assist
those people where the government is not able to reach, mainly in rural and
different border areas, and villages.”
AG expressed concern over problems with bordering countries; he asserted that:
“Afghanistan still has problems in the security sector with neighboring countries.
It’s impossible that Afghanistan will be stabilized after 2014 when the troops will
quit. We need security and a peaceful environment in Afghanistan. The
international community should support and train Afghan security and military so
they are able to enforce the laws in the country and control Afghan borders.”

73
AG wants President Obama to give the same attention to Afghanistan as he does
the U.S. He argues that if the proper attention is not given to assist Afghanistan in
maintaining internal security, securing its borders, and rebuilding its infrastructure, it is
likely to fall back to a haven for breeding terror as the world witnessed in 2001. He
asserted that:
“Afghanistan will go back like before, the terrorists will come back – different
international terrorist organizations will move into Afghanistan like before. If
Afghanistan is allowed to become the center of international terror, it would
mean the international terrorism beat America.”
To the American people, AG expressed his gratitude:
“As an Afghan citizen, I am much thankful for American nation, because the
American people pay their own tax to the government and the government uses it
to fund programs in Afghanistan. So we are much thankful to the American people
and our wish from you is don’t leave Afghanistan alone.”
To the Afghan people, he challenged his fellow country men and women to put
their country first:
“Think about your own country, positive not negative, and try to take part in the
development of the country and help bring it to that level of other developed
countries. Let’s stop the fighting and give attention to the education sector and
help educate our people. Afghanistan is the center of Asia…”
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Participant RS:
I met RS in her office suite where she was working with some young Afghan
women. They were very hospitable, providing me and my interpreter with Afghan
pastries and green tea. As we arrived, one of the ladies ushered us into a sitting room
where the interview was conducted. After the interview we were given a tour of the
facility and introduced to the women. On the hallway wall hung two large, rectangular
blue framed prints in Arabic: STOP THE VIOLENCE and a second: EQUAL RIGHTS IN
AFGHAN CONSTITUTION.
RS is the founder of an organization that focuses on providing training and
advocacy for human rights for Afghan women. Her organization was started in the 1990s
during a time she described as,
“A time that no woman, even men were free, and they were not allowed to breathe
open air. At that time, the doors of all institutions were closed and no one had the
opportunity to work, go to school, or to find a job to take care of their families. So
being college educated and enlightened, I had to think of another alternative, how
to serve the people…So that was what motivated me to establish this
organization.”
She argued that the love for her country and dedication to the people of
Afghanistan kept her in Afghanistan during the Mujahidin and Taliban rules:
“Despite all the atrocities, hardships, and suffocations, because of the love for
my country and for my people, I did not migrate to another country.”
Asked what sustained them during those years, RS replied,
“Love; the love I have for my people, for my homeland, for my country.”
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RS asserted that during these periods women remained active; few women were
elected to the Parliament, including RS, and she insists that the presence of women in
Parliament brought healthy competition to the Parliamentary process. She claimed that:
“Because women did not want to show that they are less active, incapable than
men. So this was a kind of positive competitive environment.”
She posited that:
“The members of the parliament at that time were very much integrated with the
communities, with the people, with the society and they were involved with the
people. For example when they were going from home to office, they were using
the public transport. Except the chairman of the parliament and his deputy who
had cars … the rest of the members of the parliaments were behaving like
ordinary people; like porters and shopkeepers - No special privileges and benefits
like they enjoy today.
She argued that it would not be correct to assume that all the changes in women’s rights
have occurred in the last ten to twelve years:
“Even before that, there were educated women who were involved in all types of
social activities and they were very brave women.”
RS posited that over thirty years ago when she was a student at Kabul University, her
professors were from West Germany, and they were very good professors. She argued
that if the atmosphere in Afghanistan had been conducive to change, the condition of the
people would have been different. She noted:
“I think the country, myself and all the people in the county will have developed
much, much better in a natural manner, but as I said, unfortunately, this curtain
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of terror spread all over the country and basically affected all people including
women. At that time, according to constitution, both man and woman can equally
participate in all electoral, political and all other types of activities.”
Asked what kind of hope she had for the future, she noted that a lot of work had
been done in Afghanistan in almost all sectors within the last twelve years. She referred
to this interview as a sign of progress:
“Your presence here and now sitting together with us in the interview, this is a
good manifestation and a big achievement. During the Taliban, for example, you
cannot come and sit with a woman like this and talk to a woman like this. Even
radio, we couldn't switch on radio to listen to news at that time. You will be
arrested and no one knows what fate you will have to confront.”
Remembering how things were in Kabul before the arrival of NATO troops, RS
asserted that:
“NATO forces in this country, I can say it’s a blessing. We had witnessed those
times of war and hardships, almost in every street of this city, there was
conventional war between rival groups and fortunately most of the people were so
happy with the arrival of the NATO troops.”
However, she noted that the people’s expectations were high as they expected the U.S.
and NATO troops to fix many of their problems:
“We expected a lot more and much better from the troops and from the inflow of
so many resources into the country, but unfortunately, it didn’t happen as people
had expected.
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Asked about her feelings of Afghan readiness for the U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014,
she replied by acknowledging that Afghanistan has seen many regime changes, and
argued:
“Unfortunately, this is a vital fact that during most of the changes of these
regimes, all the people mainly the women have suffered more as a result of the
change of regime.”
She asserted that terrorism is:
“Imposed or brought from outside the country.”
And she argued that Afghans are like nationals of other countries. She maintained that:
“They enjoy the same kind of mentality and will power and decisions like other
human beings do and they are good people. They’re all educated people, they are
determined people. Our people and our youth can defend our country and women
can also assist in the establishment of peace in this country. First, this is an
imposed war by foreigners, by foreign countries especially as I mentioned before,
Pakistan and other countries that would impose this war in our country and we
have good sources, we have good manpower, we have very good talents to utilize
the resources, but unfortunately, these people do not allow our people to live in
peace. This country has the ability if the foreign countries allow us to help in the
reconstruction of our country and restoration in peace and stability of our
country, otherwise these people have the ability and they have the tolerance to
help themselves. Although it is a small and poor country, we have strategic plans;
this small country is well recognized and has signed a lot of strategic contracts
with different countries who will help according to those agreements. So, there is
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no ground to worry much if foreign intervention is seized and the U.S. and
international communities countries help us to stop the intervention of foreign
countries.
On what she felt was the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, she stated that the
election was number one:
“The first dire challenge of this country is the forthcoming elections. I can say
that it will be one of the major challenges to the future of this country about which
we can worry and so there will be consequences which we cannot think about.
Another challenge is that those people who nominate themselves for presidential
elections and also provincial elections, should be tolerant and respectful of their
opponents; the losers should accept and cooperate wholeheartedly with the
winners. If this does not happen and the losers do not help for the benefit and the
interest of the entire nation, then this would be another conflict.”
A third challenge she saw regards the Afghan strategic plan, which she claimed
was signed by Afghan government and other countries around the world:
“We hope that this will not remain on paper. We hope this agreement will be
materialized. If this does not happen, then this will also be a challenge.”
RS’s message to President Obama is for the president to use his office and his
leadership in the world to influence nations that are working against the progress and
development of Afghanistan. She asserted that:
“President Obama is a leader of a strong country, and a leader of coalition of
nations that should help stop intervention of those countries who oppose the
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people of Afghanistan and who have imposed this war and instability on the
people of Afghanistan and stop their aggression and oppression – they should
look for the terrorists and those troops in other places especially in
neighborhoods of Afghanistan. Pakistan is a very aggressive country; intervenes
in affairs of Afghanistan, but most people now realize that Pakistan’s intervention
is aggressive to this country and most of the people… local people and also
people around the world now realize that this is the truth. This is a fact, not only
Pakistan, but other countries that also finance terrorist organization
organizations. We hope that President Obama will put pressure on them to stop
supporting the terrorists.”
Her message to the people of the United States was consoling with empathy and
appreciation for sacrifices made on behalf of Afghanistan:
“First of all, my condolences and my sympathy with the bereaved families who
have sent their sons and daughters here to serve and help in the security of this
country and those who have lost their sons and daughters in the war on terror,
our dear sympathy to them. And secondly, that we can say that those who sent
their sons and daughters as a result of very good will, pure will for a very pure
purpose and objectives, which is to help the innocent people, the defenseless
people of this country, this is very appreciated.
RS’s message to Afghan men and women is unyielding and speaks to the core
values of her people:
“We ourselves should build our country and make decisions for ourselves; other
people cannot build our country. The British people came here and we saw what
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they did. They did not build our country. They came here and they left. Russians
came with so much heavy power but then they left. Now we see that the troops of
around 34 countries and also the civilians of 34 countries are here and they want
to help, but we can see that with all these heavy military equipment, they still
cannot annihilate terrorism. I call on my people at this point; our country of
Afghanistan is once again engaged in a historic test. And the people of the world
are looking at us wondering what we are doing. We hope that our people will
leave behind all the differences, sociopolitical and cultural, and become united to
help each other to restore peace, stability, and development... I think we have the
ability.
At the end of the interview, I thanked her for the opportunity, and she graciously
accepted and jokingly apologized, saying that she was sorry if she talked too much,
“Because I am not diplomatic,” she joked.
Participant AA:
I met AA in his office with two of his male colleagues. All three spoke English
and did not need an interpreter. AA asked if his colleagues could participate in the
interview, which I agreed to. He is a middle aged man in his mid-to-late fifties and his
colleagues were younger men in their mid-to-late thirties. They run an Afghan NGO that
was established in the mid-1990s during the Soviet invasion. AA said the organization
focuses on:
“Education and capacity building for vocational skill training for women and
youth development, community development, rehabilitation, and humanitarian
assistance, peace building and conflict resolution.”
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AA asserts that during the Soviet war and the Afghan civil war, which lasted over two
decades,
“The government was not able to assist people, therefore, we established to work
with reliable people especially in the field of education, so the main objective was
to help our poor people in Afghanistan.”
He further posited that his organization has developed good working relationship with
donors,
“We have a good reputation among the donors, and we have projects and work in
all Afghanistan, so it’s a good value for us that I think we have a good
reputation.”
On the changes that have taken place since the arrival of the U.S. and Allied
forces, AA argued that the times were different:
“During the times of Taliban and Mujahidin we didn’t have a stable government
and there was a lot of fighting, a lot of discrimination, and everything was
suspicious, and our infrastructure was destroyed. So if you compare then with this
time, a big change has come to Afghanistan. We have government, everything is
okay.”
Asked to name some of the things that made a difference, the main thing he said was
support from the international community. He hopes that the international community
remains in Afghanistan and continues to support the Afghan people:
“We hope that the international community does not leave, so that they continue
to support our people, maybe we will have a good future. We need support of
international community from security side and financial side.”
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Responding to what has been some notable setbacks, AA asserted that a lot of
developments have taken place since the U.S. and international forces arrived; however,
he noted:
“If you look day by day, the security is bad. Bombarding the community with
women, children, and poor people, this has created bad effects.”
Another issue that he sees as a setback for Afghanistan is the issue of brain drain.
He posited that many Afghans leave the country for more secured environment. AA
argues that:
“Nowadays, our business people and all other people are leaving Afghanistan,
they cannot do business here. They cannot invest here, so this is very bad for the
people of Afghanistan. We should try to remove this idea from the people. For
example, we have salary for a soldier at $200, if you increase this salary to $400,
maybe our army will be more motivated. If you give them good weapons, this will
also have good effect to them.”
He shared an example of how the lack of funding is affecting Afghan NGOs:
“Actually last night I was meeting with NGO director at the Ministry of
Economics. He said after two months, more than 200 NGOs will be closed due to
no funding, because international community funding is now going directly to the
Afghan Government. But the government cannot provide help to the rural areas,
the remote area. NGOs have the capacity to work in the remote areas, and bring
assistance directly to the people, so we requested from international
humanitarian community to cease relations with Afghan government and support
the local NGO sectors.”
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Warning on consequences of not maintaining a strong Afghan economy, AA
asserted that:
“If the person is jobless, especially young people, they will go to another
direction. If they are not working in Afghanistan they will go to Pakistan and they
will join with the Taliban or terrorism. So this is a big problem. Nowadays it’s
very important for the government of Afghanistan and international community to
create jobs for the people, so they are able to support themselves and their
family.”
Asked what he considers the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan after the U.S.
drawdown in 2014, he thought for a moment and said,
“If they go out, maybe Pakistan will directly attack Afghanistan, maybe terrorism
will come back to Afghanistan and there will be no chance for Afghans to
participate and get education or other opportunities; and they will kill a lot of
people. They will destroy the buildings; destroy our businesses, and our
infrastructure. Many people are now trying to leave Afghanistan because of this
reason.”
After a moment of sigh, AA argued that the civil war is still going on, implying
that Iran and Pakistan do not have good relations with Afghanistan:
“So maybe people think that it will be dangerous for us. If the Afghan army is
equipped with modern weapons, maybe it is our job that we should defend our
country, our people.”
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Asked what message he had for President Obama, AA’s response was firm and
direct:
“You should not leave Afghanistan.”
He called for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, arguing for:
“Step by step you’ll strengthen our army and then withdraw some of your forces,
and then the Afghan defense will be strong. We should be 100% sure that Afghan
people can defend themself, and then you can finally withdraw all forces from
Afghanistan. If it’s really what America wants, the first thing is to destroy the
source of terrorism, strengthen our army and then the problem will be solved.”
AA’s plea to the American people was:
“You should help us to develop our infrastructure and to enable us to earn with
our own hands. Not to make us like a human society that when you leave, then we
will not be able to earn on our own. If you are a friend of Afghanistan, as we have
committed that you are our friend, you will help and enable us to earn our living
and build our infrastructure on our own.”
On his message to the Afghan people, AA made it very blunt and direct,
appealing to their pride as Afghans:
“This is our country. It is our responsibility to defend our country, we are
Muslims. We believe in Allah. They will create for us problem, they will solve our
problem. We believe that everything is from Allah.”
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At the end of the interview, I thanked AA and his colleagues for participating in
the study, and asked if there was anything that they would like to add; one of the
colleagues was quick to share his experience:
“I am working in the community as a project manager for different projects.
Whenever I’m talking with people in the remote areas, all of them talk about the
insecurity – that there is no security in their communities. They believe that all
these things are created by the foreign people, by Americans, by British, and by
Pakistanis. The foreigners are supporting the terrorists in the remote areas who
are coming from the neighboring countries. All of them believe that if the foreign
people leave Afghanistan, maybe the security will be better.”
Participant ABD:
I met ABD in his office with my interpreter. He immediately began the interview
by informing me that there were two sides to the effects of the war on terror on the people
of Afghanistan. He said,
“The positive aspect and the negative aspect - the positive answer is that the
situation that prevailed during the Taliban regime, and before the Taliban
regime, has fundamentally changed because the people have found a proper, and
more suitable environment to breathe freely. For example the educational system
was completely dysfunctional at that time, but now we can see that the
educational system is running well, and Afghan boys and girls are going to
schools. Also the Afghan population, which was taken hostage by a few people,
now they have been rescued and have become free. We also witnessed that some
changes have occurred in the economic life of the Afghan population.”
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He posited that since the war on terror:
“Ethnic differences which existed during the previous regimes have been
eliminated to some extent. For example, ethnic differences between Tajiks and
Pashtuns, as well as linguistics and tribal differences have diminished. Now the
people have been sensitized. Their awareness has been raised. They know now
about the constitution, the laws of the country. For example they can now look
forward to the next five years for new elections with the possibility to vote for
someone different if the current leaders are not doing their job. During the
Islamic emerge of Taliban; they were just a handful of people who came to power
and they ruined the country. They governed the country, the entire nation, but a
lot of the citizens of Afghanistan never saw them or knew what they looked like.
He came to power and he disappeared just like others before him, they also came
by force and reigned over these people by force. But now these people have this
kind of mentality that this is a constitutional government and they have the right
to elect their leaders, and the courage to vote.”
Asked how hopeful he was about the future of Afghanistan, he answered in the
affirmative:
“I’m very much hopeful because I have witnessed the change of many of these
regimes since the time of Soviet Union. I was a student when the Soviet troops
occupied this country. After the Soviet withdrawal, I have also seen the conducts
and misconducts of the other regimes. I can say this confidently that I’m really
hopeful for the future because of the differences, the changes that have happened
compared to previous regimes.”

87
Asked what he felt were the big challenges facing Afghanistan, he spoke of the
fact that there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities committed during the Taliban
and Mujahidin regimes. He argued that the oppressors from the past regimes are now in
power:
“The people who have created negative image among the general public, among
the population of the country, they came to power after 2001. The public
mentality was that those people who were the oppressors, who have committed all
sorts of crimes and done all sorts of cruelty to the people, will confront justice,
but unfortunately that didn’t happen. They are the owners of the government.
They are the powerful. Now the people’s only hope is that maybe these criminals
will die by natural death or they get too old and unable to stay in government.”
ABD decried the ways in which the war lords and the people in power prior to
2001 used and manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits. He asserted
that:
“Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the poor people
and needy people, was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords and
powerful people”
He argued that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan government and the
contractors:
“It’s because of all the contracts and all the things they took, and distributed all
the funds and resources amongst themselves. If the general public are certain or
assured that those people who betrayed their trust are not allowed to continue to
benefit from government and international contracts, I can certainly say that the
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situation will improve very well. The people hoped that the international
community will help us to stand on our own feet. But unfortunately, what the
people were expecting from the international community didn’t happen. So these
people lost hope.”
Asked how he thought hope could be restored to the Afghan people, he said:
“Well, the rule of law is very clear in Afghanistan. Afghanistan as you know is a
traditional and religious society, but traditional cannot suffice for the solution of
all problems and neither can religion can address all the issues. So, how can we
integrate both tradition and religion to the rule of law? For this purpose, we have
promulgated a number of very good laws for the benefit and interest of the whole
nation, the entire population of the country. Unfortunately, these laws for the
welfare and well-being of the Afghan society cannot be implemented because the
power still exists in the hands of those people who have already broken the law,
who have been criminals; the warlords who continue to oppress the Afghan
people. If the U.S. government and the international communities, through their
influence, can oblige the Afghan government to bring these people to justice, then
we can say this can be implemented and it would give hope to the people.”
On his feelings regarding Afghan readiness for the U.S. drawdown of forces from
Afghanistan in 2014, ABD insisted that the international community cannot afford to
make the same mistake that was made before 9/11/2001:
“In my personal opinion, the international community cannot repeat the mistake
of former Soviet Union, who abandoned the country. Then surely Afghanistan will
take the same path as they took before 2001. Key point that I would like to convey
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is that this is not an Afghan war; it is not a war by Afghans. Also, it is not a
religious Islamic war. Rather, this war is a war by the neighboring countries. If
tomorrow, our neighboring countries make the decision to stop this war, then I
can assure you that the next day, there will be no war in this country, no fighting.
This is a regional issue, a regional conflict. There is a claim that if the
international troops drawdown, Afghanistan can turn back to a safe haven for AlQaeda. No, it’s not the truth, Afghan mentality cannot accept any kind of external
power, be it Russians or Al-Qaeda or Western powers. After the start of the war
on terror, Afghans took their guns, their rifles and dismantled those Al-Qaeda
troops and other hostile troops who live in their hideouts around the country, so
by their own guns, Afghans eliminated them. They despise them.”
Asked what his message was to President Obama, ABD began by noting shortcomings with the President:
“One of the problems of President Obama is that he has ignited the fight in the
region and he wants to abandon this region in flames. First, if I were in President
Obama’s place, I would have given a very clear message to all the people that we
will never leave this regime. Secondly, terrorism infiltrates from centres beyond
the borders of Afghanistan. And I would have declared to these terrorist centres
anywhere they are that we will come after them. If he would convey these two
messages to the people of Afghanistan, we can hope that the situation will
improve. Otherwise, the situation will be worse than the situation which existed in
1992. We have a proverb in Afghanistan, it says; when you lift a piece of stone, if
you find out that you are powerless, you cannot lift it, kiss it and leave it in its
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place. In the beginning, in 2001, they knew that they could not lift the stone, they
should have kissed it, should not have come to Afghanistan. But now they have
actively intervened in this situation, they have come to Afghanistan and they
should not abandon it. The whole area is engulfed in the fire particularly
Afghanistan and I think he has to put out this fire. I do not mean that the U.S.
should never leave, there cannot be perfect peace until the foreign troops leave
the boundaries of Afghanistan, but before leaving they should put off this fire.”
ABD recounted his observation on the first air strikes by American and coalition
troops; he was on the way to a village outside of Kabul. He counted
“667 army trucks of Taliban loaded with weapons and armed personnel leaving
the city of Kabul. So what happened to them? Where did they go? Later they came
to my village and I asked them where they went, because they wanted to buy some
drinking water. They said, ‘we went to Khost and from Khost, we will cross
border to Waziristan and they will not chase us in Waziristan.’ The point is that
the Taliban are not sure about the goodwill of the international community;
whether they are really here to help the people. I know people who are benefiting
from all types of services, able to go to school; they use internet and other
facilities they enjoy. But the parents or elders, they are in the war season, the
fighting season. They come and fight, you see. So the point here is that the public
perception is that the international community is actually not here for the wellbeing, for the welfare, for the peace and prosperity of our people, but here for
their own objectives.”
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Asked what he meant when he said President Obama should not abandon the
region in flame, he replied with:
“I mean the Durand Line, but I do not want to trust the Durand Line itself. I want
to trust the centres, the training centres; terrorist training centres here, this area,
that side of the border. From this area, the flames of war and fighting infiltrate to
Afghanistan, but also to some parts of Pakistan as well. So this area, they should
deal with. They should not leave this region inflamed.”
When asked who the enemies of Afghanistan are, his immediate response was:
“Intelligence. Intelligence services of neighboring countries.”
Then he said,
“I have a question for you. Where was Osama bin Laden killed? This area which
is called federal area, tribal area where these training centres exist, but this area
is not under the direct control of the federal government - these people are not
controlled by the central government of Pakistan. The people who have control of
this area also want that this area to be inflamed. The Pakistani policymakers have
repeatedly declared this fighting between the Taliban and Afghanistan Jihad; a
holy war. But the same Taliban, when they fight in Pakistan, this is a treachery.
This is not a Jihad. This is treachery. This is betrayal.
Elaborating on what he meant by “intelligence war” as the enemy of Afghanistan,
he argued that:
“If Mullah Omar, the leader of Taliban, Engineer Hekmatyar the leader of Hizbi-Isslami and Haqqani die today, do you think that the war and these flames of
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war would be extinguished and the war will end? No. Because Mullah Omar is
one person, but behind him, there is 10 Mullah Omars. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is
one person, but behind him, there are 10 of Gulbuddin Hekmatyars. Haqqani is
one person, he is quite old. They call it Haqqani Network, but he is one person,
and not able physically to do something. That’s why this war will not end. That’s
why I’m saying it is intelligence war. It’s not Afghan war.”
Asked what would be his message to the people of Afghanistan, he emphasized
the condition that has existed in Afghanistan for decades:
“Afghanistan is a war-stricken country. So the law is the only source for hope. I
want the Afghanistan people to act according to the law, to help in the
implementation of the law of the country. For example, the attack which happened
yesterday, what could the government do? The government cannot predict people.
So the people themselves, they should be tolerant and they should not lose hope
and help in the implementation of the law.”
Participant RMD:
RMD was the founder of an Afghan NGO in 1990, which was based in Pakistan,
and worked with Afghan refugees who had been displaced during the Soviet invasion and
the Afghan civil war. He shared:
“At the beginning we just voluntarily did some activity for Afghan refugees
without the support of donors. And now this organization is a great mission
organization, which is working in many other provinces of Afghanistan. Our
headquarters is here in Kabul and we have eleven offices. Our main activities are
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education, community peace building, community organization, advocacy, and
community health programs.”
Asked what the challenges are now compared to the 1990s, he argued that:
“It was difficult time, but to be honest, it was not as difficult as this moment
because during the communist regime, the Taliban, and the Mujahidin times, the
process to provide help to needy Afghans was easier than now, because now the
government bureaucracy is very difficult. Several projects are taking more time to
get missions from the government and provide help to the people. The security
situation is also not good for NGOs to work in Ghazni or Kandarhar, and other
provinces. So every other day, some of the staff of the NGOs are kidnapped by the
enemy, but by the help and support of the community, some are released. It’s not
easy to work now as an aid worker in Afghanistan.”
Responding to the question of what he perceived to be the main challenge facing
Afghanistan, RMD reiterated his earlier point:
“The main challenge is security because most areas are too insecure for the
government to go in, but the NGOs are able to go there and service the people.
For example, our organization is working in five districts of Kandahar and in
Ghazni; these two provinces are very insecure. But fortunately, the NGOs have
the support of the community. This is a very good sign for NGOs. In some areas,
the government does not exist, but still the NGOs are working there especially for
health programs or MSP program, which are the mission programs of
Afghanistan. And to be honest, now Afghan civil society or NGOs are very
supportive of the government. Unfortunately sometimes, the government does not
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always support the Afghan NGOs, even though they are the main implementers of
major government programs. For example the health salaries program, and the
mission solidarity programs - Afghan NGOs are the implementation partners for
both programs; covering secure and insecure areas of Afghanistan. This is the
reality of the situation.”
He made the argument that NGOs and CSOs are the main implementers of
government programs in rural insecure areas of Afghanistan, asserting that:
“NGOs have credibility in the communities - They are working for us…The
people are very supportive of the NGOs, but they do not trust the Afghan
government.”
Asked why the lack of trust with the government, RMD posited that:
“This is a big problem in Afghanistan. The first problem is that the government is
not honest with the people. The main issue is corruption, because of their own
interest, because of the interventions of war lords. The government employees are
working for themselves, not to support the people. I give you an example,
sometimes the people have conflict, maybe a land issue and they want to solve it
through the government system, it takes months and years especially if the conflict
is with someone powerful. Sometimes, the people are happy to go to the Taliban
to solve their problem and the problem is solved in one or two days. But in the
government system because of corruption, it takes years and a lot of money
needed to pay bribes.”
He accuses the Afghan Government of being “inefficient and corrupt.”
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Responding to why the Afghan NGOs have been able to gain and maintain trust
with the people, RMD noted that:
“Afghan NGOs have been serving the communities for many decades during the
different regimes. NGOs are independent bodies, and they are not at the side of
the Taliban or at the side of the government; they are just there to assist the
people in need. They share their plans with the community and involve the people
in the decision making to solve the real needs of the people. For example, we have
28 clinics in Ghazni, and we have the health services for very poor people in the
village. They know that they will lose these services if anything happens to our
organization, so they are very protective and supportive of NGOs. If any of our
staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take action
for their release.
Asked where the insecurity is coming from if the communities are trusting of the
Afghan aid workers, he emphasized that:
“The enemy or the Taliban are still alive - the insecurity is not coming from the
community, the insecurity is coming from the Taliban or from those who are
involved in war. They want to make money. Kidnapping NGO workers is one
source of making money for them.”
Asked if he was hopeful that things would get better in Afghanistan, he took a
moment to ponder on his response, stating that no one could answer such a question
because as he noted:
“The situation is very complicated.”
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He argued that:
“The military strategy is not clear; we don’t know what they are doing in the
future… Are they staying or are they leaving?
The second issue is the Afghan government:
“The Afghan government system at the moment is very corrupted. They do not
have any strong strategy to take action against the enemy. And unfortunately, we
are not sure about the quality of the army and the police. They are not committed
to helping the people and they are not committed to keeping peace in
Afghanistan.”
The third issue has to do with the upcoming election in 2014:
“Will Karzai return to power? Are the same people also coming to power again,
after the election?”
Finally, he raised the issue of neighboring Pakistan and Iran:
“These countries, they are supporting the Taliban” he said, “Is the international
community taking action against these countries? If not, what will happen? To be
honest, Pakistan is a more powerful country than Afghanistan, they have
interventions and training areas for the enemy or the Taliban - for example,
yesterday’s attack which happened in the middle of Kabul. These are questions
that are causing uncertainty in Afghanistan. Since the last 12 years, the life of the
people did not change; the poverty rate is still the same, and the social service is
still the same. This makes the people afraid of what will happen if the
international community pulls their support and leaves Afghanistan. When the
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people have no hope, they cannot feed themselves and their families; the number
of the Taliban is increasing because when the people are poor and cannot help
themselves, the Taliban is active and recruiting. The people do not have any
chance.”
RMD continued to argue his point that the government of Afghanistan is not
prepared and not a match for the more prepared Taliban, even though the government has
more resources and should be able to overpower the Taliban militarily. He argued that:
“In the surrounding district, there are big number of police and big number of
armies, but it takes only 25 to 35 Taliban to cause damage and uncertainty in the
districts. We have two types of Taliban. The first is the local Taliban, which is
often made up of local gangs fighting against government. Their goal is to make
money. The Afghan government knows that, yet they are not taking any actions
against them or trying to arrest them. The other Taliban come from outside of
Afghanistan and they want to destroy the bridges and cause major panic to bring
mistrust between the people and the government. Unfortunately, the government
is not fighting for the people.”
Asked what the international community can do to help the Afghan government
maintain control of the rural areas, RMD jokingly replied with a question:
“What they can do in the future or now?”
The investigator retuned with the question: What can they do now? RMD claimed that
the international community in Afghanistan is unable to properly assist the government
because the communities are from different nations, so they are not working as one
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cohesive force. He posited that the international communities have different agendas and
different objectives:
“UK has their own agenda. America has its own agenda, and some of the
European countries have their own agenda. They should have a strong and
collective action and strategy to fight against terrorism, to fight against the
Taliban and to bring pressure on neighboring countries of Afghanistan. Also, they
should put pressure on the government of Afghanistan to bring an end to the
corruption, to end poverty, and stop the continued influence of the war lords.”
He argued that the international communities have spent billions of dollars in
Afghanistan, yet the people remain poor, their lives have not changed, and noted:
“Most of the people are poor and they don’t have any food or social services from
their government or from the international community. The people of Afghanistan
are angry and tied of the corruption and the mis-management of funds that should
be used to assist the poor and needy Afghan families. A lot of money is used to
pay foreign and Afghan contractors and government officials – very small
percentage is used for the poor people’s needs. Afghans do not have trust on this
government. The people are very afraid of what will happen to this society after
2014 when the international community will leave Afghanistan, because they do
not trust the Afghan government.”
Asked if he was implying that the Afghan government and the Afghan securities
were not ready to take over and maintain peace after the U.S. drawdown in 2014, RMD
asserted that:
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“If the situation continues like this, yeah, the people of Afghanistan will have no
hope for peace. But we have a good sign from Italy, Germany, and Australia.
They want to train our army and provide them with military equipment to fight
against enemies of Afghanistan. But the big problem is the misunderstanding and
mistrust between the government of Afghanistan and the government of America.
For the last two years, they are talking about the strategy; agreement should be
signed between Afghanistan and America.”
When asked if he had a message for the President Obama, his initial response
was:
“I cannot talk with President Obama. He’s far away from here… But if I’m
talking to him,” he said, “The first thing I will ask is for the troops to not leave
Afghanistan, because if they leave Afghanistan, once again, this area will be the
centre of terrorism, because it’s a complicated geographical land area, Iran,
Pakistan, China, and many Asian and Arab countries will keep this area for AlQaeda and terrorism. Before they leave, they should invest here and help bring
peace here. They should not forget the people of Afghanistan, these people are
very poor and some of them do not have a piece of bread to eat, they need a lot of
support, and the support should come through the right way. Unfortunately, the
contractors from the U.S. are eating all the money and not serving the people.
The local NGOs are committed to provide services to rural communities; we just
need the help of the international community to provide us with the funding to
meet our obligation to our Afghan people who need all your help.”
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RMD’s message to the Afghan people is to work together and build Afghanistan.
He is quite resolute on his claim that it is not up to the international community to build
Afghanistan. He called for Afghans to take
“Strong action against all injustice and to bring pressure on Afghan government
and the international community to have a fair election. Help each other and
work together to build one strong Afghan society. Take part in the upcoming
election. I know that the international communities are not building this country,
we must build our country.”
Participant EIJ
I met EIJ in his office with my translator. We were well received with hot green
tea and Afghan pastries. We were later invited to join him and his colleagues for lunch,
but we were unable due to another interview engagement.
Responding to a question of how things have changed since the war on terror, EIJ
shared:
“After 2002, a lot of improvement happened in the life of the Afghan people. After
the formation of the government in 2001, humanitarian activities increased, a lot
of construction companies were established in different parts of the country and a
lot of people had work. PRTs -Provincial Reconstruction Teams were providing
and funding projects and almost everybody in the provinces benefited. So these
activities continued until about 2009 when the PRTs decreased their activities,
which eventually forced many provinces to close their activities; causing many
people especially the youths to become jobless.”
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He posited that after the PRTs closed, the Afghan government ordered to close all the
construction companies and blamed the PRTs and the donors for providing funds directly
to Afghan NGOs, instructing them that:
“They should not give funds directly to Afghan NGOs, or CSOs; instead the funds
should go through the Afghan Government.”
EIJ argued that the government policy contradicted humanitarian and donor principles,
because he said that:
“Donor organization policy does not require NGO funding to be made through
government institutions. So this created a lot of problems between the Afghan
government, the donors, and the Afghan NGOs.”
EIJ continued to make the case against the new government policy of not funding Afghan
NGOs directly, but through the Afghan central government. He insisted that:
“The NGOs are not working to make profit, it's on their mandates, but the
government wanted to have the money for themselves. However, we know of all
the issues with the Afghan government and corruption. They claim that they want
to support the private sector, so they are creating more construction companies
and the new projects are funding through government, but still the corruption
level is very high. This is affecting many Afghan NGOs as activities continue to
decrease.”
EIJ believed that Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan;
he asserted that Afghan NGOs:
“Always have a good relationship with the people because they are from the
people and they work for the people. They consult with the people, and they use a
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participatory approach to address local issues, community issues and problems.
I’ll give you an example; there was an irrigation project in a very insecure village
that the government could not dare to step in. But this NGO went in to the village
and carried out irrigation activities for the benefit of the people with the support
and assistance of the people.”
Explaining how Afghan NGOs interact with the communities, he posited that:
“Before they start activities, they go to the area and make an assessment with the
village people. So the people have so many needs. They collect the needs, they do
the assessment and they prioritize the needs to determine which one is most
pressing and begin to address the problem in that order. Through consultation
with the people, they find out the problem and then they try to help resolving the
issue together with the people. For example right now, we are constructing three
clinics in the country, and each of these clinics is situated 100 to 150 kilometers
from the center of the province. So we talked with the people because for the
construction of the building we need a piece of land, and the people allocated us a
piece of land in one of the old graveyards and now the work is continuing there
and we hope that in the next two months, we’ll have the whole clinic ready for
service. But if it were the government seeking a piece of land for the clinic, we
will not have it - that would take much time. Because of the direct contact with the
community, they name their needs in their province. So they were ready to give us
that piece of land, and now we are in the process of providing their needs. There
is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but because the
community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not say anything
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because people in the village are working. They needed the project according to
the work place need assessment we had done.”
Asked if this type of working relationship with the communities could be
developed with the Afghan government, EIJ’s response was not optimistic; referring to
the government he asserted that:
“We have them like enemies. They are very hostile to the NGO people. And we
don’t know for what reason, they are not cooperating with the NGOs as
necessary. Because of the prevailing corruption in the government, when we want
to get something approved, we have to spend a lot of money to pay off the corrupt
people. So this is one problem. But with the community, it’s no problem because
the community is not corrupt. With the communities, they assist in the resolution
of the problem, but with the government, they are very unprofessional.
Unfortunately, nowadays every project has to go through the government; you
have to meet the demands of these corrupt officials. They don’t care if it’s for the
welfare, or the wellbeing of the country, or for the interests of the people. It
doesn’t matter how your project is useful for the people, all they care about is
feeding their own pockets.”
Asked why the insecurity against Afghan NGOs continues to increase in light of
the good relationship developed between NGOs and the communities, EIJ posited that:
“Security is a big challenge; on the one hand it is caused by the Taliban and the
terrorist, and on the other hand, the high rate of unemployment amongst the youth
today. The youths are jobless, they cannot find work, and this is a very serious
problem for Afghanistan. There are no opportunities for the youths; this is an
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important factor of insecurity. If we are able to provide job for people so they
won’t participate in any illegal actions, I suppose, they won’t go to the terrorists.
When they have jobs, they have money for their consumptions and they can take
care of their families.”
Responding to the question, who are the terrorists, EIJ was quite direct in his answer:
“Yes of course Taliban are the terrorists, and the people who are supporting the
Taliban. But in the villages, where people have no work, no hope or opportunities
to make a living, yet they must find means to provide for their families. If the
government is not able to have access to the people in the villages, but suppose
the terrorists or the Taliban have access to the people. The terrorist or Taliban
are able to provide them with food and money to take care of their families, they
are going to listen to the Taliban and do what the Taliban wants them to do.”
Asked what he thought of Afghan preparedness for the drawdown of troops in
2014, he said,
“People feel hopeless. People are disappointed when they hear that in 2014 the
drawdown of the international troops will begin, because they have seen the
situation in the 90s and they see that these powerful people, the commanders, will
create the same situation again in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul. The general
public mentality is that if the foreign troops leave the country and abandon
Afghanistan like they did in the past, the situation will get worse and they will
have no hope. But it is a transition, and we have to make ourselves ready for the
transition. However, if the international community does not stop their assistance,
there won’t be any big issue for us, because once again people will be engrossed,
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will be involved in activities, they will have job, they will have money. We need
the international community to continue their support because still we need it.”
Asked who the enemies of Afghanistan are, EIJ’s response was swift:
“Clearly I say that the enemies of Afghanistan are two neighboring countries;
Pakistan and Iran. They do not want Afghan people to live in peace and
prosperity, and they have spies and intelligence here to disturb the normal and
peaceful life of the people. They want us to have unstable government so that they
can find their benefits under such kind of government, because every day over
45,000 Afghans travel to neighboring countries for goods and services not
available in Afghanistan. So a lot of Afghan businesses go to our neighboring
countries.”
EIJ talks about business people and government officials whose families live
outside Afghanistan; he argued that some have dual citizenships:
“They are dangerous because their families are living abroad comfortably, their
children don’t know about suicide attacks, bomb blasts, the miseries of the people
they cannot see. Their families live a good life and these people are not interested
in the peace, development, and stability of this country. This is just my personal
opinion.”
Asked who are the friends of Afghanistan, his response was that:
“Those people in governments who assist people of Afghanistan, who serve the
people of Afghanistan, who help our people and who do not want to abandon and
forget Afghanistan and try to help in different ways and different sectors. It is also
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a reality that during the past recent history of this country, the Americans and the
allies have been the best friends of the Afghan people. Despite making some
mistakes, they have provided good services for the people of this country and the
people consider them as friends. And I do not say this in front of you because this
is from my heart. They helped us in the construction of the rules, and now we have
rules in the country, now we have good health terms in the country, we have
educational centers and schools and we have a very modern communication
system, such as mobile phones and internet services. Before 2011, Afghan people
did not know about internet.”
Regarding his message to President Obama, EIJ was diplomatic:
“First of all, I wish good health for President Obama and I want him not to forget
Afghanistan, to assist our country, our army, our police, and our people, to
strengthen our security and help our reconstruction and development. We need
security, but most of all we need improvement in our education so we can improve
ourselves and be able to stand on our own feet. We depend on the knowledge of
foreigners who are coming in Afghanistan who are the advisors of the ministers
or our president and so on and so forth.”
To the American people, he is thankful for the sacrifices made on behalf of
Afghanistan and the Afghan people:
“To the people of United States of America who have helped us, who have
sacrificed their services and the lives of their sons and daughters, for the service
and peace and security of this country. You have sacrificed life and blood for the
people of our country, for that we are very grateful.”
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To the Afghan people, he calls on them to:
“Unite, and to join hands in the establishment of peace and security in
Afghanistan, and also the reconstruction and development of the country. Become
educated; do not to be misled by misinformation and provocations, and to
distinguish between friends and enemies. If Afghans are educated, we are sure
that the enemies of Afghanistan will not be able to take advantage of them.”
Focus Group Participants
At the beginning, focus group participants were given post-it notes and instructed
to list their perceptions and feelings about the following issues: Insecurities and violence
against Afghan aid workers, Challenges from U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014, and the
Effects of War on Terror on Afghan aid workers. Participants were given fifteen minutes
to write, and the post-it notes were collected and taped on walls outside the conference
room. Participants were instructed to walk around and examine entries on the post-it
notes and mark the number “1” next to any entry of their choosing. Most participants
walked around and viewed the post-it notes on the wall; however, no markings were
noted on any of the post-it notes. The following are the categories with the themes that
participants listed on the post-it notes.
Category: Insecurity and Violence against Afghan Aid Workers
P. In insecure areas, people call aid workers spy of the Americans
P. Before the U.S. Forces arrived, Afghan aid workers were able to work among
the people, but after the arrival of the U.S. Forces, the Afghan aid workers were
perceived to be helpers of U.S. Forces.
P. The West pushed workers, people think
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Category: Challenges from U.S. Drawdown of Forces in 2014
P. Security situation might worsen if the Afghan national forces are not fully
equipped.
P. Interventions from neighboring countries will increase
P. Insecurities will increase
P. Resurgence of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan
P. Weak local security and governance capacity
P. Interventions from other nations, polycentricism, resurgence of insurgent and
innocent killings
P. Funding opportunities may decrease
P. Cost of living may increase
P. Reduction in humanitarian aid funding
P. Rise in unemployment as job opportunities decrease
P. Economic, military, and political transition
P. Anarchy after withdrawal of foreign troops
P. Intervention from neighboring countries
P. Increase in security problems
P. Pull out will affect aid workers’ engagement in Afghanistan
P. Survival of present government, survival of the CSOs, and decrease in funding
P. Change in economic activities
P. Rise in insurgency
P. People lost hope due to perception of unrealized objectives
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Category: Effects of War on Terror on Afghan Aid Workers
P. Created new opportunities
P. Insecurity spreads in Afghanistan by Western politicians
P. Security concerns increased for aid workers
P. International forces failed to bring security to Afghanistan, thus aid workers
were negatively affected
P. NGO expectations on security were not met
P. Security has been major challenge for NGOs – aid workers kidnapped and
killed
P. Civilian casualty high, and insecurity is major problem
P. Insecurity hampered aid service to needy communities
P. Security has been major challenge
P. Access to communities
P. Development programs designed by donors and international communities, not
matched with actual needs of the Afghan people
Focus Group Discussion
1. Concerns Over U.S. Drawdown of Forces in 2014
Female Speaker
“In 2005 I was able to go to Kharwar district of Logar, but now I cannot work
inside the cover. For me as an Afghan, if the Americans drawdown it will not
change anything, they did not come here to support Afghans, they came for their
own agenda, and they will go by their own agenda.”
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Male Speaker
“With the withdrawal of American forces in 2014, there may be many
complications, but the basic ones are unemployment and economic transition.
Foreign aids will decline as foreign troops withdraw, and many international
organizations will leave Afghanistan, causing a decline in economic activities. As
the International Military forces withdraw, responsibility for Afghan security will
shift to the Afghan National Forces. However, the insurgents are beginning to
take on our forces, so how will the Afghan National Forces be able to secure the
country without the ISAF?”
Male Speaker
“Political transitions - in April 2014 the Presidential elections will take place in
Afghanistan during the same time the Americans are drawing down forces, this I
believe will bring some sort of chaos and belligerence because there is always
conflict in Afghan presidential election. There is no concern for people’s right;
there is no concern for the widow who is walking outside the streets scavenging
woods to cook some food for their child. There is no concern for an orphan whose
father was killed in the corresponding conflict of radicalism and extremism.”
Male Speaker
“After the drawdown in 2014, what I think we need is the military transition from
ISAF forces to Afghan Forces. However, we need a good political transition of
the government; we want the International community to maintain impartiality
during the elections in Afghanistan. Any interference from the International
community in the election will highly affect humanitarian aid workers in the
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villages and communities. Afghanistan needs technical support from the
international community to have good governance, transparent, and fair election
in Afghanistan.”
Female Speaker
“The Americans have implemented their own agenda in Afghanistan. For me as
an Afghan, we are already here, we are leaving in insecurity; after 2014 we will
still be living in insecurity because they did not have the agenda to support
Afghanistan, they have their own agenda, to have their base. Finally they have
their base in Afghanistan, now they want to go back home, but the problem is still
here; lots of civilian causalities. We are victims.”
Male Speaker
“For me these are important issues that we will face, in general the drawdown
may worsen the law and order situation and the security situation in Afghanistan.
The capital flight component is a very important problem, economic decision has
started, civil war definitely will be there; increase in interference from the
neighbors; political instability, brain drain will also be there, downsizing in aid
from the International community for the civil societies, so their survival would be
at stake. Definitely, the number of civil society organizations will be decreased to
a minimum level. Law and order situation will be severely devastated and also we
will lose the achievements of the past years.
“The brain drain means the technocrats, the professional people, the
academics, scientists and economists - they will all leave Afghanistan for safer
places with greater opportunities. As we are the veteran or eye witnesses of the
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last civil war in Afghanistan, during those 30 years, there were no intellectuals,
no economists in Afghanistan. Many migrated to Pakistan or to the other
countries. There are no investment opportunities anymore, the people are afraid
of what could happen after 2014. Everyone in Afghanistan is of the opinion that
the institutions will be devastated after 2014; this will definitely affect the whole
system whether it is the security or the government.”
Male Speaker
“I believe that the civil society activists, the NGOs and the local communities
have been in conflict with Afghan politicians, warlord and regional powers, even
before the arrival of the U.S. and International forces. This conflict has continued
since the occupation, and we expect it will continue after the U.S. and the
international forces leave in 2014.”
Male Speaker
“After 2014, if the international communities will leave Afghanistan, I believe
there will be restrictions in funding for aid programs. Many Afghan NGOs will
close down their activities and engagement in Afghanistan. But who will be
affected? I think the people, the beneficiaries; the poor people will be affected.
My request is that the International community will continue their financial
support of Afghan aid programs after 2014.”
Female Speaker
“Not a lot of money comes to the aid community in Afghanistan from the
International Military Forces. Most of the aid comes from non-political aid
agencies, not the military. If we continue to have funds from non-political
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organizations who are honestly interested in the development of Afghanistan, the
drawdown of forces in 2014 will have little or no effect. So, if the military are
going, they can go.”
Female Speaker
“I believe that funding for Afghan NGOs will decrease if the International Forces
leave Afghanistan in 2014. During the past 12 years, we have developed many
programs and a lot has been achieved. Reductions in funding will create many
problems in Afghan economy; we could lose many of the things that have been
achieved as different people and different political and social ideologies of the
past begin to return to Kabul.”
Male Speaker
“Regarding the pull out of Western forces in 2014, I think it will not have any
particular effect on Afghan NGO’s, since there is no direct working relationship
with Western troops. NGOs design their own projects according to their own
constitution…”
Male Speaker
“President Obama’s plan to drawdown U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014 will
affect many things in Afghanistan. First of all, this drawdown will immediately
weaken Afghan forces readiness to be equipped to protect Afghan people because
the U.S. government is giving these arms and weapons to Pakistan. Such a move
will destabilize the security of Afghanistan. This is a very bad situation right now,
and it will become worse after the withdrawal of the international community and
their forces from Afghanistan. It will negatively affect Afghanistan.”
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2. Role of Afghan NGOs since War on Terror
Male Speaker
“NGOs and CSOs have played very important roles during the last twelve years,
but sadly enough, some have been involved in corrupt activities that have affected
the trusting relationship NGOs and CSOs have enjoyed with the people. The
people of Afghanistan depend on the aid community to be honest and not corrupt
like the government officials. If the NGOs are not honest to provide better service
for the people of Afghanistan to achieve goals and to do what the fund was given
for, this will be a big blow for the hope of the Afghan people. This is their hope
for a stable society. This is a big problem. Money is coming from the donors, but
going to Dubai. There is no benefit for the people of Afghanistan. Only a few
people benefit from aid fund to help the poor people; they put it in their pockets.
For what reason? We need accountability from NGOs.”
Male Speaker
“When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, millions of Afghans took refuge in the
neighboring countries, particularly in Pakistan. At that time, the international
forces rushed to the ground for the assistance of the refugees and other needy
Afghans inside Afghanistan. That was the beginning of aid activities in
Afghanistan - they started to deliver services to the refugees in Pakistan as well as
those inside Afghanistan.
“In 1988 the International community and the United Nations encouraged
some qualified Afghans to establish Afghan NGOs to take the lead role in
providing aid to needy Afghans. About 15 Afghani NGOs were established
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including some Arab NGOs and together, they started their aid work in
Afghanistan. Well, they were very active inside Afghanistan. Particularly the
Afghan NGOs who are on the ground and delivering humanitarian services to the
people of Afghanistan. But the situation changed after 1992 when the
international community abandoned Afghanistan, paving the way for the
Mujahidin to come to Afghanistan. That is why the terrorism, Al-Qaeda and
Talibanism came to Afghanistan. That was, I think the, the fault of the
International communities led by the United State that they failed to fulfill their
commitment when they abandoned Afghanistan. After the Mujahidin, the Taliban
came to Afghanistan, believe me, this was the period of underground activities in
Afghanistan. There were no International NGOs in Afghanistan due to the
Taliban, only the UDP was allowed to operate here - I think the editor was Mr.
Jordan; he was the only staff in Afghanistan. But the NGOs were very active, they
were engaged in the entire aid activities - everywhere they can go. There was
security, I think if they could upgrade their operation or their activities all over
Afghanistan because there was security, there was no killing – aid workers felt
secured. But the insecurity started in 2001 when the International Forces came to
Afghanistan.”
Male Speaker
“To be very specific I think the role of the NGO in civil society is to make
awareness and to create an environment that will foster change in society. If we
look into the enrollment rate of education; we have 9 million children going to
school. Many NGOs have played very important roles in promoting the awareness
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and importance of education to the people and the communities to send their
children to the school; both females and males, because they hadn’t been doing
that during Taliban time. Many NGOs also played important roles in adult
literacy. And now that we are practicing democracy, NGOs and CSOs play very
important roles in building political awareness in the communities. 20,000
community development concepts at the village level and they established the
CDCs and democratic process. We have elected government, we have parliament,
and we have commission consultants. NGOs played a very important role in
informing the people and motivating the people to participate in the elections by
providing them access to polling stations.”
Male Speaker
“In my opinion, the very significant role of Afghan NGOs is the delivery of
humanitarian aid services to needy Afghans in secure and insecure villages and
communities around Afghanistan. Due to the present security situation, our
government and other international supporters are not able to deliver services to
the needy people in certain environments. Besides, I agree with my friend that
some civil societies are acting like a bridge between communities and
governmental authorities. But in my opinion, this is a very risky task that
sometimes puts aid workers in danger.”
Male Speaker
“Generally, the CSOs play major roles in the field of education, health, access to
justice, good governance, anti-corruption, peace and contribute to the solution,
the elimination of violence against women, human rights, and the democratic
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process. As a result of these efforts, we have some significant achievement, which
have significantly improved the social condition and quality of life of our people.
In fact, human capital has been developed as a result of work done by CSOs and
NGOs with literacy rate, which has been increased because of the literacy
intervention in different adult populations in the communities. As the Minister of
Education mentioned, there are 63 million school-going children in total. Now the
government is more transparent, the people are able to evaluate the performance
of their leaders; we can see their policies, how they’re implemented, and whether
the policies address the needs of the people. The civil society organizations and
the NGOs play a vital role in this regard in the bridging between the community
and the government.”
Male Speaker
“The Afghan NGO’s and the CSO’s have played key roles in the society because
of their presence and persistence to work and continue to provide aid to needy
Afghans in difficult parts of the country with high insecurity problems. They have
helped a lot of people; five years back, NGO’s were weak, but now the country is
really strong.”
Male Speaker
“I believe that the role of the construction companies have been very weak. One
out of ten, 1/10th part of the funds will be spend in Afghanistan; most of the
construction money will go out of the country. It doesn’t mean for the stability of
Afghanistan. You build a road today and it will be destroyed within two or three
months, even the cement or the concrete that they used; just one spill of water, it
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starts to show its quality. So this is a main issue in Afghanistan and the role of the
workers are so weak in the construction companies because of the corruption and
the lack of quality control, no one cares about the future stability of the buildings
in Afghanistan. Now the CSOs are working for the social accountability and
providing information on anti-corruption.”
3. Insecurity is a big problem
Researcher: Some of you have also alluded to the idea that Afghans are not terrorists.
Okay. The argument was made that Osama Bin Laden was not killed in Afghanistan.
Alright! My question is, if that is true, which we know he was killed in Pakistan, but if it
is true that there is no terrorism here in Afghanistan, the key question for me becomes
what are the reasons, therefore, for the increased insecurities and violence against
humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan? Where is that coming from?
Male Speaker
“The big reason why people are thinking that terrorists are in Pakistan and
increasing attack against the aid worker in Afghanistan in a short sentence, aid
worker countries don't want Afghanistan and the people to have a stable country.
If the question of terrorism in Afghanistan was asked two or three or four decades
ago, this would be in fact true but there are reasons that terrorist are… terrorism
is brought to Afghanistan. Before I mention in the last question radicalism and
extremism was used as a tool by the western countries, U.S. and rest of its allies
bring terrorism to Afghanistan through these tools and question that terrorists are
not in Afghanistan, that is a fact. They are not actually pinpointing and finding
the right country with terrorist activity. Actually, the hard house and the hard bed
of terrorism is our neighboring country Pakistan. That has been interfering from
a decade mostly from the last decade and targeting our many entities;
governmental entities, political entities, educational entities but the reason for the
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insecurities are not…from only this hard house and hard bed which is our
neighboring country, many other countries are intervening in our country, they
have their interests. Before… three decades or two decades ago, the world
warriors and many great nations were suggesting and contemplating that their
Constantinople conquer the western countries and the Asian countries but
nowadays Afghanistan has been made an apogee for… in order to conquer other
countries, actually it’s a war not on terrorism because if it would be a war on
terrorism, their leader has been killed about a year ago but the main focus is on
their empire.”
Male Speaker
“I think to be very specific…in fact it’s a reality that… I think before September
2001, the people of Afghanistan were not related to either Taliban or Al-Qaeda,
but after that … this type of issues got to Afghanistan but if the situation would
continue what could happen? Suppose the situation continues, definitely there
would be insecurity, insecurity of Afghanistan. In insecure environmental
situations the aid workers do not work properly, they cannot engage their work
properly and they cannot deliver services…And from the other side if there is
insecurity in Afghanistan so the aid will be decreased, the job employment for
Afghans will be decreased and finally, the people of Afghanistan will be
negatively affected. I think Pakistan has two main reasons for keeping terrorism
in this country. First, they have an issue with … Kashmir issue between Pakistan
and India. Second one is Pakistan does not like to have a terrible country beside
its side which is Afghanistan #1. I think very soon the water … the water level will
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… because it is very important. We have a loss of water level… they are using our
water for irrigation, for their land for these things. If we have a stable powerful
government in Afghanistan and so we will do in this country. Very soon we will
have lots of … we will have control of the water; we can use our water for our
own objectives. So Pakistan would not like it. Besides that, we have a good
relation with India. Pakistan never wants another country beside it, to like India,
something like this, because they’re afraid from that…If we have a stable
Afghanistan and with a good relation with India, this will make the situation twice
as bad.”
Researcher: Thank you. Where is the insecurity coming from? Why do we continue to
see more violence against humanitarian aid workers? Where do you think it’s coming
from?
Male Speaker
“From my point of view, this again has external factors, which get cozy in
connection with our neighbors and perhaps to some other countries also. As was
mentioned by our colleagues, in particular, a neighbor country cannot tolerate a
stable, progressive, developed, and independent Afghanistan. The main issue
covered in these phenomena is the durian line and the issue of Pashtunistan in
addition to Pakistan’s control over the rulers in Afghanistan. That’s why we have
witnessed the heavy coverage of the conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan
in the media, and the clashes in the recent days on the durian line between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was also stated in Hamid Karzai‘s statement
addressing the nation that Pakistan had repeatedly requested him to discuss the
durian line issue and Mr. Karzai has clearly told them that this is not the time to
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discuss it. This shows that there is mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad, which
could possibly lead to fears from Pakistan that Afghanistan may be developed in
the future, where border line issues continue to create conflict between the two
countries. This situation is not ideal for Pakistan; hence it is important for
Islamabad that the Taliban remains viable. Osama was targeted there; all the
other terrorists are out there, the international community exists in Afghanistan.
If the international community can finger point any terrorist based stations in
Afghanistan, they have to come in front of the media and say that in this province
or in that district, in this village, or that village. So, Pakistan with all those
intentions in mind want to raise people there, brainwash people there, send them
from there to here, tell the people that Afghans are non-Muslims, it's time for
Jihad, you have to fight the foreigners, you have to fight the Afghan
government…This is intended to keep the Afghan Government and the struggles
of the international community weakened.”
Male Speaker
“Insecurities in Afghanistan started when America and the coalition forces came
to Afghanistan. America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan? All the nations in
Afghanistan are here protecting their own national interests. Russia does not
want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also
China as a major economic power does not want America in its border, and
China thinks that if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise
against Chinese Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back
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on America; it’s not only Pakistan, not only Iran that are causing the insecurities
in Afghanistan.”
Male Speaker
“Main point is insecurity, which is fueled by high unemployment, and culture of
systemic corruption. Many nations are making Afghanistan an apogee for their
conflicts, specially the neighboring countries. Whenever any Western country
wants to intervene in a Muslim country, they use radicalism and extremism as a
pretext; however, these ideologies have origins outside of Afghanistan. Since the
arrival of the NATO led ISAF, the neighboring countries have been intervening in
Afghan affairs. We have not created war or terrorism; Osama bin Laden was not
an Afghan, he was an Arab.”
Male Speaker
“In recognition of the result of the Bonn Conference in 2001, many people
including the aid workers hoped that there would be security in Afghanistan. That
the International Forces will bring security to Afghanistan, but unfortunately this
did not happen; they failed to bring security to Afghanistan and the aide works
were affected negatively. For example, in 2005 or 2003 I could go to every part of
Afghanistan, but now even you cannot go to the Maidan Shahr.”
Male Speaker
“Based on my point of view as an Afghan living in Afghanistan, the challenges
that we have been faced with the problems that we have been witnessing for over
30 years were created for us from the top. Either development or international
community or within the ordinary Afghan, the issues come from the top. Even
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when we compare the Taliban era to this time, with the overwhelming support of
the international community, I think my colleagues who are sitting around the
table, will all agree with me that security situation in Taliban’s time was much
better than the security today in Afghanistan. They would agree with me even if
you would have bags of gold with you and go wherever you want to go and
nobody would dare to stop you or take something from you. Nobody would dare
to put you down. Nobody would dare to ask you where you work, what you do or
something like that. You would have been able to travel to different parts of
Afghanistan with full confidence. However, there were limitations as my
colleagues would agree, during the Taliban era, people were not free to pursue
their dreams and live independently. Unfortunately, the Taliban fighters were not
Afghans, most were born outside Afghanistan, and they were recruited and
controlled from foreign countries. They were not really from among the people of
Afghanistan. I would also say with confidence that at that time, the belief was that
there was no border between Islamic countries; there were even some people in
Pakistan who thought that Afghanistan was the 5th province of their country. We
have heard about conflicting issues in Afghanistan; between Afghans, but
instructions on how to resolve them were received from Islamabad. I have heard a
story of someone who was arrested in Kabul at that time by Taliban and he was
released by instruction from Islamabad. On the order hand, the existence of
international community in Afghanistan, under the theme of supporting Afghans
was really about the war against terror. Like you know, at first if we think there is
no proper definition even for terror. What do we mean by terror? Terror is a
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person who terrifies people. A terrorist could be anybody. We do need to have a
proper definition for terrorism. If terrorism means to keep an innocent person
locked up, the definition could go much wider and much broader. For example
during the era of communists in Afghanistan, even Dr. Najibullah was willing to
have peace talks with Mujahidin at that time, but they did not accept it. He was
surrounded from all sides and finally the government collapsed. Kabul was
occupied by Mujahidin at that time with support from Pakistan, and from
America, which provided Mujahidin with weapons and money. In my opinion, our
biggest mistake as a people was that we did not support our leaders at that
time…”
4. A Major Issue of Trust
Male Speaker
“Another thing which is affecting the aide work in Afghanistan is that the Afghan
NGOs in the very beginning established good relations with the people of
Afghanistan. Because they were working very closely with the people in the
communities, they were able to design programs based on the needs of the people.
But when the PRTs came to Afghanistan, this trusting relationship with the
Afghan community was affected very badly; aid workers were confronted in
villages and communities and asked if they had a gun, or weapons on them. This
suspicion affected the relationship between Afghan aid workers and the Afghan
communities.”
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Male Speaker
“Since 1980, Afghan NGOs have been working in Afghan villages and
communities. After the arrival of the international troops, Afghan NGOs were the
only ones that could go into certain insecure communities that the International
NGOs could not go. The main role of the Afghan NGOs on civil society has been
the bridging between the people, communities, international communities as well
as the local governments. Afghan NGOs have been the main implementers of aid
programs and project in the villages and rural communities around Afghanistan,
including those designed by the international communities and the Afghan
government. They have established good relations with the people. The people
trust them and they are able to work even in insecure areas. The challenge for the
Afghan NGO is how to get more benefits to needy Afghan people.”
Female Speaker
“It is true that Afghan aid workers have established good and trusting
relationships with the Afghan communities, but on the other hand, we lost our
reputation in the community because some NGOs were receiving funds from
organizations that did not have the best interest of the Afghan people. The people
know which countries are supporting Afghanistan and in what manner they are
providing their support. If the money is coming from U.S. Military or from PRTs,
the people know their aims; why they came to Afghanistan, their objectives, and
what they want to achieve. We’re losing our reputation day by day because of the
objectives of some aid organizations. These organizations are operating on their
own interest, and not in the interest of Afghan people.”
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Researcher: Can you expand on that? How does that affect the reputation?
Female Speaker
“Some Afghan NGOs, who are receiving money through PRTs and implementing
PRT projects, are looked at by the people as not being honest and trusting with
the Afghan people. The people know that they are implementing PRT objectives.
For example, PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people know
that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason
they are giving money to build the mosque here.”
Male Speaker
“Before the U.S. and the NATO forces came to Afghanistan, the Afghan people
believed that the International NGOs were working with us and were here to help
us. They didn’t mind who was controlling the gun; whether it was the Talib or
Mujahid. After the coalition forces came here, the International NGOs started
aligning themselves to their different national interests. They started operating by
their national policies and objectives; no longer focused on providing
humanitarian aid to assist desperately needy Afghan people who have become
victims of the war on terror. So the people lost their trust on the International
NGOs. Many of the International NGO projects are now implemented through the
strategies and stipulations of their home countries. This is a major issue of trust
and accountability; there is no quality control, there is no follow-up of their
projects, there is no impact assessment for the projects, and that’s why people
have lost trust and no longer rely on the International NGOs. The question that
most Afghan people are asking is that the Taliban was toppled within 48 hours by
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the U.S. and International Forces, and they occupied the whole country in 2001,
how come now, the Taliban have been very strong and powerful? American
troops came within two nights and conquered the whole country, but now, more
than 100,000 troops from NATO and other countries are here in Afghanistan and
we still have insecurity. So the people are asking, how come now there is no
security in Afghanistan? The Afghan people do not trust any troops even the aid
workers. This is the biggest issue. So if you compare with 10 years ago,
Afghanistan should be more stable and secure, but every day the security is
getting worse.”
Male Speaker
“America thought that if Russia controlled Afghanistan then we will start up
another scenario by the name of Pakistan. That’s a big problem between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. America planned how to defeat Russia to prevent their
progress. They made a lot of agendas, a lot of strategies. They supported the
Mujahedeen for their mission. And also they provide money. They provided the
military supply and the other countries who were involved in the business of fuel,
Arab Countries; they all put their money to support of America. They have that
big investment to protect, to save their business in Afghanistan. Yeah. So finally
America become victor…they got the victory and then the next scenario was to
create an unstable government under the leadership of Mujahedeen. But their
plan was for the Mujahedeen government to fail because they have the next plan first to give a bad name or a bad point of view from the Islamic Government for
the people of Afghanistan throughout; this is Muslim leaders. What are they
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doing? That was the…the keys, a bunch of keys for dispute. And second they had
another plan to create a military force like Taliban, they named after by the
suggestion of Saudi Arabia and MI-6 England and America CIA. Did provide this
plan together to provide and later force to attack Mujahedeen government and to
remove them from power. This was the second scenario. And after that Taliban
came to…the push back of the Northern Alliance to North of Afghanistan people
saw a lot of economy weakness, a lot of society problems. So they once again, the
experience of such a government that was commonly played Muslim leaders. This
all was how to bring a new idea for the people of Afghanistan for example
democracy. People of Afghanistan were looking for a new sort of government that
will provide a better life for them. The coalition force, the international
community, so for example I can see how NATO and all those country who are
members of NATO - how they came to Afghanistan. This was not only to bring
democracy for our country. Not only to have a democratic government, to provide
better life for the people. They are all big project. For example the pipeline of gas
from Turkmenistan to India. This is a big project. All the agents working there
have the agendas of their countries. Especially those NGOs, they’re foreign
not…Afghans. For example, what Russia wants? What China wants? What does
India want? And what American or Western countries want? The centre for
Western country is from the Middle Asia to the East…the South of Asia. For
example, we have to draw a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan to
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh to Indonesia. It’s a big economical project. They
have their economy entrust in the world. The war against terror…”
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5.

Corruption and Mismanagement

Male Speaker
“If the United State gives funds to USAID, and USAID gives this money to United
Nations. United Nations gives this money to International NGOs, and the
international NGOs give some of the money to the Afghan NGOs. Then the
Afghan NGOs will implement the project, but only a fraction of the original
amount will reach the intended beneficiaries of the aid. This is because the
Afghan NGOs do not have direct access to the funds. This is a big challenge for
Afghan NGOs and CSOs.”
Male Speaker
“I believe that if we are to bring about real peace in Afghanistan, a real peace for
humanity throughout the world, we must remain honest in our policies and our
strategies. If we are spending money and if we are initiate developmental
programs, but if they are not honest, I think it would be difficult to achieve our
objectives. The positive side with the presence of the international community in
Afghanistan was that a huge amount of money was poured into this country.
Although obviously we see this as a positive point, but based on my experience,
we also witnessed a lot of disadvantages with this. For example, we did not have
high rates of corruption in Afghanistan in our history. A huge amount of money
came, but it caused high levels of corruption throughout the country where the
development is involved, where international community is involved –
unfortunately, even some civil society organizations were also involved. My
colleagues would argue with me that we did not have so many civil society
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organizations in Taliban’s time. If you will investigate, you will find some donors
who do not consult with the Afghan Government. They develop their programs
unilaterally, and seek agencies to implement them. The government is not in the
picture, the people are not in the picture. The problems of the people are not
identified, and so, they are not met. For example, if someone gets sick and goes to
the doctor, first of all, the doctor will diagnose the problem and then based on the
problem, prescribe the medicine. In our case, it’s the other way around, there are
no diagnostics, there is no effort at identification of the real problem of the
people, but instead, they continued spending money on programs and projects,
under the pretext of development for the people. If there is honesty, there would
be success. If there is no honesty, there is not going to be success at any level. As
far as the U.S. and the international forces drawing down in 2014, I think if there
is honesty taken into consideration, the foreign troops leaving will have impact,
and their staying will have impact. If there is no honesty considered, there will not
be any impact, and their leaving will have no effect on the Afghan people.”
Male Speaker
“The other issue of why this corruption came into Afghanistan and why the
Afghans are involved in it - the high ranking levels of the decision makers are all
robbers and non-competent people. And as we see the commanders involved, they
are just observing new participants when they are working in the authorities on
the high levels. So that causes what? Increase of instability of Afghanistan, no
security and then the high level of corruption in Afghanistan and the community is
also not encouraging…”
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Male Speaker
“I guess NGOs and CSOs played it good role, but they also played a deficit role they were also involved in corruption, accounts, in addition to that, this deficit
working of the services …the society or Afghanistan. People are all involved in
corruption, so the need for NGOs because government was corrupt. NGOs have
to be created to apply and implement the services for the people. If they are not
honest, as they are, most of the NGOs are not honest to provide better service for
the people of Afghanistan to achieve goals and to do what the fund was given for
them. We need honest NGOs. After 2014 and each year ahead, for a long time,
and for a stable society, there is a need for accountability, which includes what
and how it will be accounted. This is a big problem. Money is coming from the
donors, and going to Dubai. There is no benefit for the people of Afghanistan.
Only a few people printed this agenda, just do this and this, and finished, over,
and they put it in the pocket, for the few guys, where is the reason, what was the
reason? We need the NGOs with our honest impacts. We have to go to that
accountability for each of the organization. Not only NGOs, governmental
organization and NGOs have to support accountability.”
6.

Human Rights and Rule of Law

Female Speaker
“If the Taliban are true Muslims - Islam does not stop girls from going to school,
Islam does not stop girls from getting education, Islam does not stop girls from
going to work, but this is the Islam that was created by America and Pakistan.
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They create this vision of the violation of human rights, and the violation of
women rights for the Taliban.”
Male Speaker
“Yeah just in argument to comments on the issues just to with the, to do with the
specifics corresponding the withdrawal or after the 2014 this situation of
Afghanistan I have noted down some, for me is important issues that we may face,
you know, in general it may worsen the law and order situation and the security
situation in Afghanistan. In capital flight this is very much important problem,
economic decision has started, civil war definitely will be there; increase in
interference from the neighbors; political instability, brain drain will also be
there, downsizing in the aide from the International community for the civil
societies so their survival would be at stake. There is definitely the number of the
civil security will be decreased to the minimum level. Law and order situation will
be severely devastated and also we will lose the achievements of…”
Themes
Themes were derived from in-depth face-to-face storied narrative interviews from
ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers—three women and seven men—and from a twohour focus group discussion panel of twenty Afghan humanitarian aid workers. The
narrative face-to-face interviews generated six themes; each theme had four or more subthemes. The dominant themes from the interviews are as follows: insecurity is the biggest
challenge; international communities should increase funding to Afghans; do not abandon
Afghanistan; building trust with Afghan communities; corruption and rule of law; human
sacrifice, and the cost of conflict. The focus group discussion generated seven themes;
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each theme also had four or more sub-themes. The dominant themes from the focus
group are as follows: many changes came to Afghanistan; Afghans are not terrorists, war
and insecurities are imported from other countries; drawdown in 2014 may lead to chaos,
but orderly transition may help avoid chaos; the U.S. and international community
abandoned Afghanistan in the 1990s; insecurity is a big problem; Afghan NGOs have
credibility and trusting relationships with Afghan communities; and corruption and the
rule of law.
Many of the themes and subthemes generated from the narrative face-to-face
interviews and the focus group discussion overlapped and shared similar conceptions.
Table 1 (Themes and Sub-Themes) shows the major themes and sub-themes for the faceto-face interviews and focus group discussions.
Table 1
Themes and Sub-Themes
INTERVIEWS
1. Insecurity is the biggest challenge
 Insecurity started in 2001
when the international forces
came to Afghanistan
 Afghans are not terrorists;
insecurities are not from
Afghan communities, but
from Afghan neighbors
 Other countries should not
make Afghanistan the base
for their conflicts
 Youth joblessness and lack of
opportunities lead to social
unrest and insecurities

FOCUS GROUP
1. Insecurity is big problem
 Before the U.S. and
international forces came to
Afghanistan in 2001, there was
security
 Afghan aid workers negatively
affected by the international
communities’ inability to bring
security to Afghanistan
 Every day the security is getting
worse
 Key role of Afghan aid workers
is to deliver services to insecure
areas
 Security situation in Taliban’s
time was much better than the
security today in Afghanistan
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Table 1 cont.
2. Do not abandon Afghanistan
 We cannot lose what has
been achieved
 Thankful to Americans for
their sacrifice, do not
abandon Afghanistan
 Help us develop our
infrastructure with our own
hands

2. The U.S. and international
community abandoned Afghanistan in
the ’90s
 When the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan millions of Afghans
took refuge in the neighboring
countries, particularly in
Pakistan
 Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and
Taliban came to Afghanistan

3. Building trust with Afghan
communities
 Afghan NGOs have
credibility and trusting
relationships with Afghan
communities
 Military incursions into
Afghan communities cause
mistrust
 Military strategy is not clear
– international community is
not cohesive
 Mistrust between the
government of Afghanistan
and the U.S. Government

3. Afghan NGOs have credibility and
trusting relationships with
communities
 Afghan NGOs established good
relations with the people of
Afghanistan
 Collaborations with PRTs
affected trust with Afghan
communities
 Afghan NGOs do not have
direct access to funds
 Funding source may affect
Afghan NGO credibility in local
communities

4. Corruption and Rule of Law
 Rule of law and equal rights
for women and all Afghans
 Afghan government is
corrupt and inefficient
 Acceptance of election results
and respect for political
opponents

4. Corruption and Rule of Law
 Unemployment, cronyism,
nepotism, and official
malfeasance
 No quality control, no project
follow-ups, and no impact
assessment of projects
 High level of corruption in
Afghan governments and
institutions
 NGOs and CSOs must also be
accountable
 The problems of the people are
not identified; they are not met
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Table 1 cont.
5. International communities should
increase funding to Afghans
 Increase funding to avoid
disaster after drawdown of
forces in 2014
 International donors not
helping to fund Afghan aid
programs
 Funding increased in 2001
 Used personal funds to start
humanitarian aid agency

6. Human sacrifice and the cost of
conflict
 Every Afghan family has lost
someone to war
 Sacrifices on behalf of
Afghanistan
 Brain drain as professionals,
experts, and intellectuals
emigrate to other countries

5. Drawdown in 2014 may lead to chaos,
but orderly transition may help avoid
chaos
 Economic, military, and
political transition
 Make peace not war with
Taliban
 Reduction in aid funding
 Increase in interference from
neighboring countries may lead
to political instability and brain
drain
 May lose what has been
achieved
6. Many changes came to Afghanistan
 Infrastructural development
 Development of human capital
 Social justice and equal rights
for women
 Good governance and rule of
law

7. Afghans are not terrorists; war and
insecurities are imported from other
countries
 We have not created war or
terrorism
 America and Pakistan created
Taliban for Afghanistan
 The base of terrorism is in
Pakistan, not in Afghanistan
 Osama bin Laden killed in
Pakistan

For the efficacy of this study, I used the following themes to best represent and
give meanings to the most significant aspects of all the face-to-face interviews and focus
group discussions that yielded the thirteen themes noted above: Security/Insecurity;
Funding; Trust; Abandonment; Achievement; and Interventionism. These six themes and
their sub-themes will be discussed in the following section. As I discuss the themes and
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the sub-themes, direct quotations from the participants are used to support the themes,
and the participants’ voices from their stories are annotated in quotes and italics. To
provide clarity and richness to the themes, occasional references are made to existing
literature and research studies that validate the stories and experiences of Afghan aid
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also included are some instances where participant’s
stories contradict other participant’s accounts, or contradict existing literature. In the
following section, I analyze each theme with a fundamental objective of giving voice to
the narrators of these dominant narratives. I believe that these themes are exhaustive and
best represent the perceptions of the participants of this study.
Security/Insecurity.

The

words

security

and

insecurity

were

used

interchangeably by most of the participants in the study to convey the same feeling of
concern for safety. They often spoke of security in the context of insecurity or feeling
insecure, and vice versa. The issue of security or lack of security was always at the core
of this research study and has framed the main issues that have guided this narrative
study.
All interview participants, including the focus group participants, viewed the
security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural areas of the country, as one of
the major issues facing the Afghan government and the people of Afghanistan. Much of
what is said about the need for security is a manifestation of the insecurity that permeates
all sectors of Afghan society.
Sub-Theme: Insecurity is the biggest challenge. The main underlining issue in
Afghanistan is the lack of security; hence, the United Nations and other experts have
termed the condition in Afghanistan a complex political emergency, where there is
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“considerable breakdown of authority” such that government institutions no longer have
the capacity to protect its citizens from insurgents who operate with impunity (United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999, p. 6). The issue of
insecurity extends beyond attacks on innocent civilians; it is systemic—a structural
collapse of law and order with rampant corruption, indicative of an underdeveloped third
world nation where the citizens yearn for change and structural development, but the
leadership and the powerful lack the capacity and the will to create and enact meaningful
change to protect and improve the lives of its citizens.
AB felt that the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan is that there has been no
retribution for crimes and atrocities committed against Afghans during the Taliban and
Mujahedeen regimes, and argued that the oppressors from the past regimes were now in
power with no indications that they will relinquish governing power to a more forward
thinking and progressive generation of leaders. According to AB, the former war lords
who oppressed the Afghan people and “committed all sorts of crimes and done all sorts
of cruelty to the people” are now the ones running the government. He believes that the
people’s only hope of eventually governing their country with progressive leaders who
are more interested in making a difference for all the people of Afghanistan is that these
“criminal will die.”
SD saw the correlation between insecurities and the lack of law and order or the
inability to enforce existing laws that are meant to protect the people and provide a
pathway for the development of Afghanistan. She agreed that the major challenge facing
Afghanistan is the insecurity and suicide attacks. Her organization’s focus was to educate
Afghan women, so they were able to set up the first “intensive education” center in the

138
area, but they experienced difficulties due to insecurities in the area, not only as a result
of the Taliban presence in the area. She was also disappointed to discover that most
Afghans were not willing to send their daughters and their sisters to school for fear of
reprisal from the Taliban or others in the communities.
“We wanted the women to be educated and this school was running very well. It
was the first one in that area. The area was insecure; the Taliban presence was in
that area, so the school was stopped.”
For RMD, the biggest issue facing Afghanistan is the kidnapping of humanitarian
aid workers. He said that even though the communities rallied to their aid, nobody wants
to be kidnapped, so in the end the poor and needy Afghans suffer from deprivation of
their basic needs. According to RMD, the “security situation is not good for NGOs to
work.” He said that Afghan humanitarian aid workers were kidnapped frequently,
making it very difficult he said, “…to work now as an aid worker in Afghanistan.” This
issue of violence against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan was one of the key
factors that prompted this investigation into the lived experiences of Afghan
humanitarian aid workers.
A focus group participant said that the lawlessness and the structural violence that
undermines the Afghan society create an environment that is enticing to their neighbors
whose goal is to create mayhem among the people and destabilize the political and
economic sectors by interfering in Afghan affairs. However, he felt that much of the
insecurities in Afghanistan are fueled by “high unemployment” and a “culture of systemic
corruption.” He claimed that many nations are making Afghanistan an “apogee” for their
conflicts, particularly referring to the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.
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AA sees the military incursions into Afghan communities by the U.S. military and
NATO troops, as the major set-back since the war on terror. Even though the arrival of
the U.S. and NATO troops brought investments, developments, and opportunities to
Afghanistan, he argued that military incursions into Afghan homes affected relationships
between Afghan aid workers and the local communities;
“Bombarding women, children, and poor people in communities has created bad
feelings among Afghan communities.”
AA shared an experience during a visit to an Afghan community; he said the
people blamed the foreign forces for the insecurities, including Pakistan, and claimed that
the U.S. and NATO forces are encouraging and supporting the military interventions
coming from neighboring countries. His hope is that when the U.S. and NATO forces
leave Afghanistan, “maybe, the security will be better.” AA said that when he talks to
Afghans in the rural communities, many of them are worried about the insecurities in
their communities, and they blame “America and their allies” for bringing this condition
to their country.
Sub-Theme: Every day, the security is getting worse. Several studies and reports
have shown that the violence in Afghanistan has progressively worsened since the arrival
of the U.S. and NATO forces, and pointed to the rise in violence perpetrated against
humanitarian aid workers in complex political emergencies such as Afghanistan,
Somalia, and Sudan. According to the recent Aid Worker Security Report (Harmer,
Stoddard, & Toth, 2013), Afghanistan had the highest number of attacks on aid workers
in 2012, with a number of 56 attacks compared to second place South Sudan with 21
attacks, with Syria coming in third with 18 attacks, and Somalia and Pakistan tied for
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fourth place with 17 attacks. The report questions whether Syria is likely to “drop off the
‘most dangerous’ list, or become like Afghanistan, where aid workers are used as proxy
targets” (2013, p. 3). A focus group participant articulated the point of view that security
has worsened since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO forces, and argued that security was
better in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime. He made a comparison between the
Taliban era and the current period with the U.S. and NATO troops, indicating that in the
Taliban era people felt safe walking around “with a bag of gold” without feeling
threatened that someone might attempt a robbery. He said, “…nobody would dare to stop
you or try to take it from you.” However, he also acknowledged the high cost of such
security provided by the Taliban. With the heavy-handedness of the Taliban security
enforcement and the loss of individual freedom and liberty, they created an atmosphere of
fear and intimidation. He asserted:
“You would have been able to travel to different parts of Afghanistan with full
confidence. However, there were limitations as my colleagues would agree,
during the Taliban era, people were not free to pursue their dreams and live
independently.”
He made the argument that the Western troops were in Afghanistan for the sole
purpose of executing the war on terror and not for the progress of Afghan people: “the
existence of international community in Afghanistan, under the theme of supporting
Afghans was really about the war against terror.”
Another participant from the focus group echoed this point of view—that the U.S.
and NATO forces have not been able to bring security to Afghanistan—saying that
people expected that their presence in Afghanistan would bring peace and security to the
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Afghan people. He stated that during the early stages of the U.S. and NATO operations in
Afghanistan, it was safe to travel to different parts of the country without fear of
violence, but now, he said, “You cannot go to the Maidan Shahr.”
Another focus group participant saw the lack of security as a super power design,
a certain belief that the first world purposely does not want peace in Afghanistan, so they
(the U.S. and Russia) intentionally created these conflicts. He argued that:
“Insecurities in Afghanistan started when the coalition forces came to
Afghanistan. America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan? All the nations in
Afghanistan are here protecting their own national interests. Russia does not
want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also
China as a major economic power does not want America in its border, and
China thinks that if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise
against Chinese Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back
on America; it’s not only Pakistan, not only Iran that is causing the insecurity and
struggles against America.”
These are examples of narratives that are constructed from historical, social, and
political conditions in environments. I am reminded of the many conspiracy theories that
have often been used to explain phenomena in the American experience—such as the
notion that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated by the U.S. government as a
pretext to start wars in the Middle East, or that crack-cocaine and the AIDS virus were
purposely developed to affect and destroy the African American communities, or even
the more recent controversy of President Obama’s place of birth, which some continues
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to argue that he was not born in the United States. In a University of Chicago research by
Oliver and Wood (2014), they define conspiracy theory as:
Narratives about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating political and
social plots and calamities to further their own nefarious goals. (Davis, 1971, as
cited in Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 1).
This University of Chicago study finds that “conspiracism” as they labeled it was not
simply an “important form of public opinion, but expressive of some latent principles
behind Americans’ political beliefs” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 3). In other words, this is
how some people express and construct meaning to explain phenomena that they
experienced. Oliver and Wood conclude that conspiracy theories can help us understand
how individuals perceive and ascribe meaning to events and phenomena that shape the
world in which they live (2014).
A focus group participant wondered why Afghanistan continues to struggle with
insecurities with all the efforts and military might of the U.S. and NATO troops. He had a
sceptical view of the force presence in Afghanistan and questioned its commitment to
maintaining security and protecting the Afghan people. He remembered when the
Americans first came to Afghanistan; he said the Taliban was “toppled within 48 hours,”
and asked why the Taliban have become “strong and powerful.” My participants
wondered why the U.S. and NATO troops continue to have difficulties with a less
equipped, and less sophisticated Taliban.
Sub-Theme: Afghans are not terrorists; insecurities are coming from outside
Afghanistan. The belief that terrorism and insecurities that have been the main issues
impacting lives in Afghanistan for many years, and even led to the war on terror, is not
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home grown but foreign to Afghanistan. My participants claimed that the Taliban are not
Afghans, after all, Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, and that many of the Islamists
and Jihadist come from outside of Afghanistan. Some have blamed the United States and
its allies for not doing enough to stop the terrorists from entering Afghanistan. When I
asked where the insecurity was coming from, RMD argued that the insecurity is not
coming from Afghan communities, and blamed the Taliban saying that:
“The insecurity is coming from the Taliban or from those who are involved in
war. They want to make money. Kidnapping NGO workers is one source of
making money for them.”
AG argued that terrorism is not in the culture of Afghan people; he said that the
terrorists and the Taliban focus on rural Afghans who are uneducated and take advantage
of them. According to AG, the terrorists are foreign fighters from neighboring countries
who come to Afghanistan and set up terror organizations. He said,
“They take advantage of the people’s kindness and start different terrorism
activities; such as the one that destroyed the World Trade Center in America.
These activities are international terrorism activities, not Afghan local terrorist
activity.”
During my stay in Kabul, one of the attacks took place close to a compound
where I had conducted an interview the previous day. RMD commented on the attack,
asking how such attacks could still be happening in the middle of Kabul, the capital city
of Afghanistan. According to RMD, the war on terror has been going on for about twelve
years, but the life of the ordinary Afghan is not better; he said, “The poverty rate is still
the same, and the social service is still the same.” Hence, he said the people are worried
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of what will happen when the U.S. and NATO troops drawdown in 2014. He made the
argument that:
“When the people have no hope, they cannot feed themselves and their families;
the number of the Taliban is increasing because when the people are poor and
cannot help themselves, the Taliban is active and recruiting. The people do not
have any chance.”
For SP, her view is that Afghanistan needs development and not war, so people
can find employment and be able to support their families. She argued that if people have
no opportunities to earn a living and create better lives for their families, they are more
likely to be seduced into terrorist acts. She insisted that the source of terrorism was never
in Afghanistan and blames Pakistan for radicalizing Afghan youths. According to
Burton’s basic human needs theory (1992, 1990, 1997), if people are frustrated from
satisfying their basic need to provide for themselves and take care of their families, and if
the structural violence denies them the ability to hope and diminishes their sense of
identity, they will do whatever is necessary to fulfil their unmet needs, even if it means
going against the social norms. Stern (2003) posits that such conditions lead to
vulnerabilities that make individuals prime targets for jihadist and terror recruits.
SP called on the U.S. and the international communities to help Afghanistan to
develop its own security, so that Afghan forces are able to secure Afghan borders with its
neighbors. She called on the people of Afghanistan to “be vigilant” and not to be
“deceived by fundamentalists and criminals against democracy who operate under the
name of religion.”
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According to Stern (2003), leaders of terrorist groups will often use religion to
appeal to the hopes and sentiments of vulnerable young men and women they seek to
recruit and radicalize.
On a hallway wall directly facing the entrance door into RS’s office hung a large
framed writing in bold blue Arabic letters: “STOP THE VIOLENCE.” For RS, the
violence is structural; it is not only against Afghan women, but against all Afghans.
Sub-Theme: Bridging roles endanger Afghan aid workers. The dominant
narrative from my participants is that Afghan NGOs have played critical and significant
roles in the war on terror. Afghan humanitarian aid workers are said to be the main
‘bridge’ between the local communities and the Afghan government, and between the
local Afghan communities and the international NGOs. Several participants said that both
the Afghan government and the international NGOs had difficulties building and
maintaining good relationships with the Afghan communities. They claimed that in many
instances, the Afghan aid worker is the only one who is able to go into certain rural
Afghan communities where the Taliban has stronghold, but because the people
desperately need the assistance from the aid workers, the Taliban is forced to look the
other way and allow the relationship to flourish. RMD made the argument that NGOs and
CSOs are the main implementers of government programs in rural insecure areas of
Afghanistan. He made the argument that the people in the remote areas of the country do
not trust the Afghan government, but they are very supportive of the Afghan aid workers.
He said that the relationship between the Afghan aid workers and the communities dates
back to past regimes.
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“They know that they will lose these services if anything happens to our
organization, so they are very protective and supportive. If any of our staff is
threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take action for
their release.”
However, RMD warned that the insecurity creates unsafe conditions for Afghan
aid workers, particularly in the rural provinces of Ghazni and Kandahar where he said aid
workers are kidnapped “every other day.” Even though most of the kidnapped aid
workers are released with the help of the community leaders, RMD insisted that it is not
safe to work as aid worker in Afghanistan. He believes that the kidnapping of aid workers
is simply a strategy by terror groups to negotiate ransom payment for aid workers they
hold captive; he insisted that aid workers are perceived to be good targets for ransom.
According to EIJ, Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan;
he attributed this to the fact that the Afghan aid workers, unlike the Afghan government,
have always maintained good relationships with the Afghan people. He argued that
Afghan aid workers use a “participatory approach” to address and find resolution for
community and individual issues. Most of all, he said, “they are from the community”
and work for the benefit of the Afghan people.
“I’ll give you an example; there was an irrigation project in a very insecure
village that the government could not dare to step in. But this NGO went in to the
village and it’s carrying out irrigation activities for the benefit of the people with
the support and assistance of the people. There is no Afghan government in that
village, but the Taliban is there, but because the community is directly working
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with the NGO, the Taliban does not say anything because people in the village
are working.”
As I noted in an earlier section, NGOs are under pressure from the communities
they serve to continue to provide aid services without risking their security, and pressured
by the government to implement their programs; they are also under pressure from the
military, donors, and different groups pressuring them to align with different strategies.
In addition, they are pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition groups (AOGs)
who threaten their safety” (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 4). They compared
the struggle between the NGOs and the military with being “engaged in a complex dance
with shadowy partners whose moves are increasingly unpredictable and deadly” (2008, p.
74).
One of the things that AB pointed out during my interview was the nightly
incursions by the U.S. military and NATO forces into Afghan communities. He felt that
the military incursions affected perception of aid workers in Afghan communities and
jeopardized the trusting relations the Afghan aid workers had developed with the
communities over the years. AB feels that such incursions that cause the loss of life to
Afghans in the communities could have significant consequences for Afghan aid workers
after the pull out of U.S. and NATO forces. He argued that the people are not happy
because the incursions or drone attacks cost them the loss of lives of their family
members. He said that the talk in the communities now is that the Afghan aid workers are
with “those people who were bombing the villages.”
AB argued that when the U.S. and NATO troops leave Afghanistan, the Afghan
aid workers will be treated as the ones who worked with the enemies that raided their
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homes at night. He warned that the Afghan aid workers cannot afford this type of image,
noting that at first it was the collaboration with the PRTs, which he felt was a disaster and
contradiction with the humanitarian principle of neutrality and independence and created
more precarious conditions for aid workers in Afghanistan. For that reason he and other
Afghan humanitarian aid workers opposed working with the PRTs, and they were very
happy to learn that the PRT program was halted in Afghanistan.
A focus group participant agreed that the Afghan aid workers have played
significant roles as ‘bridge’ for Afghan government and international NGOs to provide
desperately needed aid in the Afghan communities; however, he pointed out that these
roles might also be responsible for exposing Afghan aid workers in conditions of high
risks that lead to violent attacks:
“Due to the present security situation, our government and other international
supporters are not able to deliver services to the needy people in certain
environments. Besides, I agree with my friend that some civil societies are acting
like a bridge between communities and governmental authorities. But in my
opinion, this is a very risky task that sometimes put aid workers at risk.”
Above all, the number one issue that the participants felt were responsible for the
violent conditions is the issue of youth joblessness. They said that there are no job
opportunities for the youths of Afghanistan; most of the youths are without jobs, and
cannot find work to earn a living or support their families. They link the issue of
joblessness to security—a key issue of basic human need—that if people’s abilities to
fulfill their basic needs are frustrated, they will opt for other means to fulfill those basic
needs, even if it means going against the social norm (Burton, 1990).
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According to Stern’s (2003) interviews with Hamas leaders, they assert that
conditions of joblessness and despair create favorable environments for recruiting
jihadist, in their words, “Hardships always bring people back to God. It is like sickness”
(p. 38). Stern posits that when people feel deprived and have no hope, but can see how
others live in comfort and opulence, it is easy to understand why there is not a shortage of
those who will volunteer for martyrdom (2003).
AB believes that there is a correlation between not having opportunities for
youths and insecurities. He said that if there are opportunities in Afghanistan for young
men and women to have hope—to have opportunities to earn a living and be able to
provide for their families—they will not be the ideal candidates to be radicalized into
terror groups or jihadist training camps.
Funding. Many of the participants saw funding as fundamental to maintaining
stability in Afghanistan, and the lack of funding as a precursor to the violence and
insecurities gripping their country. They argued that international funding is necessary
and crucial for creating economic activities that will provide employment and
opportunities for young Afghans, so they are able to earn a living and support their
families. Such economic opportunities, AB believed, will deter young Afghans from
fundamentalism and jihadist aspirations, which he said were preached to vulnerable
young men and women by those he referred to as “some elements in our neighborhood”
who are appealing to young Afghans about the holy war and martyrdom—that “if they
kill themselves they will be going to Janna.” AB argued that “joblessness and unequal
distribution of the revenues” were the main issues that caused past “skirmishes and
fighting.” He maintains that if one has a job and he or she is able to feed themselves, and
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provide for their family, they will not have the need to seek or join any jihadist or
terrorist groups.
However, AB was quick to point out that the war on terror brought many
developments to Afghanistan. Speaking about how the arrival of the U.S. forces in 2002
affected his organization, he noted that the arrival of the U.S. forces brought influx of
economic activities to Afghanistan as many new businesses formed and old and dying
businesses were revitalized.
Sub-Theme: Afghan NGOs do not have direct access to funds. This issue of lack
of direct funding by donors to Afghan NGOs resonated with many participants.
Particularly during the focus group discussions, one could feel the intensity and passion
in the room. Voices were raised and everyone, including the participant who introduced
the topic by challenging the dominant notion that Afghan aid workers were the main
implementers of aid programs in the mostly insecure environments, agreed that the
Afghan aid workers were able to go into insecure areas that the Afghan governments and
the international NGOs could not go, because the Afghan aid workers “established good
relations with the people and the people trust them,” but the participant said that the one
challenge for Afghan NGO management is to determine the actual percentage of the
initial aid given that ultimately reaches the final beneficiary. He gave an example to
illustrate his point:
“The United State gives some funds or money to USAID. USAID gives this money
to United Nation. United Nation gives this money to International NGO. The
international NGO gives some amount of that to the Afghan NGOs. Then the
Afghan NGOs will implement the project and then a small amount will go to the
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direct beneficial of the product. So I mean the Afghan NGOs don’t have direct
access to the funds.
The focus group participants agreed that this is a big challenge and a major
problem for the Afghan CSOs and Afghan NGOs and their Afghan aid workers in the
field. Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008) alluded to the frustration and the
dissatisfaction of local NGOs on several issues, particularly the debate on civil-military
collaboration and NGO funding. The Afghan aid workers complained that often local
Afghan NGOs were underfunded unlike the international NGOs.
Many participants talked about the lack of funding available for them to start their
humanitarian aid organizations; most participants used their personal funds, quite often
funds from family savings, while some had to discontinue certain programs due to
inadequate funding. SD said that she sought funds to start up a kindergarten for children,
in order to help Afghan women so they have a place to leave their young children and
babies while they went to work. However, she was not able to get funding, so she used
her own personal funds to start it, but she still needed money to keep it open.
Unfortunately, she did not receive any responses from the proposals she sent to donors.
When I interviewed her in Kabul, she was still upset about not being able to keep the
kindergarten open. She said that most Afghan women who work have no one to take care
of their young children while they are at work. That was why she felt the need to set up a
day care for young mothers, but unfortunately, she said,
“No one helped, no organization assisted to fund this kindergarten and so I lost
the kindergarten… they do not pay any attention to this pressing problem.”
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RMD shared similar experience with donors not directly funding local Afghan
programs. Unable to get funding, they started their aid organization in Pakistan, and now
the agency has grown to several offices in Afghanistan. At the beginning, once he
realized that the donors were not going to give him start-up money, they decided to start
their organization by volunteering some services for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The
agency has since grown to eleven Afghan locations with its home office in Kabul.
“Our main activities are education, peace building, community peace building,
community organization, advocacy, and community health program.”
For AB, he said that funding activities increased with the arrival of the U.S. and
the international military forces. According to AB, prior to the arrival of the U.S. and
NATO troops, many Afghan aid workers were having difficulties raising funds: “all the
other organizations were in a terrible situation like in 1999 and 2000.” However, after
2002, with the arrival of the U.S., many projects saw a lot of growth. He said economic
activities and opportunities increased for everyone:
“After 9/11; many actors entered into Afghanistan, and the funding situation
became very good to frankly speaking. In terms of reconstruction of the country,
many things had happened.”
AB feels that funding for Afghan projects has diminished since 2011, and this
decrease in funding is impacting many local Afghan programs. In his bicycle program for
the disabled, there has been no funding for the last two years. He said that it has been
difficult trying to raise funds to run the bicycle program because “sometimes donors want
their own kind of things and that was basically it.” AB recalled attending a conference in
Jalalabad, Afghanistan; he said, “There were ministers and people from foreign affairs,
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almost 160 countries.” He presented on the impact of the bicycle program for people
with disabilities, but to his surprise, his program was never funded. He spoke proudly
about the program accomplishments:
“We graduated thousands of people from this program - more than 5,000 people.
They are freely mobile now and they can work, they can have a job, they can
complete their schools and so I’m satisfied.”
AB postulated that the lack of funding has become a major problem as
Afghanistan approaches the U.S. plan to drawdown forces in 2014. He feels that there is
“tremendous downfall” in humanitarian funding and insisted that funding has diminished
significantly. He shared:
“In most of our projects right now, we have problems. The only hope is for
funding to be kept in the same level like it was two or three years ago.”
AA was quite optimistic, suggesting that his agency had “good reputation among
the donors.” He said that his aid agency gets funding from donors, and they have been
able to develop projects in different areas of Afghanistan.
“It’s a good value for us; I think we have a good reputation.”
When I asked him why he thought his agency has been able to get funds from donors, he
attributed his success to maintaining a good reputation with donors.
AB remembered the first time his agency received funding from the Afghan
Refugees Funds based in London, England. He said, “We got $40,000 from them to start
in Jalalabad.”
According to AB, it all began when he presented his bicycle idea to other
orthopedic doctors, and they liked the idea very much and encouraged him to implement
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it. He also shared his idea with some friends from the U.S. who had come to Peshawar,
Afghanistan, to bring medical help to the people. He said they all encouraged him,
saying,
“Doctor, go ahead with this, this is the perfect idea and they encouraged me a lot.
And then I shared this with the other aid communities and then they said, go
ahead with it. So the first time we got funding was from Afghan Refugees Fund
based in London”
Even though many participants agreed that funding for programs and projects
increased with the arrival of the U.S. and the international forces, many of the
participants who run their own NGOs said that they had to use their own personal funds
to sustain some of their aid programs.
Sub-Theme: Increase funding to avoid disaster after U.S. drawdown of forces
in 2014. AA warned about the consequences of not maintaining a strong Afghan
economy, echoing the argument made by Burton on Sites’ control theory (1973), in
which he argues that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual human needs are the
key sources of societal order and change. He insists that people will fight and risk dying
to protect values related to need gratification. They argue that the desire to satisfy basic
needs is so strong that people are willing to “step out of the real world into a world of
their own” in order to seek the satisfaction of their basic needs or simply to “escape their
complete frustration” (Sites, 1973, p. 10). Burton and Sites agree that if individuals are
not able to satisfy their needs through legal, morally or socially justifiable means, they
will seek other means necessary, including causing harm to themselves or others (Burton,
1990, p. 96). According to Burton, basic human needs will be pursued without regard to
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the consequences, even when it leads to conflict. Therefore, the desire for individuals to
seek and satisfy their basic needs is a fundamental precondition for maintaining social
order. He argues that any society’s ability to function is dependent on its individual
citizen’s ability to fulfill their basic human needs (1990, 1997). AA argued that when
people are jobless and have no means to provide for themselves, they will seek other
alternative options. He said that “If they are not working in Afghanistan they will go to
Pakistan and they will join with the Taliban or terrorism.” AA sees this as a major issue
facing Afghanistan and the world. He believes that it is “very important for the
government of Afghanistan and international community to create jobs for the people, so
they are able to support themselves and their families” so they do not become prey for
those who seek vulnerable men and women to recruit into terror groups.
RMD appeals to the international community not to decrease funding to the
private sector in Afghanistan. He argued that the local NGOs need the help of the
international community to fund programs that provide and sustain basic needs for many
poor Afghans. He pleaded with the international community not to forget the people of
Afghanistan, and blamed the contractors from the U.S. whom he said were “eating all the
money and not serving the people.” RMD assured the international community that the
Afghan NGOs are “committed to provide services to rural communities.” What they
need most, he said, is help from the international community to provide them with the
funds to meet their obligation to the Afghan people who desperately need their help.
RMD pleaded to the international community:
“not to forget the people of Afghanistan, these people are very poor and some of
them do not have a piece of bread to eat, they need a lot of support…”
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AB warned that youth joblessness and the lack of opportunities were the main
causes of past wars in Afghanistan. He said that “If I have a job and I can feed my
children, I will not be going to join any group.” He argued that if one has opportunities to
make a living and provide for their family, they will not be attracted to groups that “do
roadside bombing or kill himself or blow himself or things like that.” AB feels that if
these conditions of structural violence in Afghan society are addressed, it would be more
difficult for “some elements in our neighborhood that are spreading propaganda about a
holy war and going to Janna.”
AB believes that the U.S. and the West are spending a lot of money on military
strategies to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. He challenged the Western leaders to spend
“just 10% of those cost that they were using on militaries on civil affairs in Afghanistan,”
and he is promising that such strategies will take away the incentives for terror. As a
result, he said, “there will be no fighting.” AB’s message to President Obama is not to
abandon Afghanistan; he insisted that Afghanistan still needs U.S. assistance and support
in “building up the national police and the military,” financial support, and technical
support to create opportunities for people to be able to earn a decent living.
SP appealed to the people of the U.S. to help Afghan people, “especially Afghan
women,” but she insisted on “accountability” from any group that is receiving funding
assistance. She said that Afghan people are very “grateful for the generous support –
please don’t stop now.” She challenged the Afghan humanitarian aid community to insist
on transparency and accountability.
Sub-Theme: The influx of funds also created corruption and greed. Many of the
participants talked about the influx of money into Afghanistan with the arrival of U.S.
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and NATO troops in 2001, and all sectors of the Afghan society experienced sharp
increases in funding and business activities. This included the humanitarian aid agencies,
which AB said were experiencing low to almost no funding activities in the late 1990s
before the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops. He said that many of the Afghan NGOs
were closing their doors prior to the arrival of the U.S. and the foreign troops; however,
after 2002, many business organizations and humanitarian agencies “new actors and old
actors” come to Afghanistan. He said that a lot of developments have taken place since
the arrival of U.S. troops to improve the lives of many Afghans.
A focus group participant talks about the influx of funds into Afghanistan after
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops; however, he said that along with the increase in
funding came widespread corruption in all sectors of society, including the humanitarian
aid community. He insisted that Afghanistan did not have a history of corruption prior to
the U.S. arrival and the influx of “A huge amount of money.” He blamed the international
community for the current high rates of corruption and maleficence in the Afghan
society, and he called on the Afghan humanitarian aid community to condemn those
within the aid community that are misusing funds that were meant to benefit Afghans in
desperate need.
My participant claimed that claimed that some donors were not consulting with
the government:
“They develop their programs unilaterally, and seek agencies to implement
them.”
He argued that the Afghan government and the Afghan people were taken out of the
picture, and that made it difficult to focus on the people’s business. Instead, a lot of

158
money was spent on programs and projects “under the pretext of development for the
people.” He said,
“If someone gets sick and goes to the doctor, first of all, the doctor will diagnose
the problem and then based on the problem, prescribe the medicine. In our case,
it’s the other way around, there are no diagnostics, and there is no effort at
identification of the real problem of the people”
The Afghan government and the Afghan NGOs disagree on how the Afghan
NGOs are to be funded by international donors. The government wants all international
funding to be directed through a government agency; however, the Afghan NGOs
disagree. They seek direct funding from the donors. The NGOs argue that the
government is corrupt and its agencies are inefficient. They contend that such a policy
will delay assistance to people who urgently need help, and would increase the cost of
providing desperately needed services because local NGOs will have to pay bribes to
government officials. AA shared information from a recent meeting local NGO heads and
the Ministry of Economic Development: that 200 Local NGOs will be closing in a few
months as a result of a new policy by the Afghan government that foreign donors must
now fund Afghan NGOs through the Afghan government—that Afghan NGOs can no
longer receive funds directly from international donors. This angered the Afghan NGOs
who argue that the government does not have access to the rural communities. They say
that:
“NGOs have the capacity to work in the remote areas, and bring assistance
directly to the people, so we requested from international community to close
relations with government and support the NGO sectors.”
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Trust. The issue of trust is deep-rooted in the relationship between the
participants of this study and the local Afghan communities who depend on them for
most of their basic needs. Many of the participants’ narratives depicted insecure
conditions that exposed aid workers to risk of violent attacks. Even when the aid workers
were aware of the potential dangers and risk of attacks and kidnapping, they trusted the
communities for their protection. Many participants described the relationship between
the Afghan NGOs and the local Afghan communities as a “bridge”—referring to the
Afghan aid workers as “implementers of aid programs” from the Afghan government and
the international community. A dominant narrative used by most participants to express
the theme of trust was: “We are Afghans and we are in the communities.”
Sub-Theme: Afghan NGOs are implementers of aid programs and the people
trust them. According to a focus group participant, since the 1980s, Afghan NGOs have
been working in local Afghan villages and communities, distributing and providing
desperately needed humanitarian aid to the people. Since the arrival of the U.S. and the
international military troops, Afghan NGOs were the only ones that could go into
insecure communities where the International NGOs and the Afghan government could
not go. The main roles of the Afghan humanitarian aid workers have been as a “bridge”
and “implementers” of aid programs and services from the Afghan government and the
international communities to the local Afghan communities and villages.
EIJ believes that Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan
since the war on terror. He posited that Afghan aid workers have always had good
relationships with the people of Afghanistan because he said, “they are from the people
and they work for the people.” The dominant argument is that unlike the Afghan
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government or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the Afghan humanitarian
aid workers “consult with the people”; they use a “participatory approach,” which
invites the community leaders to become part of the problem-solving, allowing the
communities and the local Afghan NGOs to work together towards a common goal for
the benefit of the people. He said that at the beginning of every project, they develop a
needs assessment to determine the community’s priorities, so they have a road map on
how to address specific problems.
“Through consultation with the people, they try to help resolving the issue
together with the people. For example right now, we are constructing three clinics
in the country, and each of these clinics is situated 100 to 150 kilometers from the
center of the province. So we talked with the people because for the construction
of the building we need a piece of land, and the people allocated us a piece of
land in one of the old graveyards and now the work is continuing there and we
hope that in the next two months, we’ll have the whole clinic ready for service.”
EIJ argued that unlike the “Afghan government bureaucracies, which take too
long to complete projects, the Afghan NGOs are able to work directly with the
communities, so they are more efficient and better at developing new within the
communities.
“There is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but
because the community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not
say anything because people in the village are working.”
RMD posited that Afghan humanitarian aid workers have been serving the local
Afghan communities for several decades during the different regimes that have occupied
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and ruled Afghanistan. He noted that Afghan NGOs are “independent bodies” and do not
take sides in any conflicts. NGOs are guided by their humanitarian principles of
neutrality to provide help to all individual in need. RMD argues that Afghan aid workers
involve the communities as partners in the projects, so community leaders are part of the
decision making process and take active roles in resolving potential conflicts and
determining the needs of the people.
“We have 28 clinics in Ghazni, and we have the health services for very poor
people in the village. They know that they will lose these services if anything
happens to our organization, so they are very protective and supportive. If any of
our staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take
action for their release.”
Likewise, the community leaders are invested in the projects and services
provided by the Afghan aid workers, so they have a vested interest in making sure that
the aid workers are protected from harm.
Sub-Theme: Afghan humanitarian aid workers’ roles cause distrust and expose
them to risk. A focus group participant shared his opinion regarding the role of Afghan
aid workers in the war on terror. He agreed with other participants that the Afghan aid
worker is like a “bridge” connecting the communities with the Afghan governments and
the international communities, most of whom are unable to reach aid beneficiaries in
rural and insecure areas. However, he argued that the “bridge” roles might also be
exposing aid workers to risks of violence.
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“I agree with my friend that some civil societies are acting like a bridge between
communities and governmental authorities. But in my opinion, this is a very risky
task that sometimes puts aid workers at risk.”
EIJ agreed with the assertion that Afghan aid workers are able to go into rural
communities where the Afghan government agencies are not able to go because of the
presence of insurgents. He argued that such roles could lead to risks of danger since there
is no Afghan security presence in the rural areas; should the aid workers need protection,
he posited:
“There is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but
because the community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not
say anything because people in the village are working.”
Another focus group participant shared the point of view that from the very
beginning, Afghan aid workers established credibility and a good working relationship
with the local Afghan communities. He argued that this relationship was developed from
close collaborations with people in the communities by working closely with the
community leaders and designing programs to fit their specific needs.
However, when the PRTs started the “Winning hearts and minds” program and
Afghan aid workers began to collaborate with the PRTs on several projects, the people
became suspicious of the aid workers’ allegiance to the communities, and the trusting
relationship was affected. He said that aid workers were confronted in rural communities
and asked if they had any weapons on them. The people became suspicious; and this
began to affect the relationship with the Afghan communities.
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AB further clarified this dilemma that the Afghan NGOs find themselves vis-à-vis
their collaborative relationships with the U.S. military forces, which former U.S.
Secretary of State, Retired General Colon Powell welcomed as “force multiplier”
strategy for the U.S. (Ferris, 2010). On the other hand, this interaction with the military
affects the long standing relationship that Afghan humanitarian aid workers had
developed with their local communities. AB was quick to condemn any working
relationships with the PRTs, arguing that such relationships created a “bad image” of aid
workers in the communities. He said the people were associating the Afghan aid workers
with the foreign military forces—“those people who were bombing the villages.” He
warned that interactions with the PRTs or the foreign military forces could produce
hostile responses from the communities when the U.S. and NATO troops pull out from
Afghanistan in 2014.
AB was critical of the PRT’s approach in dealing with the local communities. He
argued that PRTs needed to be more sensitive to the community’s needs instead of
dismissing their points of view or any concerns the community might have, and simply
insisting that community leaders should welcome them: “After all, we are building a
bridge for you.” He accused the PRTs of indifference and not treating the Afghan
communities with compassion.
From the review of current literature, Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. (2008) allege
that the military is driven by “Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) theory”, which is
seen as a “charity paradigm” for the “deserving poor” (p. 7). On the other hand, they
claim NGOs have spent several years building understanding and service dedicated to
eradicating the “handout mentality” and working to bring “ownership, involvement, and
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empowerment” to the Afghan people (p. 7). They argue that the military should be
cognizant of how their “charitable acts can undermine NGO activities” (p. 7) and
relationships with the communities.
According to AB, the people are suspicious of foreign military forces; he argued
that Afghans have had negative experiences with foreign military troops, particularly the
“super-powers.” AB said the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and before them were
the British, who also invaded, and now the Americans. He said,
“The general image of these super powers is not so good in the minds of the
Afghan people.”
A focus group participant noted on the post-it note that:
“Before the U.S. Forces arrived, Afghan aid workers were able to work among
the people, but after the arrival of the U.S. Forces, the Afghan aid workers were
perceived to be helpers of U.S. Forces.”
Another participant made this entry on a post-it note:
“People call aid workers spy of the Americans.”
The question that Strand (2007) posed in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan
Trust” is germane to this study:
Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined
compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s? Why were people not coming
out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past?
(Strand, 2007, p. 9, 11)
Why? When I posed this question to my participants, the dominant narratives in
response to the question centered on the conditions of despair—that “the people have lost
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hope”—that what they expected is not what they got. They had expected that the
“Americans” will solve all their problems, bring them new hope, get rid of the war lords
and the foreign fighters, and stop the interventions from the neighboring countries, but
instead they have insecurity, corruption, and “the people are not safe.” The people have
lost hope.
Sub-Theme: Corruption and abuse cause distrust. The main issue at the center
of this theme is linked to the questions that Strand (2007) posed on why the people are no
longer welcoming and why are they no longer trusting. As noted in the previous subtheme section, what the people were expecting from the “Americans” was not what they
got, but in this sub-theme, it can be understood that maybe the people might have gotten
more than they expected. EIJ asserted that after 2002, a lot of developments came to
Afghanistan and created many opportunities for the people:
“humanitarian activities increased as a lot of construction companies were
established in different parts of the country and a lot of people had work.”
Even the PRTs that my participants felt that were not working in the best interest of
Afghans were providing and funding new projects and “almost everybody in the
provinces benefited” from the influx of new economic activities.
SP felt that hope was created among women and all Afghans—the arrival of the
U.S. and NATO troops was a liberation from the fundamentalists for all Afghans. She
said,
“We had new constitution, and good things started to happen, until 2005 when
everything started to change. The U.S. and their allies changed their support for
the fundamentalists.”
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According to my participants, the Afghans want to trust the U.S. government, but
feel that the U.S. will always act in its best interest, even if it means abandoning
Afghanistan like it did after the Soviet invasion. In this predicament, the Afghan aid
workers enjoy the closest trusting relationship with the Afghan communities, but are
under pressure from all sides of the conflict.
As stated in the literature review section, the NGOs are now under pressure from
the communities to “deliver without jeopardizing security.” They are under pressure from
the host government to “implement national programmes”; under pressure from the
“politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to align with ‘hearts and
minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition groups
(AOGs) who threaten their safety” (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 4).
According to Donini (2011), the UN and NGOs in Afghanistan have to make very
difficult and decisive choices; the local Afghan perception is that NGOs are in
collaboration with foreign military forces and the Afghan government, perceived by most
Afghans to be hostile to the Afghan people (2011).
Another issue of trust has to do with the Afghan people’s lack of trust for the
Afghan government because of the government’s inability to provide for the needs of the
people and gain their trust. According to RMD, the Afghan government is corrupt and
inefficient; the government does not work for the benefit of the Afghan people. He
posited:
“I give you an example; sometimes the people have conflict, maybe a land issue
and they want to solve it through the government system, and it takes months and
years especially if the conflict is with someone powerful. So the people are happy
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to go to the Taliban to solve their problem and the problem is solved in one or
two days. But in the government system because of corruption, it takes years and
a lot of money needed to pay bribes.”
The corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan government is perceived to be a
major challenge by my participants. Not only is it wasteful, but as they acknowledged, it
hinders development. This is an issue that many developing third world countries
continue to deal with.
According to AB, there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities committed
during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes. He argued that the oppressors from the past
regimes are now in power; these were the same people who took advantage of the Afghan
people, oppressed them, and committed different atrocities against the people. He insists
that the “warlords” regained power in 2001 after the arrival of the U.S. and foreign
forces, and argued that:
“They are the owners of the government. They are the powerful. Now the people’s
only hope is that maybe these criminals will die by natural death or they get too
old and unable to stay in government.”
AB described how the warlords misused their power and abused humanitarian aid
funds and took advantage of vulnerable Afghans in need. He said that the warlords
manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits, asserting that:
“Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the poor people
and needy people, was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords and
powerful people”
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According to AB, the people were hoping that the international community will not allow
the warlords to stay in power. He argued that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan
government and all the contractors:
“It’s because of all the contracts and all the things they took and they just
distributed all the funds and resources. If the general public are certain or
assured that those people who betrayed the assistance support are not allowed to
continue to benefit from government and international contracts, I can certainly
say that the situation will improve very well. The people hoped that the
international community, over 40 nations, are here and they will help us, they will
assist us to stand on our own feet. But unfortunately, what the people were
expecting from the international community didn’t happen. So these people lost
hope.”
Underneath the issues of trust is a deep suspicion of other nations, particularly the
super powers or the first world nations. Most of the narratives have nuanced implications
or suspicions of intent by the super power nations that have significant presence in
Afghanistan that these first world nations are in Afghanistan for their own national
interests, rather than for the benefit of the Afghan people. This sentiment is echoed by
many participants. A focus group participant felt that the United Nations actually works
for United States of America with the sole purpose of spreading “Americanism, and
Americanization” around the world. However, he was quick to acknowledge all the
achievements in Afghanistan. He said that since the arrival of the “Americans,”
Afghanistan has seen many new developments, particularly in:
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“Employment, economic changes, social relations between people, construction
projects, educational exchanges like universities and colleges, schools were built,
political organizations and elections, the governmental organizations were
supported and aided by the CSOs and NGOs, medical rehabilitations. CSOs and
NGOs have provided many medical facilities to different governmental hospitals
in faraway and remote areas.”
Nonetheless, he insisted that even though the changes and developments benefited the
people of Afghanistan, the U.S. was still operating from its own interest. He believed that
everything done by the “Americans,” even though many Afghans benefited from them,
had to advance or be in concert with the “American agenda.”
One of the things that my interpreter pointed out as we drove through the streets
of Kabul was the different schools set up by different countries. He would point at
secured compounds, and he would identify them as American school, British school,
German school, French school, Russian school, Canadian school, Chinese school, or
Turkish school. Why all the different national schools, I asked. Who is attending these
schools? And how does training young Afghans in all the different national ideologies
and national identities help develop young Afghans into good Afghan citizenship that
will lead to a peaceful and united Afghanistan? Based on the lessons learned from
colonization this method of fragmenting society only leads to further disintegration and
conflict among member of the different ethnic factions of society.
A focus group participant had a different viewpoint on the relationship between
the Afghan NGOs and the local communities. She argued that even though Afghan aid
workers have established good and trusting relationships with the Afghan communities,
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“we lost our reputation in the community because some NGOs were receiving funds from
organizations that did not have the interest of the Afghan people.” She said that the
Afghan people knew which countries were supporting Afghanistan and how they were
providing their support. She cautioned Afghan NGOs to be mindful of their associations
with the international military forces, insisting that “these organizations are operating on
their own interest, and not in the interest of Afghan people.” She echoed the argument
that the international communities were operating on their national interests, and not for
the benefit of the Afghan people:
“If the money is coming from U.S. Military or from PRTs the people knows their
aims; why they came to Afghanistan, their objectives, and what they want to
achieve. We’re losing our reputation day by day because of the objectives of some
aid organizations.
She said that some Afghan NGOs, which are receiving money through PRTs and
implementing PRT projects, are perceived by the local communities as being dishonest
and should not be trusted by the Afghan people. She insisted that the people know that
they are implementing programs that support the PRT objective:
“For example, PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people know
that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason
they are giving money to build the mosque there.”
She warned that the people are not fooled by such acts, and argued that collaborations
with the military forces jeopardize well established trust between the Afghan aid workers
and the local communities, and expose the aid workers to risk of violent reprisals.
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A second focus group participant blamed the international NGOs for the
breakdown of trust between the local communities and the humanitarian aid community.
He asserted that before the U.S. and the NATO forces came to Afghanistan, the Afghan
people believed that the International NGOs were working for the interest of the Afghan
people. He said the Afghan people “didn’t mind who was controlling the gun; whether it
was the Taliban or Mujahedeen.” But after the U.S. and NATO forces came to
Afghanistan, the international NGOs started aligning themselves with their different
national interests, and were no longer working for the benefit of the Afghan people.
Therefore, he said that the Afghan people stopped trusting the international NGOs. Most
international NGO programs are now implemented by local Afghan NGOs.
The Afghan people have been through many regimes, many invasions and
occupations, and have seen too many wars. They do not trust the Afghan government.
They claim that the people in power were the former warlords who abused and took
advantage of the people, and that the foreign military forces have incursions into their
communities, which endanger their families. They accused the international communities
of being fragmented with different national interests; hence, there is no cohesion among
the different parties providing help, and a lack of consistency in the efforts provided.
EIJ shared his thoughts about Afghan business executives and government
officials whose families live outside Afghanistan. He claimed that some Afghans have
dual citizenships, and argued that their dual citizenship makes them dangerous because:
“Their families are living abroad comfortably, their children don’t know about
suicide bomb blasts; the miseries of the people they cannot see.”
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He argued that their families live well overseas and are shielded from the
insecurities and the lack of opportunities in Afghanistan. He warned that these people are
not interested in the development of Afghanistan; most he said are happy with the status
quo. He said their children are born abroad and have no knowledge of the conditions in
Afghanistan.
Abandonment. This theme of abandonment forms from a sense of
disillusionment felt by many participants that their country was abandoned by the U.S.
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was defeated with help from the U.S. As Burton
(1990, 1997) argues, when people begin to feel abandoned, their desire and need for
identity and recognition are being frustrated and this leads to a sense of insecurity. Burton
postulates that if these human needs for identity, recognition, and security are not
satisfied, conflict will ensue (1990). He warns that the conflict will be so intense that “no
suppressive means will contain it. Attempts to suppress it will lead, on the contrary, to
exponential increases in conflict” (Burton, 1990, p. 231). This he warns could lead to
total failure in society.
Sub-Theme: Do not abandon Afghanistan like in the ’90s. A focus group
participant shared that the situation changed in 1992 after the U.S. and the international
community abandoned Afghanistan, paving the way for the Mujahedeen, Al-Qaeda, and
Taliban to move in and take over Afghanistan. He said,
“This, I think was the fault of the International communities led by the United
State; they failed to fulfill their commitment when they abandoned Afghanistan.”
Another focus group participant explained that after the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan, millions of Afghans took refuge in the neighboring countries, particularly in
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Pakistan. This was the beginning of the international humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan,
as major international organizations rushed to assist refugees and needy Afghans. He said
that in 1988 the international community and the United Nations encouraged Afghans to
establish local Afghan owned NGOs to take the leading role in bringing desperately
needed aid to rural Afghan communities. About fifteen locally owned Afghan NGOs and
some Arab owned NGOs were established, and together they started providing aid in
rural Afghan communities, where most of the international NGOs could not reach. These
local Afghan aid agencies became successful in reaching Afghans in very rural areas of
Afghanistan. However, he said that when the Mujahedeen and the Taliban came to
power, the international NGOs left Afghanistan, and the local NGOs became very active.
“This was the period of underground activities in Afghanistan. There were no
International NGOs in Afghanistan due to the Taliban, only the UDP was allowed
to operate here - But the Afghan NGOs were very active, they were engaged in the
entire aid activities - everywhere they can go. There was security…there was no
killing, and aid workers felt secured. But the insecurity started in 2001 when
America and International Forces came to Afghanistan.”
AB agreed with other participants that the U.S. and international communities
abandoned Afghanistan, hence the foreign fighters, including Taliban and Al-Qaeda,
were able to intervene in Afghanistan. AB remembered what it was like; he said that in
1994, Kabul was destroyed, and that the U.S. government made a big mistake:
“When Mujahedeen came to Afghanistan, Americans thought, Oh! We defeated
the Russians so time to leave this mission… but Afghanistan still needed their
support. That is why this country turned into a place to train terrorists.”
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AB thinks that the U.S. and its NATO allies are about to make the same mistakes as in
the 1990s. He feels that the first sign of such mistake was when they started to cut funds
for services. He warned:
“Right now, 3560 de-miners are on standby positions to lose their jobs. Tell me,
what will those de-miners be doing if they cannot support their families? You
better believe that a group will show them other ways to find bread for their
children.”
AB argued that if the proper attention is not given to assist Afghanistan in
maintaining internal security, securing its borders, and rebuilding its infrastructure, it is
likely to fall back to becoming a haven for breeding terror as the world witnessed in
2001. He insisted that different international terrorist organizations will return to
Afghanistan as they did after the U.S. abandoned Afghanistan in the 1990s. AG pleaded
with the international community not to repeat the mistakes of the past:
“Our wish from you is don’t leave Afghanistan alone; not to repeat 1992 mistakes
and stay with us. Not in terms of military force. We want their financial support,
their technical supports.”
He urges the international communities to help Afghanistan develop its
infrastructure, so as to provide opportunities for its people. He said that Afghanistan
needs the U.S. and its allies to train and support the Afghan military and the Afghan
national security forces, so they can secure Afghan borders and maintain law and order.
Sub-Theme: We cannot lose what has been achieved. The key focus of this
theme is the realization that much has been achieved since the arrival of the U.S. and the
international forces in Afghanistan, but the sacrifice has been high on all sides of the
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conflict, particularly among Afghans. The consensus is that they, the Afghans, have to do
whatever is necessary to preserve what has been achieved for all Afghans. The
achievements are in education, infrastructure, law and order, communication, civil
society, health, governance, human rights, and the rights of women and minorities.
AB pleaded to fellow Afghans to stay focused on what they have achieved as a
country; he said that over one million Afghan girls are now enrolled in school and a
record number of boys are enrolled in colleges and universities. He pleaded to Afghans
not to “ruin what has been achieved.” The roads are now paved, he said, and he hopes
that maybe the next generation of Afghans will have better opportunities to build on what
has been achieved. AB talked about growing up during the Soviet invasion: “I was 17
when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is war.”
AG challenged his fellow countrymen and women to put their country first, and
make every effort to take part in the development of their country. He wants all Afghans
to have a stake in the building of Afghanistan by working together towards their national
goals:
“Let’s stop the fighting and give attention to the education sector and be educated
and help bring Afghanistan to that level of other developed countries.”
RS referred to my interview with her and her female colleagues in her office, as a
sign of major achievement in Afghanistan. She said that the fact that my interview was
taking place is a “manifestation and a big achievement,” noting that during the Taliban
regime, I would not have been allowed to interview her and her female colleagues. They
were not even permitted to listen to radio broadcast. She said, “People were arrested and
no one knew their fate or ever saw them again.”
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RS remembered the way things were before the arrival of the U.S. and the NATO
troops. She said people were “happy with the arrival of NATO troops.” However, she
posited that the “people’s expectations were high” as they were expecting the U.S. and
NATO troops to fix all their problems. According to RS, a lot of resources were brought
to Afghanistan by the U.S. and NATO forces. She said,
“We had witnessed those times of war and hardships, almost in every street of
this city; there was conventional war between rival groups”
AA said that during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes, Afghanistan did not
have stable governments. There were civil unrests, and many Afghans faced
discrimination because of their gender or their ethnicity. He said that Afghanistan has
seen many changes and developments since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops;
they now have a stable government and the system is working. He said Afghans now
have a chance to build on what has been achieved.
Sub-Theme: Help us develop Afghanistan with our own hands. AA pleads to the
American public to assist Afghans in the development of their infrastructure, so that
Afghans play important roles in the development and learn how to do it for themselves.
In his narrative, he pointed out that Americans are friends of Afghanistan; at the same
time he makes it known that so far, what he is asking for, has not been achieved—to
teach them how to build their own infrastructure:
“Not to make us like a human society so that when you leave, then we will not be
able to earn on our own. If you are a friend of Afghanistan, as we have committed
that you are our friend, you will help us to enable us to earn our living with our
own sources. So you should help us in that, it hasn’t been done so far.”
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AA argued that the civil war is still going on, implying that Iran and Pakistan do
not have good relations with Afghanistan; however, he believes that if the Afghan army
and security forces are trained and well equipped by the U.S. with modern weapons,
Afghans will be able to secure their borders and improve security in their country. He
called for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The first step is to
beef up Afghan security with training and equipment, and gradually pull out only when
the Afghan forces are ready and able to take over:
“We should be 100 percent sure that Afghan people can defend themself, and that
time you can finally withdraw all forces from Afghanistan. If it’s really what
America wants, the first thing is to destroy the place, the source of terrorism,
strengthen our army and then the problem will be solved.”
This theme—to help Afghans develop Afghanistan with their own hands—is a
sentiment that is heard frequently in developing or underdeveloped countries, what some
call the ‘third world’. The dominant narrative is that the ‘first world’ with good
intentions, builds technology and infrastructure known as ‘turnkey’: when a project is
constructed and turned over to the recipient as a completed product (“Turnkey,” 2014).
However, the problem with this approach is that the recipient is usually not well informed
on the process, is not part of the construction, or has no knowledge of how it was
constructed, so he or she will not have the skills to maintain or optimize the product. So,
what was intended to help the recipient may become a burden. What this theme is
suggesting is that the Afghans be brought into the early stages of development as
partners, so they can learn from the builders and become familiar with the stages of the
development, understand the process, and acquire the skills to maintain and enhance
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product performance and process. Thus, instead of giving them turnkey development,
teach them how to replicate the development for themselves.
Achievement. All ten interview participants and the majority of the focus group
participants said that a lot of changes occurred after the arrival of the U.S. and
international forces in 2001. Many participants spoke about achievements and transitions
in the economy, politics, good governance, equal rights for women and all Afghans,
education, employment, infrastructural development, and even social and cultural
tolerance. However, many participants agreed that much still needed to be done. For
many, the costs of the achievements have been high, both on Afghans and on the
international communities. This section addresses the changes in Afghanistan since the
war on terror, the significance of these changes to Afghanistan, and the impact they have
on the lives of many Afghans.
Sub-Theme: Many changes came to Afghanistan. AB told the story of how his
bicycle program for disabled Afghans, prior to the arrival of the U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, only had three kilometers of what he called “pot-holes,” which were caused
by bombs and mines, on which to practice their biking. Now he said they have many
thousands of kilometers of paved roads to practice and ride their bikes. When AB told his
story to a group of American doctors visiting Afghanistan, he said the Americans did not
believe him. Their reaction was: “this is the 21st century and you have only three
kilometers paved road?” And he answered, “Yeah, it was potholes from Jalalabad to
Torkham.”
On the drive from Kabul International Airport, we drove down a newly built
modern highway that runs from the airport in to town. This road, my escort said, was
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built by the “Americans” (as he pointed to the new developments along the drive) since
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, also letting me know that “they” (the
Americans) built big projects, but he said that they (Americans) left them no guide nor
expertise on how to maintain and duplicate them for new local projects.
RS said this interview was a sign of major achievement in Afghanistan. She
acknowledged that my ability to conduct this interview in her office, in the presence of
her female colleagues, is a “good manifestation and a big achievement.” Contrasting this
time with the Taliban regime, she said that I would not have been permitted to “come and
sit and talk with a woman like this.” She said that I would have been arrested and “no
one knows what fate you will have to confront.” RS maintained that people were not even
allowed to listen to radio programs, but today, “people can breathe freely.” She said,
“I can say it’s a blessing. We had witnessed those times of war and hardships,
almost in every street of this city, there was conventional war between rival
groups and fortunately most of the people were so happy with the arrival of the
NATO troops.”
According to RS, the people’s expectations were high. A lot of resources were
brought into Afghanistan, and the people expected the U.S. and NATO troops to fix
many of their problems, “but unfortunately, it didn’t happen as much as people
expected.”
AA remembered the unstable and chaotic times during the Mujahedeen and the
Taliban regimes. He said Kabul was devastated; the entire infrastructure was destroyed
from wars and ethnic conflicts. But he said that things are much better now—“a big
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change has come to Afghanistan”—and they have a stable government in Kabul. For AA,
“Everything is okay.”
For ABD, the situation in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime had
“fundamentally changed” after the arrival of the U.S. and the international military
forces. He said that the Afghan people have “found a proper and more suitable
environment to breath freely.” He argued:
“The educational system was completely dysfunctional at that time, but now we
can see that the educational system is running well, and Afghan boys and girls
are going to schools. Also the Afghan population, which was taken hostage by a
few people, now they have been rescued and have become free and some changes
have occurred in the economic life of the Afghan population.”
ABD also claims that ethnic, tribal, and linguistic conflicts, such as between
“Tajiks and Pashtuns,” which existed prior to the arrival of the U.S. and international
troops were no longer major conflict issues. He insisted that the Afghan people have been
“sensitized” and their awareness has been “raised.” He said Afghanistan now has a
constitution, and the people “can now look forward to the next five years for new
elections with the possibility to vote for someone different if the current leaders are not
doing their job.”
The Afghan presidential election in April 2014 is perceived by many participants
as a hopeful sign of what has been achieved. According to ABD, during the Taliban
regime, the Afghan people did not see or get to know the men who were leading the
country; they did not make themselves known to the people. Now he said the people have
the right and the power to vote their leaders in and out of office. He asserted:
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“They governed the country, the entire nation, but a lot of the citizens of
Afghanistan never saw them or knew what they looked like. He came to power
and he disappeared just like others before him, they also came by force and
reigned over these people by force. But now these people have this kind of
mentality that this is a constitutional government and they have the right to elect
their leaders, and the courage to vote.”
ABD is hopeful about the future of Afghanistan; he said he was a student during
the Soviet Union invasion, and experienced a lot of misconduct during the Taliban and
Mujahedeen regimes. Now he is confident and “really hopeful for the future because of
the changes that have happened compared to previous regimes.”
However, ABD feels that there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities
committed during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes. He wants to see the oppressors
from the past regimes punished for their actions and not be allowed to return to political
power. He said that the Afghan public were expecting that these “oppressors, who have
committed all sorts of crimes and done all sorts of cruelty to the people, will confront
justice.” So the people are disappointed as most of these war lords are still in power.
ABD claimed that these “oppressors” have political and economic powers, but he is
hopeful that the “criminals will die by natural death or they get too old and unable to
stay in government.”
EIJ shared that after 2002 many achievements were made in Afghanistan and a lot
of jobs were produced through the PRT projects. He said that after the formation of the
Afghan government in Kabul in 2001, funding and humanitarian activities increased;
many construction companies were established in different parts of the country, and a lot
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of Afghans were able to find employment. “PRTs - Provincial Reconstruction Teams
were providing and funding projects and almost everybody in the provinces benefited.”
But EIJ noted that in 2006 when the PRT projects ended, many Afghans lost their jobs,
“causing many people especially the youths to become jobless.”
According to a focus group participant, Afghan NGOs and CSOs have played
major roles in the areas of education, health, social justice, good governance, anticorruption, and peace building, as well as contributed to the elimination of violence
against women, human rights, and the democratic process. As a result of these efforts,
social conditions and the quality of life of the people have significantly improved. She
posited that the literacy rates among women and the adult populations have increased,
and the Afghan government has become more transparent. Now, he believes that the
powers have shifted from the leaders to the people; the people he said are now able to
evaluate the performances of their leaders and decide if to allow them another term by the
power of the people’s vote. My participants warned that Afghan must remain vigilant and
insist that their leaders abide by the “constitution; the laws of the country.”
Sub-Theme: We cannot afford to lose what has been achieved. AB echoed a
dominant narrative amongst the participants of this study that a lot has been achieved
since the arrival of the U.S. and international forces, and a lot still needs to be done, but
they cannot afford to lose what has been accomplished. AB, educated in Pakistan, called
on Afghans to “stay calm,” to be patient and tolerant, so they can hold on to what has
been achieved. He pointed to achievements in all sectors of Afghan life, particularly in
education, which he acknowledged that over one million girls are now attending school,
unlike during the Taliban time when it was illegal to send girls to school. His hope is that
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Afghanistan will be a much peaceful and prosperous place for future generations. AB has
spent most of his life in wars. He imagines a more tolerant Afghanistan:
“Now we have paved roads, keep it intact. Now we have schools. Do not ruin
them. Keep it intact and maybe your future generation, a knowledgeable
generation, not like the generation of our age. I grew up in this situation; I was 17
when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is
war.”
AB’s hope is that Afghanistan moves forward by learning from the past and not
repeating the mistakes of the past generations. He echoed the fear of many participants,
that if the U.S. repeats the mistake of the past and abandons Afghanistan, the “seeds of
terror will return to Afghanistan.” AB warns that if the U.S. and its allies abandon
Afghanistan, “surely Afghanistan will take the same path as they took before 2001.”
ABD has a different point of view, insisting that Afghans are capable of
protecting their nation. He refuted the assertion that if the U.S. and NATO troops
drawdown forces in 2014, Afghanistan will return to being a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and
terror groups. Instead, he perceives a different scenario: that Afghans will not tolerate any
foreign troops occupying Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda. He insisted that:
“Afghan mentality cannot accept any kind of external power, be it Russians or AlQaeda or Western powers. After the start of the war on terror, Afghans took their
guns, their rifles and dismantled those Al-Qaeda troops and other hostile troops
who live in their hideouts around the country, so by their own guns, Afghans
eliminated them. They despise them.”
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ABD suggested that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect Afghanistan, citing an
Afghan proverb similar to the famous words of former Secretary of State, Retired
General Colin Powell that “If you break it, you’ll own it” (as cited in Samuels, 2007,
para. 1). ABD uses an Afghan proverb to explain why the U.S. must not leave
Afghanistan until the fire is put out. He inferred that President Obama has ignited the
fight in the region, and now he wants to abandon this region in flames. “We have a
proverb in Afghanistan,” he said, “when you lift a piece of stone, if you find out that you
are powerless, you cannot lift it, kiss it and leave it in its place.” He insisted that “they
knew they could not lift the stone, they should have kissed it, should not have come to
Afghanistan.”
ABD said that President Obama should have given a “very clear message” that
the U.S. “will never leave this regime” (the Karzai government). Secondly, he said that
President Obama should have made it clear to any country that “harbors” terrorists, or is
the “seed of terror,” that the U.S. will come after them, including putting an end to
terrorism that “infiltrates from centers beyond the borders of Afghanistan.” ABD insisted
that if the U.S. does not give proper attention to these concerns, the consequences could
be worse than the “situation which existed in 1992.” He maintains that the whole area is
“engulfed in the fire,” particularly Afghanistan and calls on the U.S. president to “put
out this fire” before the U.S. and NATO troops pull out from Afghanistan. He insisted
that “There cannot be perfect peace until the foreign troops leave the boundaries of
Afghanistan, but before leaving they should put off this fire.”
A focus group participant recapitulated the achievements since the arrival of the
U.S. and NATO forces: the advances in education, health, access to justice, good
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governance, anti-corruption, peace, human rights, the elimination of violence against
women, the rights of women to education, work, and equal justice, the democratic
process, and the people’s right to vote and elect their leaders. He posited that these
achievements have led to significant improvements in the social condition and quality of
life of the Afghan people. “In fact,” he said, “human capital has been developed as a
result of work done by CSOs and NGOs with literacy rate,” and the literacy rate among
adults has increased due to “literacy interventions” in the local communities. Now, he
said that the Afghan people have been “sensitized” and awakened to the new ‘normal’
state of affairs in Afghanistan, they know their “constitution and the laws of the
country.” The Afghan people now know that they all have the right to have an education
as boys and girls are going to school in record numbers. SP said that Afghans want equal
justice.
Sub-Theme: Human rights and the rights of Afghan women. Even though the
focus of this theme is on the fundamental rights of Afghan women for equal justice, still
at the core, as one of the female participants pointed out, the rights of women in
Afghanistan are intertwined with the rights and freedom of all Afghans. She explained
that Afghan women will not be free until all Afghans are free to “lives of dignity.” The
dominant narratives from the participants of this study, as they described the conditions
that prevailed prior to the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, were of horror, anarchy,
and degradation of Afghan men and women. According to SP, during the Mujahedeen
and Taliban regimes, her organization was forced to work underground and successfully
continued the fight for the rights of Afghan women. She said the Taliban regime was a
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“total dehumanization of women” and the women were forced to marry “criminals.” She
said they brought them:
“catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the world; cruelty, violence,
barbarism, rape, kidnappings, cutting women’s breasts, and openly forcing
women naked and killing their husbands in front of them.”
SP posited that after the fall of the Taliban regime and the arrival of the U.S. and
NATO troops, Afghan “Women got access to their relative rights and freedom, and
equality with men according to Afghanistan constitution.” This also gave women the
right to participate in elections and the right to seek opportunities within different
government sectors.
The new freedom and rights of women created opportunities for Afghan women
to go to school, seek higher education, and become educated, so they are able to compete
with their male counterparts for opportunities. People became hopeful as they
experienced the new freedoms, and the nation was rebuilding from many decades of war;
however, in 2005 things started to change. According to SP, the U.S. and the NATO
allies began to change their support for the fundamentalists. She said that Azhar Ibrahimi,
Special Representative for the UN Secretary General, played a positive role in the
empowerment of the Mujahedeen and in paving the way for their participation and return
to political power.
RS argued that it would not be correct to assume that all the changes in women’s
rights have occurred in the last ten to twelve years. She said that even before the arrival
of the U.S. and NATO troops, there were educated Afghan women who were involved in
all types of social activism: “they were very brave women.” She asserted that over thirty
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years ago when she was a student at Kabul University, her professors were from
Germany (then West Germany), and she maintained that they were very good professors
and that if they had been allowed to continue to train and develop young Afghans, the
country might have developed “much, much better in a natural manner, but
unfortunately, this curtain of terror spread all over the country and basically affected all
people including women.”
According to RS, prior to the arrival of the U.S. and NATO forces, both the
Afghan women and Afghan men were not free, nor allowed to “breathe open air.” She
said that during that Taliban regime, the “doors of all institutions were closed” and no
one had the opportunity to work: the schools were closed, and no one had any type of
social life.
RS considered this interview with her and her female colleagues as a testament of
the freedom and the rights of women in Afghanistan. She referred to this interview as “a
sign of progress, a sign of what has been achieved.” She said my interview would not
have been permitted during the Taliban regime. RS alluded to the many gains Afghan
women have made in in the Afghan Parliament: “Our efforts have allowed women to
become members of Parliament – opposed by fundamentalists who have fought against
equal rights for women.” According to RS, the Afghan Parliament was forced to
withdraw from their past positions, to finally granting women equal protection under the
Afghan law.
Interventionism. One of the dominant themes in this study is that Afghans are
not terrorists—that terrorism comes to Afghanistan from outside its borders. Many
participants pointed to Afghan neighbors—Iran and Pakistan—as the two main sources of
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terror, but also blamed other countries aiding this phenomenon. They believe that the
terrorism and insecurity in Afghanistan are caused by interventions mainly from foreign
fighters who come into Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan and Iran, and they blame
the U.S. and the NATO troops for not stopping these infiltrations of foreign fighters into
their country.
Sub-Theme: Base of terror is in Pakistan where Osama bin Laden got killed.
They claim that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated since the arrival of
the U.S. and NATO forces in 2002. Almost all the participants who had something to say
about the source of terrorism blamed Pakistan for the insecurities and terrorism in
Afghanistan. AG echoed this belief that terrorism was never in the culture of the Afghan
people, claiming that international sources bring terrorism to Afghanistan: “this is not the
culture of our people, and Afghan people never were terrorists.” He argued that the
foreign fighters come to Afghanistan and set up their offices and terror organizations. AG
concluded that the Taliban and similar fundamentalist groups prey on vulnerable
members of society. He said, “they took advantage of those people who were
uneducated.” These are the people who are likely experiencing challenges and having
difficulties fulfilling their basic needs. They are, therefore, prime target for jihadist
recruiting (Burton, 1990, 1997; Stern, 2003).
Another dominant narrative amongst the participants of this study is that Pakistan
and Iran have been acting with impunity, and without regard for the territorial integrity of
Afghanistan. AB echoed this belief in his argument that America knows the true source
of terrorism. When he was asked which countries he considers to be the source of terror,
he hesitated, as if unsure if it was alright to say it… referring to the death of Osama bin
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Laden in Pakistan: “Everybody knows that the cow is black, but the milk is white…where
Osama bin Laden got killed.” I asked AB for clarification, and he responded with email:
“This is a phrase or proverb that we use when we want to reiterate that something is
proven and crystal clear to every person.” This Afghan proverb implies that the situation
in Pakistan is so transparent; everybody knows that Osama bin Laden was killed in a
compound at Abbottabad in Pakistan. Everybody, meaning the U.S. and NATO allied
troops, knows where the jihadist training camps are in Pakistan, or what some have called
the “seed of terror,” but my participants claimed that since Pakistan is an ally of the
U.S., nothing gets done. Nonetheless, the U.S. and Pakistan share many similar interests.
The U.S. can exert influence on Pakistan, but there is no willingness to do so—since
2001 Pakistan has received over $10 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) from the
U.S. (Brennan, 2013).
A participant from the focus group shared his point of view. He challenged the
international community to “finger point any terrorist based stations in Afghanistan.” If
they are able to find a terrorist base in Afghanistan, they should make it public—he was
certain that the international community will not find a terror base in Afghanistan. He
accused Pakistan of using propaganda tactics to lure young Afghans into jihadist training
camps in Pakistan. He said young people are brainwashed to believe that Afghans are
non-Muslims: “it's time for Jihad, you have to fight the foreigners, you have to fight the
Afghan government.” This is their way of maintaining disorder within Afghanistan and
undermining the efforts of the international communities in developing Afghanistan. He
argued that the goal is to disrupt all the attempts of rebuilding in order to have:
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“Afghanistan in a situation where it is in need for all the time, particularly to its
neighbors so that they further prolong the durian line issue between Afghanistan
and Pakistan.”
Another focus group participant made a correlation between foreign interventions
in Afghanistan and the insecurities that continue to threaten the lives of many Afghans.
He argued that the issues of insecurities in Afghanistan pre-date the war on terror,
implying that the powerful nations have interior motives in Afghanistan, that insecurities
started when the U.S. and NATO troops arrived in Afghanistan. He said other nations
currently in Afghanistan were there pursuing their own national interests, and made the
argument that:
“America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will Russia now
allow America to be here in Afghanistan? Russia does not want America
occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also China as a
major economic power does not want America in its border, and China thinks that
if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise against Chinese
Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back on America; it’s
not only Pakistan, not only Iran that is causing the insecurity and struggles
against America.”
A participant of the focus group discussion blamed the U.S. and NATO for the
continued interventions from Pakistan and Iran, insisting that Afghans never created
terrorism. He argued that since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, Afghan
neighbors have been intervening in Afghan internal affairs. He said that Afghans did not
create the war on terror—that “Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, he was an Arab.”
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“Many nations are making Afghanistan an apogee for their conflicts, especially
the neighboring countries. Whenever any Western country wants to intervene in a
Muslim country, they use radicalism and extremism as a pretext; however, these
ideologies have origins outside of Afghanistan.”
RS’s message to President Obama is for the president to use his office and his
leadership in the world to influence nations that are working against the progress and
development of Afghanistan. She asserted that President Obama should lead a coalition
of nations and do more to stop countries that are intervening in Afghanistan. She wants
the U.S. to look more closely at Afghan border countries. She insisted that Pakistan is an
aggressive nation that seeks motives that do not benefit Afghanistan, and wants President
Obama to help keep Pakistan out of Afghanistan.
Sub-Theme: Need for strong Afghan borders. This sub-theme corresponds with
most of the major issues that my participants believe are responsible for the problems
facing Afghanistan. They believe that if Afghan borders were fully secured to deter
foreign fighters from coming into Afghanistan, the problem of insecurities will be
significantly reduced or become non-existent. But they argue that Afghanistan does not
have the infrastructure or the capacity to provide such a level of border security without
the help of the U.S. and the international community. They are frustrated, however,
because they believe that the U.S. knows that well secured Afghan borders will stop ongoing activities from Pakistan that create insecurities in Afghanistan, but to their
frustration, the U.S. is not willing to address the issue with Pakistan.
AA believes that the Afghan civil war is still going on, implying that Iran and
Pakistan do not have good relations with Afghanistan. But he is convinced that if
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Afghans were well equipped with modern weapons, they will be able to defend their
country against their aggressive neighbors. AA’s biggest fear is that if the U.S. and
NATO troops pull out of Afghanistan without properly helping Afghans to secure their
borders, he believes that Pakistan is likely to mount a military attack on Afghan border,
or the Taliban or other jihadist group looking for a safe haven will come to recruit and
operate. AA feels that such conditions will roll back all the achievements that have been
gained under the U.S. and NATO troops.
A focus group participant speculated on why he thought that Pakistan benefits
from an unstable Afghanistan on its border. He suggested that Pakistan will not allow a
good relationship between Afghanistan and India because of the conflict between
Pakistan and India over Kashmir. “Any relationship between Afghanistan and India will
threaten Pakistan and will not be acceptable to Islamabad.” He anticipates that soon
Pakistan and Afghanistan will be in conflict over water supply. He said that Pakistan
currently depends on water from Afghanistan for its land and soil irrigation. He warned
that as Afghanistan becomes more independent from its neighbors, Afghan leaders may
begin to seek better control of its resources, including water. AA believes that such
prospects threaten Pakistan and force them to find ways to sabotage Afghan progress. He
believes that a strong Afghan border is needed to repel potential aggression from Afghan
neighbors. Other issues have to do with the conflict between Pakistan and India over
Kashmir; AA posited:
“Pakistan does not want to have a viable country on its border. Besides, we are
developing a good relationship with India.”
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Sub-Theme: They should not make Afghanistan a base for conflict. AB talked
about the Durand Line as a factor in Afghan relationship with its neighbors. Over 100
years ago, the Durand Line was a demarcation along the Afghan border with Pakistan
that was drawn by the British and signed into a treaty in 1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir
Abdur Rehman Khan. The treaty was for 100 years, and should have ended in 1993 with
the territory turned over to Afghanistan; however, Pakistan has refused to do so, and the
government in Kabul has refused to renew the treaty (Afghanistan’s Web Site, 2012).
According to AB, Pakistan has been trying to get Afghan warlords and Taliban to
renew the treaty, but this effort from Pakistan has not been successful. The Durand Line
issue has been one of the key issues between Kabul and Islamabad. AB posited that some
people have referred to it as the “Imaginary Durand Line.” AB insisted that this is one of
the issues of conflict between Kabul and Islamabad. He maintains that there is no written
document found on the Durand Line agreement anywhere:
“Since there is no written document or proof, no Afghan government has
accepted this. This is the main reason why the neighbors are trying to make
Afghanistan as weak as they can.”
Another issue that AB raised had to do with Pakistan’s conflict with India. He
noted that President Karzai was recently asked by a reporter why India was allowed to
have a consulate in Afghanistan. He warned that other countries should not make
Afghanistan the base for their conflicts.
“If they have problems with India, there are many channels to deal with their
problems. Diplomatic channels or military channels, whichever option they
choose, just keep their conflict away from Afghanistan.”
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Dalrymple (2013) posits that when Pakistan thought that India was sending a
military adviser to Afghanistan, Pakistan raised immediate objection to any sort of
military aid or assistance from India to Afghanistan, calling it “unacceptable
provocation” (2013, p. 3). He believes, however, that if Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan
can find a way to mutually address the insecurities and uncertainty in Afghanistan, all
three countries stand to benefit from a viable and stable Afghanistan (2013).
For AB, the war on terror is not an Afghan war, and he took issues with the
suggestion that after the U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014, Al-Qaeda will return to make
Afghanistan a base for terror as it did before September 11, 2001. He made the argument
that Afghan will no longer allow Al-Qaeda or any other group to reign over Afghanistan
as before. He insisted that the current Afghan mentality will not accept any form of
external power to reign over its people as before. He said,
“After the start of the war on terror, Afghans took their guns, their rifles and
dismantled those Al-Qaeda troops and other hostile troops who live in their
hideouts around the country, so by their own guns, Afghans eliminated them. They
despise them.”
A focus group participant felt that the issue of Afghanistan was “polycentric.” He
claimed that the countries in Afghanistan have no interest in the prosperity of the Afghan
people. He accuses the West of using “radicalism” as a pretext for invading Islamic
countries, and blames the U.S. and the international troops for allowing interventions
from neighboring countries to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. He argued that
Afghans have not created the war on terror, and suggested that Osama bin Laden was not
an Afghan. He said,
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“If you see the identification card of Osama bin Laden, he is not an Afghan, and
he is an Arab. And war is brought to us, we have not created war.”
Another focus group participant sees the war on terror as a conflict between
Russia and the U.S. She accused the U.S. of helping to create the Taliban, insisting that if
the U.S. goal was to fight terrorism, they should have started in Pakistan, which she
referred to as “the root of terrorism.” She argued:
“America always had a plan to come to Afghanistan to have their bases here. The
attack on September 11, 2001 gave them a good reason to come to Afghanistan. It
was their plan and now they have succeeded, they are not here to support us and
they are not here to fight against terrorism.”
Another focus group participant echoes the same point of view that the U.S.
presence in Afghanistan was to make certain that Russia does not control Afghanistan.
She argued that the “American” plan was to prevent the Soviet Union (Russia) from
occupying and controlling Afghanistan. She said the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen with
military equipment and money; hence, the Soviet Union was defeated. She claimed that,
“Now they have come to Afghanistan to protect their investment.” However, according to
my participants’ theory, Russia now wants to make sure that the U.S. does not succeed in
Afghanistan. They perceive this conflict in Afghanistan as a conflict between the
superpowers—between the East and the West—a struggle for who will be positioned to
control Asia.
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Implications
In this final chapter, I reflect on my experiences in conducting this investigation
and present the research findings, summarizing the themes that best represent the
experiences of my participants and using selected quotes to illustrate my research
findings and echo their voices. I also analyze the key research findings of this study by
using the theoretical framework of Burton’s basic human needs theory to identify and
understand the conditions that give rise to the conflicts that cause and form the themes. I
also discuss the limitations of the study, contributions made to the field of conflict
analysis and resolution, and future direction for further research. Again, actual names of
participants are not used in this study to protect their privacy and maintain
confidentiality.
My face-to-face interviewees and focus group discussants have helped me to
understand the lived experiences of my participants—the endemic and fundamental role
of “structural violence” which gives rise to the conditions that create insecurities and
expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to violent attacks and experiences that frame
their world views.
Meaning Making
Krauss (2005) posits that “The most fundamental aspect of a human social setting
is that of meanings” (p. 762). That meaning is “transbehavioral”; hence, they do not only
“describe behavior,” but they also “define, justify” and “interpret behavior” (Lofland &
Lofland, 1996 as cited in Krauss, 2005, p. 762). The meaning making for this study was
best informed through the theoretical framework of social constructionism—the idea that
our reality is a construct of our own experiences, formed through interactions and
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collaborations with other members of our communities through cultural, social, and
historical contexts (Kukla, 2000; Pratwat & Folden, 1994). On several instances, I asked
participants of this study how they felt about the war on terror, and almost always their
responses seemed to beg the question of my definition of terror. Terror for them were the
incursions by Western forces into their local communities; the drone attacks that killed
and maimed their brothers, sister, sons, daughters, husbands, and wives; the Taliban and
insurgent attacks that dared young men and women to go to school and seek Western
education; and the fear of abandonment from the U.S. and NATO forces that can lead to
the return of anarchy and destruction, which a female participant described as
“Catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the world.” She talked about the violence and
cruelty of the Taliban—how the Taliban forced the women to take off their clothes, raped
the women in front of their husbands, and forced them into marriages.
As I tried to align the context of the phenomenon from which my participants
drew their inferences and attributed meanings to the events of their experiences, the better
I was able to understand and engage in meaning making together with my participants
(Krauss, 2005). The process of meaning making was formed in the context of culture and
social interactions with my participants. According to Krauss, knowledge constructed by
individuals in a particular culture and time can be perceived as ‘true’ reality as it becomes
acceptable by individuals and society, and becoming the social norm (2005).
As the researcher, I was engaged in the context—being in Kabul, Afghanistan,
and participating in the act of “being with” my participants in their lives to generate
meanings of their experiences; developing themes and narratives that feature the words
and experiences of my participants; and resulting in data analysis that is rich in findings
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and meaning making (Krauss, 2005, p.767). When I asked a participant how he felt about
the war on terror, he answered with an Afghan proverb that “When you try to lift a piece
of stone, and you find that it is too heavy; you cannot lift it, you should kiss it and leave it
in its place.” He went on to say that “In the beginning they knew that they could not lift
the stone, they should have kissed it, and should not have come to Afghanistan.” The
point and meaning my participant was making was not that the stone was too heavy for
the U.S. and NATO troops to lift, but that the conditions in Afghanistan in 2001 should
have alerted the U.S. and NATO of the fragile and inadequate state of the Afghan nation.
Even former General Colin Powell warned: “if you break it, you will own it” (as cited in
Samuels, 2007, para. 1). My participant went on to assert that “The whole area is
engulfed in fire, particularly Afghanistan,” and warned that the U.S. and NATO troops
have “actively intervened in this situation, they have come to Afghanistan; they cannot
abandon it.” Even though many of my participants expressed the belief that the U.S. and
foreign troops must leave Afghanistan in order for there to be peace in the country, they
agreed that before leaving, the U.S. and NATO troops should put out the “fire,” which
my participants saw as a consequence of U.S. and NATO intervention.
Another participant reflecting on his memories of war in Afghanistan’s decades of
military interventions and civil unrests used an Afghan proverb that “Sweets are not
distributed in war; but bullets are exchanged.” He said that there are no good outcomes
from war; he lost very close relatives in the wars, and spoke painfully about the loss of
his older brother who was a graduate of Oxford University and was killed during the
Soviet invasion. He believed that every Afghan family had lost two or three family
members to the wars; most of them, he said, were “breadwinners for the families.” As
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another participant said, “wars have been very harsh on our people.” According to the
former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates (Gates, 2014), during his interview promoting
his memoire Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, there are no military solutions to the
Afghan conflict. This point of view has been echoed by several high ranking government
officials and top ranking military strategists, including Retired General David Petraeus,
former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and former Commander of U.S.
Forces in Afghanistan (2010-2011). They all agree that there has to be a political
solution. Indeed, war cannot be the solution to the many conflicts around the world. As
the Afghan proverb implies, bullets are exchanged in wars, not sweets; people die in
wars, people’s lives are destroyed, and the memories of these destructions live through
many generations and ferment odium, which give rise to future conflicts.
Participants point to the source of what they named as the challenges and the
problems that the people of Afghanistan have faced and witnessed for over three decades.
All of these they claimed have been “witnessed from the top.” One participant contrasted
the eras of the Taliban and Mujahedeen, which he claimed were controlled from
Islamabad, Pakistan, and the current Afghan government of Hamid Karzai, and which he
claimed has been controlled by the U.S. and the international community. He cited a
conflict situation that occurred in Afghanistan within the Afghan jurisdiction but was
decided by orders received from Islamabad, Pakistan. He gave another example that
occurred during the Taliban era: a man who was detained in Kabul, Afghanistan by the
Taliban security forces, but was later released by orders from Islamabad, Pakistan, the
implication being that the decisions to carry out atrocities or acts of terror are made by
orders from non-Afghans who are outside the Afghan borders. When I asked my
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participants where terrorism against humanitarian aid workers was coming from, they
answered that Afghans are not terrorists, that terrorism is coming into Afghanistan from
outside its borders—from Pakistan, Iran, or jihadist fighters who they claimed are foreign
fighters. Several participants informed me that “Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, he
was an Arab,” they said. One participant used an Afghan proverb that “Everybody knows
that the cow is black, but its milk is white; where Osama bin Laden got killed,” he said.
This was a reference to Pakistan as the source of most of Afghanistan’s problems,
“having the seeds of terror.” But since Pakistan is an ally of the U.S., they accuse the
U.S. of ignoring the hard facts of terrorism and the radicalization of young men and
women for jihad. One participant suggested that the U.S. and Pakistan got together and
created Taliban for the purpose of causing chaos and destabilizing Afghanistan. In order
words, my participants suggested that the U.S. is aware of Pakistan’s behavior and role in
radicalizing young Muslims for jihad, yet the U.S. chooses to not address the issue with
Pakistan, but instead continues to see Pakistan as a partner in the war on terror.
During the focus group discussion, one participant inquired from other
participants in the group if they will agree that the security situation during Taliban
regime was much better than the current security situation in Afghanistan now. He
explained that during the Taliban regime, people felt safe to walk around the streets of
Afghanistan with “bags of gold” without the fear of being attacked or robbed because
nobody dared to steal from another person. However, he noted that such security from the
Taliban came at a high price to the Afghan society. The implication is that the
consequences of being caught stealing during the Taliban regime were catastrophic. As
my participants noted, the punishment for stealing could mean death or the loss of body
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parts. On the contrary, since the presence of the U.S. and NATO troops, the number of
insecurities have been higher and have been the source of major problems, they said, but
the Afghan people have freedom and they are independent.
One participant spoke of insecurities in the context of military incursions into
Afghan villages and communities by the U.S. and NATO forces, calling it “Bombarding
the community with women, children, and poor people.” These incursions, he said, have
negative impacts on Afghan aid workers who are confronted with the aftermaths, and
forced into positions of trying to explain such deadly attacks on the communities. Often
aid workers are unable to provide adequate explanations for the attacks that caused the
loss of family members; this led to mistrust and the belief that insecurities in their
communities “are created by the foreign people, by American, by Britain, by Pakistanis,
by these people.” The participants claimed that these incursions caused loss of lives and
affected the trusting relationships that had been developed between the Afghan
humanitarian aid workers and the local communities. They insisted that the interactions
between the foreign military, the PRTs, and the Afghan humanitarian aid workers created
perceptions that gave rise to mistrust of the Afghan aid workers by the local
communities.
Three participants said that insecurities in Afghanistan began when the U.S. and
the NATO troops came to Afghanistan. They argued that during the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the U.S. did not want the Soviet Union occupying Afghanistan: “Why will
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan?” They insisted that the allied
nations in Afghanistan were there to protect their national interests, and claimed that
Russia does not want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle
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Asia. Also, they claimed that China does not want America in its border out of concern
that the “Muslim travelers” in China will rise against the Chinese Communist
Government.
Many explanations were offered throughout this study by participants in attempts
to explain occurrences and why they believed certain things happened, or are happening
to their country and the Afghan people. Some of these explanations fall within the scope
of ‘conspiracy theories,’ which I address in detail later in this section.
In a complex political emergency like Afghanistan, the Afghan humanitarian aid
workers are under pressure from all the parties, entities, and organizations with special
interests (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999),
involved in the war on terror in Afghanistan. According to Burton (1972), everyone
enacts different roles as we carry out our different daily functions, and often my
participants are forced into roles with different actors in the conflict. Making the analogy
with actors on stage, Burton notes that the stage actors enact roles, and he argues that
“they must deliberately act a part and not behave as they would in their own life” (1972,
p. 72). In the same token, the Afghan humanitarian aid worker playing a role in a
complex political emergency is deliberate and purposeful in being in the role.
When I asked the participants of the focus group about the different roles Afghan
aid workers played in the war on terror, many of the participants described the key roles
of the Afghan NGOs as “bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in Afghan
communities. Many of the participants spoke of the ‘roles’ as issues of trust between the
Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the Afghan local communities. One of the focus
group participants said that after the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, the Afghan aid
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workers were the only ones who were welcomed in the local communities, noting that the
security situations in most of the local communities posed great danger for international
NGOs. As a result of the insecure environments, the Afghan NGOs and CSOs quickly
assumed the roles of “bridge” and “implementers” of humanitarian aid programs for the
international communities and the Afghan local and central governments, who did not
also feel safe going into the local communities. As my participants noted, several rural
communities were known to have Taliban members, while some were controlled by the
Taliban.
The Afghan aid worker by virtue of his/her nationality and membership in the
local Afghan community finds himself/herself at the center of this conflict known as the
war on terror, playing different important ‘roles’ with several stakeholders who have
competing interests. The goal of the Afghan aid worker is to provide humanitarian aid to
needy and vulnerable Afghans in very difficult conditions. However, in order to meet this
objective, the Afghan humanitarian aid workers must play required ‘roles’ to seek funds
and develop new programs; however, funds and programs come from outside the Afghan
communities. Quite often the funds come from the international communities, which are
perceived by some local Afghans to be hostile to the Afghan people. As Burton (1972)
posits, “Each person is many people. Some we like, some we may not like” (p. 110). And
these roles, which the Afghan aid workers play, may not be perceived favorably by local
Afghans, thereby giving rise to perceptions that lead to mistrust by local community
members. Some participants felt that Afghan aid workers who were receiving funds from
PRTs and implementing PRT programs were being dishonest and should not be trusted.
One participant said that “PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people
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know that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason they
are giving money to build the mosque there.”
As noted in my review of literature, the purpose of the PRT was for implementing
the Winning Hearts and Minds campaign (WHAM). This was the U.S. military’s attempt
at the use of softer and gentler approach to fighting terrorism. But the strategy quickly
became a major fiasco, a very well-intended strategy that was poorly implemented.
According to Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key problems with the
WHAM program was the frustration from local Afghan NGOs who complained that their
input was not sought out in the civil-military debate, and pressed for the “Afghanisation”
of the civil-military process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5). They complained
that often local Afghan NGOs were underfunded and undervalued unlike their
counterparts with the international NGOs.
One participant felt that the association with PRTs and the foreign military forces
affected trusting relationships between Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the Afghan
communities, while another participant shared an experience when he was confronted by
Afghans in the rural communities and asked if he had a gun. They were suspicious
because of his association with the PRTs in the area. According to the participant, he was
seen in the company of the foreign PRT agents, but the people did not know the reason
and content of their association. It could have been to benefit the community, but they
perceived him to be working with the enemy, so he was not to be trusted. This rush to
judgment on the side of the Afghan community posed great danger of hostilities toward
the Afghan humanitarian aid worker. A focus group participant echoed a similar
sentiment, acknowledging that even though the Afghan aid worker had developed a
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trusting relationship with the communities, the people’s perceptions of the new ‘role’
with the international community was suspect and can potentially lead to violence against
the aid worker.
The participants agreed that their key role is the delivery of humanitarian aid
services to needy Afghans no matter where they may be. Sometimes they have to go into
very insecure environments to reach desperate aid beneficiaries. Due to the trusting
relationships with the local communities, the Afghan humanitarian aid workers are the
“bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in insecure areas where the Afghan
government agencies and the international NGOs are unable to reach. So they believe that
maintaining the trusting relationship with the Afghan communities is crucial to making
sure that critical services reach vulnerable individuals and families in local communities.
The issue of adherence to humanitarian principles was discussed in my review of
literature. Egeland et al.’s (2011) study showed that the “lack of respect for principles
was third-largest contributor to insecurity” and warned that NGOs have conveniently
“compromised a principled approach in their own conduct by closely aligning with
political and military activities and actors” (p. 19). Incidentally, Stoddard et al. (2011) in
their study which interviewed international NGO staff, the respondents believed that local
and national NGO employees lacked proper training and expertise on conduct and
humanitarian principles, and questioned their ability to handle difficult and often life
threatening situations in complex political environments. However, my participants
believed that the main reason they have been able to maintain trusting relationships with
the local communities has to do with the NGO principles of neutrality. One participant
said that Afghan NGOs are independent, that they do not take side in any conflict. He
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acknowledged that his agency had been serving the communities through different
regimes. They are not on the Afghan government’s “side” or the Taliban “side” or the
U.S. military “side,” and claimed that they simply “share their plans with the community
and involve the people in the decision making to solve the real needs of the people.” And
if any of their humanitarian aid staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will
come together to seek their release from the Taliban. Some participants shared stories of
their close proximity with the Taliban in rural communities that they served. They said
that the Taliban were aware of their presence, but as long as they were providing needed
services to the community, the Taliban did not pose any danger or problem to them.
Due to the increasing risks of violence to their employees, international NGOs
began to adopt the ‘remote management strategy’ which Stoddard et al. (2010) defined as
“adaptation to insecurity, and an aberration from normal programming practice” (p. 11).
They asserted that remote strategies were not meant to be a permanent or a standard
situation; however, several international NGOs relied on local and national aid workers to
maintain their presence and continued their aid activities in local communities, while the
international NGO staffs oversaw operations from safer environment. Stoddard et al.
(2010) questioned the morality and effectiveness of the remote management strategy, and
wondered if the local Afghan NGOs were capable of maintaining high “levels of
sophistication and quality” of aid programs when the remote management strategy was
implemented (2010, p. 8). However, other studies showed that the local Afghan NGOs
wanted more autonomy and sought comparable funding levels as the international NGOs.
Several participants saw funding as a major challenge for the Afghan NGOs; they argued
that the Afghan NGOs did not have direct access to funds and funding sources, and saw
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this as a major challenge facing the Afghan humanitarian aid worker. One participant
gave an example with a U.S. government funding for Afghanistan made available
through the USAID. He said that instead of giving the money directly to the Afghan
NGO, “USAID gives this money to the United Nations. United Nations gives this money
to international NGOs, and the international NGOs gave some of the money to the
Afghan NGOs.” He argued that the Afghan NGOs only end up with “a fraction of the
original amount” to develop and implement aid programs to very needy local Afghan
communities. My participants said that they were the ones in the communities who
worked directly with the people and understood what their key needs were. They spoke
about assessments that they developed in conjunction with the local community people,
and how these assessments addressed the specific needs of the communities, yet funding
the programs was not made directly to them; instead, it had to go through other sources
which had no direct interest in the project. In the end, they claimed that this method of
funding Afghan programs created waste and led to corruption and maleficence.
Nonetheless, many participants still hoped that the international community will
remain in Afghanistan and continue to support the Afghan people. One participant said
that “Despite making some mistakes, the Americans and their allies have been the best
friends of the Afghan people.” He said that Afghanistan desperately needs the support of
the international communities in maintaining security and developing the Afghan
economy, which many participants believed to be the key to reducing terrorism in
Afghanistan and the rural areas bordering Pakistan.
One of the criticisms against the international communities in Afghanistan was
their inability to help the Afghan government become more sustainable. The participants
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claimed that the international communities comprised of representatives from different
nations who represent different national interests, and are not working as one cohesive
force. Therefore, the participants argued that the international communities have different
agendas and different objectives. One participant said that “They should have a strong
and collective action and strategy to fight against terrorism, to fight against the Taliban
and to bring pressure on neighboring countries of Afghanistan.” Another participant said
that if the international community were working cohesively, they would have been able
to “put pressure on the government of Afghanistan to bring an end to the corruption, to
end poverty, and stop the continued influence of the war lords.”
The issue of corruption was of major concern to my participants. Many felt that
the arrival of the international communities brought in a lot of money and economic
activities in to Afghanistan; however, these activities also led to the current state of
corruption. They decried the ways in which the war lords and the people in power prior to
2001 used and manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits. One
participant said that “Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the
poor people and needy people was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords
and powerful people,” thus depriving help to the most vulnerable Afghans. He argued
that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan government and the independent
contractors who they claimed were simply enriching themselves. The participants said
that the Afghan people had hoped that the international communities in Afghanistan,
which they claimed represented “over forty nations,” would have helped them, by
empowering the Afghan people: “they will assist us to stand on our own feet. But
unfortunately, what the people were expecting from the international community didn’t
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happen. So these people lost hope.” Several participants also spoke of the PRTs and the
presence of independent contractors among PRT personnel, whom they associated with
corruption and misappropriations of funds.
Conspiracy Theory
As I listened to some of my participants and the meanings they ascribed to the
conditions of their experiences, I am reminded of the many conspiracy theories that have
often times been used to explain phenomena in the American experience—such as the
notion that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated by the U.S. government as a
pretext to start wars in the Middle East, or that crack-cocaine and the AIDS virus were
purposely developed to affect and destroy the African American communities, or even
the more recent controversy of President Obama’s place of birth, which some continue to
argue that he was not born in the United States. In a University of Chicago research by
Oliver and Wood (2014), they define conspiracy theory as:
Narratives about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating political and
social plots and calamities to further their own nefarious goals. (Davis, 1971, as
cited in Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 1)
According to their study on conspiracy theories, 94 percent of the people sampled
agreed to have heard that “President Obama was not born in the United States and does
not have an authentic Hawaiian birth certificate,” and “22 percent of the sample” were in
agreement with what is now known as the “Birther conspiracy” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p.
13). The University of Chicago study (2012) finds that “conspiracism” as they labeled it,
was not simply an “important form of public opinion, but expressive of some latent
principles behind Americans’ political beliefs” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 3). In other
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words, this is how some people express and construct meaning to explain phenomena that
they have experienced. Oliver and Wood conclude that conspiracy theories can help us
understand how individuals perceive and ascribe meaning to events and phenomena those
shape the world in which they live (2014).
Not unlike the American experience of interpreting events, my Afghan
participants also interpreted events and phenomena that shaped their world in ways that
they could best understand them, by using triggers from their own specific conditions that
frame their own experiences, such as the historical, political, social, economic, and
cultural conditions that have framed their experiences and perceptions of their world, and
the world which they live. My participants referenced many narratives that some might
dismiss as simply conspiracy theories without credible foundation—such as the notion
that the U.S., Britain, and Pakistan got together to create Taliban to destabilize
Afghanistan; that the war on terror is a war of the superpowers for who will control
Afghanistan, and ultimately control the rest of Asia; that America made sure that the
Soviet invasion did not succeed in Afghanistan, so Russia is making sure that the U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan does not succeed; that the issue of the Durand line is the reason
Pakistan will continue to make sure that Afghanistan does not become a viable nation on
its border; that the war on terror is not about fighting terrorism, but about the control of
oil; that Afghanistan is being used as a “proxy” for the Kashmir dispute between India
and Pakistan; that Afghans are not terrorists; that terrorism comes to Afghanistan from
outside its borders; and others that show Afghans as victims of circumstances induced by
other nations, which are beyond Afghan control. Often such assertions from developing
and less developed “third world” countries are dismissed as mere conjectures and

211
innuendos not to be taken seriously. However, the University of Chicago study on
conspiracy theories by Oliver and Wood (2014) reveals that conspiracy theories show
how individuals interpret and make meaning of their individual experiences, and the
“tendencies of all people for understanding their political world” (p. 31).
In a world with a long and violent history, Afghanistan is a South Asian country,
“the size of France, Switzerland and Benelux combined” strategically located, and for the
last thirty years has been “marked by appalling episodes of violence, war and genocide”
(Khan, 2012, p. 201). It was first challenged by the British in the 19th century, but the
British invasion was repelled by the Afghans in 1878 (2012, p. 210). In 1893 the Durand
Line was used to create the border with India, allowing the carving out of Pakistan
territory from Afghan land; the Durand Line is known as the “Imaginary Line” dispute
between Pakistan and Afghanistan (p. 210). This dispute between Pakistan and
Afghanistan is what my participants referred to as the Durand Line dispute. Another
attempt was made by the British in 1921 but was again repelled by the Afghans. The
country began to experience internal struggles and forceful changes of government and
leadership. In 1978, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, causing the U.S. to side with
the Afghans.
The U.S. found a “conduit” for arms and military supplies to Afghanistan, in
Pakistan, and this relationship gave Pakistan its status of “Frontline State” (Khan, 2012,
p. 210). This, according to Khan (2012), was the beginning of Afghan religious
fundamentalism and jihadism, which was referred to by my participants as the creation of
Taliban for Afghanistan by the U.S. and Pakistan, for the sole purpose of destabilizing
Afghanistan. Afghanistan quickly became a battle ground for the cold-war between the
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United States and the Soviet Union (Khan, 2012). This was also referenced by my
participant who felt that the war on terror was simply a war of the superpowers. He said
that with the help of the U.S., the Soviet Union was defeated in 1989, and after the
Soviets withdrew their forces, the U.S. decided to leave Afghanistan, thus opening the
door for insurgencies. Eventually the Afghan civil war broke out, which a female
participant described as “anarchy, never witnessed anywhere in the world.” She said
Kabul was completely destroyed. According to Khan (2012), the men were “arrested,
humiliated, and killed, and women were molested, tortured, and raped” (2012, p. 211).
This was the condition that ushered the Taliban to power and created a haven for AlQaeda and Osama bin Laden, and a base to launch the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
U.S. that killed over 3,000 people. Consequently, in October of 2001, the U.S. launched
air strikes against Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden, declaring the war on terror, which
is now the longest war in U.S. history (Dalrymple, 2013), lasting over twelve years and
claiming the lives of over 2,144 U.S. military personnel who have so far paid the ultimate
price (Crowley, 2013). Afghan civilian casualties of the war on terror are estimated over
21,000 men, women, and children (Watson Institute, 2011).
Civil-Military Collaboration
The impact of civil-military relationships in complex political emergencies like
Afghanistan was a key motivator for this research study. One of the questions that drove
this study was how the interactions between the Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the
U.S. and international military troops in Afghanistan have exposed the Afghan
humanitarian aid workers to suspicion and violent attacks in local Afghan communities.
From the section on literature review, it was noted that the military and humanitarian
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communities have divergent interests and objectives with regards to delivering
humanitarian aid to people in desperate need (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008). The
military perceived their WHAM program as a charitable program aimed at the “deserving
poor” (2008, p. 7), while the humanitarian aid workers, by virtue of their years of
building understanding and trusting relationships with communities in need, tried to bring
feelings of “ownership, involvement, and empowerment” to the Afghan people (2008, p.
7). They argued that the military should be cognizant of how their “charitable acts can
undermine NGO activities” (2008, p. 7).
According to the report exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations
by Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key issues from the Winning Hearts
and Minds program was the dissatisfaction felt by local NGOs that the civil-military
debate in Afghanistan did not include nor seek out the input of Afghan humanitarian aid
workers. They believed that there should have been an “Afghanisation” of the civilmilitary process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5), a feeling among the local
NGOs that their opinions should be included. In addition, they complained that often
local Afghan NGOs were underfunded unlike the international NGOs (2008).
Referring to how the PRTs have impacted on the Afghan humanitarian aid
workers, one participant shared that when the PRTs came to Afghanistan, the trusting
relationships that had been built between the Afghan aid workers and the local
communities were deeply affected, as the people became suspicious and accused aid
workers of working with the foreign troops: “Oh you are the spies, you have a gun, you
have a weapon.” Another participant felt that the nighttime military incursions into
Afghan communities affect perceptions and the trusting relationships of Afghan
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humanitarian aid workers in the communities. He said that after the incursions, it was
difficult for Afghan aid workers to return to the communities and witness the aftermath
and the grieving families who lost family members during the nightly military incursions
by the U.S. and NATO troops as people mourned and buried their dead.
Another participant talked about the many issues he had with the PRTs and
foreign military forces. He said that they often felt that because they were building roads
and bridges for the Afghans communities, they had a license to do as they pleased. He
said that “the people are not in favor of the military people. The general image of these
super powers is not so good in the minds of the people here in this country.” They gave
an example of PRTs giving Afghan NGOs funds to build mosques in Kabul. One
participant said that the local people were not “fooled.” He accused Afghan NGOs of
implementing PRT objectives that were not in the best interest of the Afghan people, and
felt that the association with PRTs and the foreign military forces were affecting the
trusting relationships that were built between Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the
Afghan communities.
Focus group participants were given three categories and instructed to list their
feelings and perceptions regarding each category. One of the categories was: Potential
Challenges from 2014 Drawdown of U.S. Forces. The entries in this category were quite
comprehensive, and they validated the following themes that were discussed in chapter
four.
Security/Insecurity
Most of the interview and focus group participants felt that the drawdown would
worsen the security situation after the U.S. and NATO troops leave Afghanistan. They
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assert that “Afghan national forces are not fully equipped” to defend their country, so
they believe that “insecurities will increase.” Some see a “rise in insurgency” and a
weakening of “local security and governance capacity” as a result of the drawdown of
forces in 2014. One participant predicted “anarchy after withdrawal of foreign troops.”
The belief is that the enemies of Afghanistan are very motivated and capable of
destabilizing Afghanistan by creating fear, disorder, and insecurities in all areas of the
country with the presence of the U.S. and NATO troops. They believe that with the
current strength and preparedness of the Afghan national security forces, without the
backing of the U.S. and NATO troops, the Taliban and the foreign jihadists will easily
overtake the current Afghan security forces and turn back all the achievements of the past
twelve years under U.S. and NATO occupation. In other words, my participants fear that
the Afghan security forces are not ready to take over securing their nation from the U.S.
and NATO troops.
Interventionism
Participants expressed concern that “interventions from neighboring countries
will increase” as a result of the U.S. and NATO drawdown in 2014, and they felt that the
pull out of Western forces could lead to “polycentricism, resurgence of insurgent and
innocent killings, and a possible resurgence of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.”
This issue of interventions from the neighboring countries, namely Pakistan and
Iran, is seen by the participants as one of the major causes of insecurities in Afghanistan.
The belief is that these interventions bring in foreign jihadists that commit atrocities that
destabilize their nation. Some of the participants stated that the terrorists are not Afghans,
insisting that they are foreign fighters from outside Afghan borders.
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Funding
Participants agreed that a U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces will lead to
decrease in funding opportunities, and fear that the “cost of living may increase” thereby
making life more demanding for Afghans who are already experiencing hard times—the
thinking that such a drawdown will cause “reduction in humanitarian aid funding.” Still
some participants believed that a force drawdown by U.S. and NATO will lead to “rise in
unemployment as job opportunities decrease.” One participant expressed the belief that a
decrease in funding will weaken the “survival of the present government” and the
“survival of the CSOs.”
According to my literature review, the Afghan economy is heavily dependent on
foreign aid, most of which is humanitarian aid, and the majority of the aid assistance
comes from the USAID. My participants fear that a drawdown of U.S. forces may also
reduce or completely eliminate humanitarian aid support from the United States. Funding
of the Afghan economy is perceived as being critical for maintaining law and order,
providing opportunities to Afghan youths, and fighting the rise of jihadist tendencies
among Afghan youths. They argue that if Afghans have the opportunities to make a
living and provide for their families, they will not become viable recruits for the Taliban
or foreign jihadists.
Trust
A group of participants felt that a U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces in 2014
would affect aid workers’ “perception” and “engagement” in Afghan communities.
They claim that “people lost hope” due to “unrealized objectives.”
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The issue of trust with the Afghan people and communities continues to resonate
in this research study. Strand (2007), in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan Trust”,
posed these questions: “Why have NGOs become military targets…? Why were people
not coming out to greet us…, as they always did in the past?” (p. 9). One area that all my
participants agreed on and spoke about passionately was the significance of the trust
developed between the Afghan aid workers and the local communities. They were
equally consistent on the role trust between the communities and the Afghan aid workers
made them the “bridge” for the local communities and the Afghan government, and
between the local communities and the international military and humanitarian
communities. My participants claimed that even though the people lost hope due to their
perception of what the arrival of the U.S. and its allied troops will mean for them, they
still believed that their lives will get better because they trusted the Afghan humanitarian
aid workers whom they referred to as the “bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in
local and insecure communities. With the drawdown of forces in 2014, my participants
fear a backlash in the local communities; as the funds decrease and the living conditions
become harder for the people, they are likely to blame and turn their frustrations to the
Afghan humanitarian aid workers who they perceive as the agents or “bridge” between
them and the international communities.
Drawdown of U.S. and NATO Forces in 2014
On June 22, 2011, U.S. President Barak Obama addressed the nation from the
White House and highlighted his objectives for the surge: to send 30,000 more American
troops into Afghanistan (Obama, 2011). The President told the American people that his
objective was to “refocus on al Qaeda,” and to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum,” while
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the U.S. military will focus on training Afghan forces so that they are ready to “defend
their own country” (Obama, 2011, para. 3). He made it clear that the U.S. “commitment
would not be open-ended” (2011, para. 3), stating that the U.S. drawdown of forces
would begin in July 2013. “Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014,
this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for
their own security” (Obama, 2011, para. 4).
On Tuesday night, February 13, 2013 during President Obama’s State of the
Union speech before a joint session of Congress, the president announced to the nation
that “another 34,000 American troops” (Jackson & Michaels, 2013, para. 3) will be
coming home from Afghanistan. The drawdown, he said will continue into the following
year; “and by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over (Jackson &
Michaels, 2013, para. 3).
My participants shared their perceptions of how the drawdown of U.S. and NATO
troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will affect the people and institutions in
Afghanistan

with

dire

consequences.

The

following

are

the

concerns

and

recommendations that they shared.
Gradual force drawdown to strengthen Afghan security and borders. They
alluded to the danger of maintaining weak borders with Afghan neighbors, and asked for
international forces to help strengthen Afghan securities forces, so that they are able to
secure and protect the country from external interventions. Instead of a sudden pull out of
forces, they asked for a gradual pull-out with intense training of Afghan military and
security personnel before gradually pulling out and handing over security responsibilities,
and eventually turning over all security enforcement when the Afghan forces are ready to
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take control on their own and able to defend the country. One participant expressed the
fears of most Afghans that “Afghanistan neighbors will definitely show themselves strong
and just bring their puppets again in power.”
My participants insisted that terrorism and insecurities in Afghanistan originated
from outside the country’s borders with its neighbors. They blamed Pakistan and Iran for
the interventions and pointed to jihadist training grounds in Pakistan that are known to
train and radicalize foreign fighters that end up in Afghanistan.
Invest and fund the civilian sectors. They asked for the international community
to continue investing and funding the civilian sectors, particularly the humanitarian
sectors, which they claimed has been the key engine of Afghan development. There is
need to continue to provide uninterrupted basic needs for the most poor and vulnerable
Afghans. They would like the international communities to continue providing advisory
roles to the Afghan government so as to maintain good governance, law and order, and
rid the government of corruption. Several participants talked about the Afghan
government’s inability to care for its people. They claimed that the Afghan humanitarian
aid workers created the “bridge” between the Afghan people and the Afghan
governments, and argued that the people’s needs are met through the efforts of the
humanitarian sector, not by the Afghan government. Hence, they advocated for direct
funding of the humanitarian aid sector, to maximize services to the communities, and
avoid dealing with what they claimed to be a corrupt Afghan government; they also
accused the Afghan government of not having any programs that addressed the needs of
the Afghan people, and gave examples of circumstances where the Taliban was able to
provide help for people in rural areas where the government was not able to reach due to
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insecurities. However, they insisted that Afghan humanitarian aid workers provided
services in rural insecure areas, which sometimes expose aid workers to violence and
physical dangers.
Many participants feared that a drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces may lead to
the closing of Afghan NGOs and humanitarian aid services that provided desperately
needed help to Afghan communities. One participant expressed his fears of things
returning to the past and the potential of losing what had been achieved since the arrival
of the U.S. and NATO troops.
In light of what has been witnessed in Iraq since the pull out of U.S. forces, it is
very critical that these circumstances, that create conditions which lead to insecurities, are
addressed so that systems are put in place to allow young Afghans to develop themselves
and seek opportunities to provide for themselves and their families. One participant said
that if a person has a job, and he or she is able to provide for their family, he or she will
not be thinking of joining groups in Pakistan, or going to jihadist training camps in
“Yemen” or “Kashmir, Pakistan” or “doing roadside bombing” or “blowing himself
up.”
According to Burton (1990), if people have no means of providing for themselves
and satisfying their basic human needs, they are likely to seek other means that are
outside the social norms. If the conditions that exist after the U.S. and NATO pull out
from Afghanistan create the sense of hopelessness and despair for young men and women
in Afghan communities, they will become easy targets for recruit into terror and jihadist
groups. As Hamas leaders assert, poverty and the feeling of hopelessness provide
opportunities for recruiting young jihadists (Stern, 2003).
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Broker agreement with the Taliban. My participants asked the U.S. and
international communities to help broker an agreement between the Taliban, the Afghan
government, and the Afghan people, which will allow the Taliban to participate in
Afghan political process so as to avoid backlash upon the U.S. and NATO drawdown or
any possibilities of sectarian war. My participants claimed that the Afghan government
forces will not be able to defeat the well-funded Taliban who control most of the rural
communities and the Afghan borders:
“If the government is not able to have access to the people in the village, but the
Taliban provides them with food and money to take care of their families, they are
going to listen to the Taliban and do what the Taliban is telling them to do.”
One participant, even though critical of some of the actions of the Taliban, noted
that “their regime and the time of their government was very good.” Another participant
said that security was much better during the Taliban regime than with the U.S. and
NATO troops. He insisted that people did not dare to steal from other people for fear of
getting caught and the consequence; however, he noted that now, Afghanistan is insecure,
but the people are “independent.” He said Afghans now have the right to vote, go to
school, work, and the rights of women and minorities.
A fundamental goal articulated by my participants is the need for “peace,” and
some referred to it as “just peace” through education. They claimed that terrorism or the
jihadist tendencies are not intrinsic to the Afghan culture, and argued that the sources of
terror and jihad are foreign. However, the lack of education allowed terrorism to fester
and grow, and so if they are “cut from their roots and not allowed to germinate,” he said,
they can be controlled and eventually eradicated. One participant made the argument that
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the Taliban preyed on people who were uneducated, alleging that during the Taliban
regime, the Taliban took advantage of the people who were uneducated. Therefore, she
said that education of men and women in Afghanistan is the key to attaining Afghan
freedom and prosperity.
Basic Human Needs Model
I use the basic human needs theory advanced by Burton (1990, 1997, 1972) to
frame and form a contextual analysis of the major themes developed from the study, and
to understand the conditions that give rise to the destructive processes that lead to violent
attacks and cause danger to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. In
Burton’s work on structural violence and conflict causation, he warns that:
if certain human needs are not satisfied, there will be conflict. The conflict will be
of such a character that no suppressive means will contain it. Attempts to suppress
it will lead, on the contrary, to exponential increases in conflict. One could go on
to predict a total catastrophe. (Burton, 1990, p. 231)
Even though Burton did not invent human needs theory, he is regarded by many
conflict and international relations scholars and political scientists as one of the pioneers
of conflict resolution and dispute studies (Sandole, 1999). Burton’s basic human needs
theory posits the existence of certain universal basic needs that must be attained in order
to avoid destructive conflicts in societies. He argues very firmly that when the pursuit of
these basic needs are frustrated, and people are deprived the opportunities or the means to
attain them, individuals will go to extreme measures in order to fulfill their “deeply felt
needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (Burton, 1997, p. 19).
Burton’s basic human needs theory has four components that are most significant to
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understanding destructive social conflicts, and these are the needs for: identity,
recognition, security, and personal development (Burton, 1990, 1997). However,
according to Burton, no model is able to “depict deep-rooted human motivations” (1990,
p. 75). He believes that such motivations require a “conceptualization that goes beyond
the capacity of models to describe” (p. 75). He concludes that such uses of models are
“misleading” (p. 75), because they only bring attention to certain interactions, hence not a
“substitute for a full analytical exposition” (Burton, 1990, p. 75). Nonetheless, for the
sake of empirical evidence and to avoid observations that merely lead to labeling
aggression, frustration, violence, and anti-social behavior, Burton posits the following
hypotheses:
If learning and social development require consistency in response, security,
identity, and recognition, and if human behavior is characterized by learning and
social development, then humans pursue consistency in response, security,
identity, and recognition as a condition of their learning process. It is reasonable
to argue, further, that organisms have a genetic drive to learn, for existence
depends upon learning. These learning needs will be fulfilled. If recognition,
identity of self, and some measure of control over the environment are human
needs, then the absence of their fulfillment will lead to adaptations that restrict
development and perhaps create abnormalities in behavior, or lead to anti-social
behaviors. (Burton, 1990, p. 95)
Burton’s argument is supported by Sites’ control theory (1973), in which he
argues that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual human needs are the key sources
of societal order and change. He insists that people will fight and risk dying to protect
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values related to need gratification. Sites maintains that the individuals’ desire to satisfy
their basic needs is so strong that they are willing to “step out of the real world into a
world of their own” in order to seek the satisfaction of their basic needs or simply to
“escape their complete frustration” (Sites, 1973, p. 10). In the same token, Burton and
Sites agree that if individuals are not able to satisfy their needs through legal, morally, or
socially justifiable means, they will seek other means necessary, including causing harm
to themselves and others (Burton, 1990, p. 96). According to Burton, basic human needs
will be pursued without regard to the consequences, even when it leads to conflict.
Therefore, the desire for individuals to seek and satisfy their basic needs is a fundamental
precondition for maintaining social order. He argues that any society’s ability to function
is dependent on its individual citizen’s ability to fulfill their basic human needs (1990,
1997).
My participants spoke of instances when the young men and women in Afghan
communities had no hope. They cannot take care of themselves or feed their families, so
they said, “When the people have no hope, the number of the Taliban is increasing.” My
participants did not attempt to defend young Afghan men and women who struggle every
day to have their basic needs met, but instead they provided an empathetic understanding
of the consequences of structural violence, which created the conditions that continues to
frustrate young Afghan men and women and deny them their basic human needs.
In an attempt to explain the conditions of structural violence as experienced by
young Afghan men and women, one participant talked about the issues of “joblessness
and unequal distribution of revenue.” These were the conditions that he said created
“past skirmishes and fighting” that led to sectarian and civil conflicts in the Afghanistan.
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Insisting that if he has a job and the ability to provide for his family, he would not be
thinking of joining jihadist or terror groups, or doing harm to himself and other innocent
people. He talked about the propaganda used to lure young men and women into jihadist
terror training camps by what he called “some elements in our neighborhood,” referring
to Pakistan—“they’re explaining that this is like a holy war. If they kill themselves, they
will be going to Janna.”
In Jessica Stern’s work entitled Terror in the Name of God (2003), she affirms
that “martyrdom operations are sacred acts, worthy of both earthly and heavenly
rewards” (p. 33). From her interviews with Hamas leaders, they acknowledged that
poverty and hopelessness increased support for them and made recruiting for jihad easier.
During one of her interviews, she was asked to take a look at the living conditions of the
Palestinian people, and then she would understand “why there are always volunteers for
martyrdom” (p. 38). One of the Hamas leaders told her that “Hardship always brings
people back to God” (p. 38). During one of my interviews with a participant, I asked him
what he would say to the U.S. President Obama if he had the president’s attention, and he
simply said he would ask the president to spend half the money it would cost the U.S. to
pull out its military troops from Afghanistan on civil development that will provide
opportunities for Afghan people. And he said, “Just ten percent, and there will be no
more fighting.” He believed that the main issue driving insecurity and terrorism is the
lack of opportunities—that people are fighting because “they do not have hope”—they
cannot see the “endless enduring dream and a thousand points of light” that the former
President George H. Bush (1988, para.107) spoke about during his speech accepting the
Republican presidential nomination. So my participant will ask President Obama to shine
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some light of hope for the Afghan people to see, just as the former President George H.
Bush (1988) likened America to “a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand
points of light in a broad and peaceful sky” (para. 62). My participant believed that
Afghans will choose peace, prosperity, and long life, instead of blowing themselves up.
Identity. The issue of identity deals with how individuals navigate the pursuit of
belonging and acceptance, sometimes sought through groups such as ethnic groups,
religious groups, social groups, or work/professional groups (Burton, 1990). This need
provides the feeling of belonging, which can translate to a sense of confidence and
security knowing that one is not alone. The question of identity was never asked directly
to my participants, and was not discussed during the interviews and the focus group
discussions. However, one participant alluded to the fact that one of the achievements of
the war on terror was the elimination of ethnic conflict and rivalry. He noted that prior to
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, ethnic rivalry between Tajiks and Pashtuns, as
well as language and tribal differences used to be causes of conflict; now he said,
Afghans have become less interested in such divisions, suggesting that the people have
been “sensitized” as their “awareness has been raised.” They have new issues to dwell
on that are much bigger than the individual: they worry about protecting the constitution,
civil rights for all Afghans, and equal justice for all as they look ahead for the next
election season to vote for someone they believe will be the best leader for all the people
of Afghanistan.
A key element of identity has to do with the issue of joblessness—the inability of
young Afghans to find employment and be able to provide for their families. Burton
(1972) alluded to role behaviors and how they affect and define the individual’s sense of
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self. The roles individuals play in society affect how they are perceived by the society
and people that they interact with, thereby affecting their own self-esteem and how they
self-identify.
The issues of jobs and employment are central to the ability of an individual to
seek and attain their basic human need of identity. Having gainful employment provides
the individual with a role in society that gives them the identity and self-worth, which
leads to how they perceive themselves in society and how society perceives them. If they
are not working, not able to provide for themselves or take care of their families, they
may begin to look elsewhere for the diminished sense of pride in their identity.
According to Burton (1990), they become vulnerable and susceptible to ideologies and
propagandas in the environment because they will now do whatever it takes to fulfil those
unmet needs, even if it means using terrorism or joining jihadist groups that promise
them hope.
Finally, the issue of foreign interventions from Pakistan and neighboring
countries, which my participants claim imposed their will on the people of Afghanistan,
were voiced frequently by my participants. One participant talked about how orders to
release a prisoner from an Afghan jail were given from Islamabad, Pakistan. He shared
that people referred to Afghanistan as another province of Pakistan. This erosion and
deprivation of national identity can affect one’s ability to perceive themselves as a
member of an independent people, therefore affecting their self-esteem. This feeling can
also be compounded by the fact that Afghanistan has been occupied by several powers in
recent history: once by the British, then the Soviet Union, and now by the U.S. and
NATO troops. As Stern (2003) states in her study of religious militancy, one of the
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dominant issues that drives Islamic militancy is pride, the shame of humiliation by the
West. This may be a self-defeating proposition, or as a result of the conditions from
conflicting dynamics playing out in several Islamic environments such as the Israeli and
Palestinian conflict, or the Western invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.
As a result of these structural conditions, young Islamic men and women seeking to
redeem their identities are made vulnerable in their quest to fulfil this unmet human need
(Burton, 1990, 1997). When the conditions in the environment frustrate their ability to
attain their basic needs, they may begin to seek other means outside the social norm,
including violent means to express their frustrations (Burton, 1990).
Security. Insecurity has been a critical area of vulnerability affecting the
psychology of most Afghans for over thirty years. A nation that has seen many
occupations, invasions, and internal civil conflicts, and has been classified by the UN as a
complex political emergency is an environment with considerable breakdown of
authority, requiring international response beyond the capacity of any single nation
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999). Its people
are not safe, as insurgents and jihadist groups attempt to disrupt their fragile state of
normalcy using fear and mayhem to subject its people to ideologies that will form and
frame their existence.
Several participants talked about their lack of trust in the Afghan government and
the Afghan national security’s inabilities to protect them and their families. One
participant felt that the Afghan military was not capable of defending the country against
military attack from Pakistan following the U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces in 2014.
This sense of vulnerability affects not only the individual’s sense of security, but also
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their sense of national identity. When the attainment of basic human need is obstructed
and made unattainable, people will resort to dire measures to attain them (Burton, 1997).
According to Burton (1990, 1997), if people do not feel safe, and have no way of
making sure that their loved ones will be safe, many will resort to vigilante justice; they
will seek ways to protect and shelter their loved ones even if it leads them to breaking the
law. Individuals will go to extreme measure in order to provide safety needs for their
family (1997). A female participant shared that during the Taliban regime, many Afghan
women risked their lives, operating underground to sustain the women’s movement
against the Taliban rules and knowing fully well that they could be put to death, but they
were not deterred from fulfilling the need for the pursuit of the rights of women and equal
protection of all Afghans under the law. They were willing to risk their lives to get
freedom from the Taliban.
Recognition and Personal Development. I am reminded of Burton’s assertion
that behavior is a function of “learning and social development” (1990, p. 95). He argues
that “if recognition, identity of self, and some measure of control over the environment
are human needs, then the absence of their fulfillment will lead to adaptations that restrict
development and perhaps create abnormalities in behavior, or lead to anti-social
behaviors” (Burton, 1990, p. 95). With hope and the opportunity for self-development,
individuals have a conducive atmosphere that nurtures and encourages the attainment of
the basic human needs of recognition and personal development without fear of physical,
psychological, mental, or social harm. Individuals and societies have the opportunity to
develop environments that are free from structural violence, which frustrate the
attainment of basic human needs, and give rise to conflicts that create insecurities.
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Structural Violence. In earlier sections, I introduced ideas from John Burton
(1972, 1990, 1997), Johan Galtung (1964, 1969, 1990), and Paul Sites (1973),on
structural violence and the systematic conditions that frustrate individuals from attaining
their basic human needs, and how the frustration and inability to attain basic human
needs of security, identity, recognition, and personal development or self-actualization
can push people and societies into conflicts, terrorism, and social disorder. Galtung
(1969) defines violence as the reason for the “difference between the potential and the
actual, between what could have been and what is” (p. 168). And cultural violence is
defined as those attributes and characteristics that define our core essence “exemplified
by religion, language and art, empirical science and formal science that can be used to
justify or legitimize direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). To this end,
my female participants were quite clear on the type of peace they seek in Afghanistan:
just peace! They told me—the belief that all Afghans (men, women and children) need to
be free with equal opportunities and peace for all Afghans.
Theoretical Framework from Research Findings
One main objective of this study was to explore the lived experiences of Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, on the war on terror, and to better
understand the conditions that expose them to risks and violent attacks. My investigation
led to a better understanding of the conditions that continue to give rise to the increase in
violence, kidnapping, and killings of humanitarian aid workers in complex political
emergencies. Using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) my data analysis generated
six dominant themes from the storied narratives of my 10 face-to-face interview
participants, and seven dominant themes from my focus group discussions with twenty
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Afghan NGO directors. Originating from my research data is a new theory of
intervention, which I have named Otubako Post 9-11 Conflict Theory. The name Otubako
is in memory of my late father who was assassinated during the Nigerian civil war in
1968. A family legend is that the original family name was Otubako, meaning that a
woman’s vagina is wealth. Shamed from ridicule my father decided to change the family
name from Otubako to Ogwude. The early Ibo custom believed that a woman that bore
many children brought wealth to her husband’s home.
Emanating from this theory of intervention is a model for transforming
environments from violent conflicts to sustainable, collaborative, co-existence of its
entire people—an environment which provides individuals the ability to seek and attain
their basic human needs of security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization.
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Security:

Funding:

Trust:

People feel secure in their
environment; secure borders; and
the ability to make decisions for
themselves and their families

Increase funding for new
businesses; create jobs and
opportunities; build schools and
infrastructure

Establish good relationships with
local people, communities, and
governments; develop and
communicate clear military and
political goals/strategies

Conflict Environment:
Complex Political Emergency:
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where
there is total or considerable breakdown of authority
resulting from an internal or external conflict and which
requires an international response that goes beyond the
mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the
ongoing United Nations country programs

Secure Environment:
Where people are able to
provide basic needs for
themselves and their families;
have a strong sense of identity;
ability to seek personal
development; and feeling of
recognition for their
contributions

Improve
efficacy
and the
rule of
law

Create
opportunities
for all; improve
national pride
and identity

Develop
human
capacity;
discourage
brain drain

Improve
collaboration
with all parties
and
stakeholders including
insurgents

Just Peace
– with
equality
for all

Eradicate
hopelessness
and the
militarization
of youths

Figure 2. Illustration of Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory is a theory of interventions founded and
derived from my data of storied narratives from ten face-to-face interviews and a focus
group discussion with twenty Afghan humanitarian aid workers. The theory postulates
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that the efficacy of interventions and their ability to transform conflict environments
(Complex Political Emergencies) to more secure, supportive, and just environments can
be determined by the conditions in the environments vis-à-vis the conditions that existed
in the environments at the time of the interventions. A favorable intervention will
produce positive conditions that are secure, supportive, and just for its inhabitants, so that
they are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and their families. However;
an unfavorable intervention will produce negative outcomes, which give rise to
conditions that create chaos and insecurities in the environment—conditions of structural
violence that deny and frustrate individuals from attaining basic fundamental human
needs for themselves and their families. The nature of the intervention may be hostile as
in the case of Afghanistan, or friendly as in the case of the plumber. In either case,
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory postulates that for interventions to be successful, the
interveners must leave the context in conditions similar to, or better than, the original
conditions that existed at the time of the intervention, otherwise the resulting conditions
will lead to chaos and insecurities.
When I asked my participants how they felt about the war on terror, in almost
every instance the answer was: “Do not abandon Afghanistan like in the 1990s.” Many
followed with the Afghan proverb: “When you try to lift a piece of stone, and you find
that it is too heavy; you cannot lift it, you should kiss it and leave it in its place.” They
said that in the beginning of the U.S. intervention, the U.S. and NATO troops knew that
they could not lift the stone; they should have kissed it, and should not have come to
Afghanistan. Just like the plumber who was invited into a home to repair a clogged
kitchen sink, but creates conditions worse by damaging the garbage disposal. His
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intervention will be deemed unsuccessful because the condition in the home as a result of
the intervention is worse than the condition that existed prior to his intervention. In the
same token, when the U.S. and NATO troops intervened in Afghanistan, they tried to fix
a fragile state in disarray, but only to create conditions worse than the original state of
disarray. Now my participants claim that the whole area of Afghanistan is “engulfed in
fire.” They warned that since the U.S. and NATO troops have actively intervened in
Afghanistan, they cannot abandon Afghanistan until they put out the “fire,” as former
General Colin Powell warned that “if you break it, you own it” (as cited in Samuels,
2007, para. 1).
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory postulates three ingredients: security, funding,
and trust, necessary for transforming complex political emergencies in a post-9/11 world.
The model begins with building security infrastructure, adequate funding for all sectors
of society, and building trust between all groups and stakeholders, including insurgents.
These actions, correctly executed, have the ability to transform conflict environments
(Complex Political Emergency) into secure environments where different groups
collaborate and individuals are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and
their families; individuals are recognized for their contributions to society and as a result
have strong sense of self and national identity.
The model is configured in sections to illustrate the different components needed
to create sustainable post-conflict environment; the top section depicts the conditions that
must be initiated in order to begin the process of transformation. The next section is the
context or environment that is acted upon to produce change; this change process is
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depicted in the last section as it transforms from violent state into a more secure
environment.
Contribution of Study
The primary contribution of this study of the lived experiences of Afghan
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, is to create a better understanding of the
conditions in Kabul as a result of the war on terror that give rise to the structural violence
that leads to insecurities, terrorism, and Islamic militancy. I also expect that this study
will make viable contributions to scholarly debates and lead to further investigations on
how the conditions in complex political emergencies like Afghanistan lead to suspicion
and mistrust that give rise to violence against humanitarian aid workers (Deutsch, 2011).
With the escalation of conflicts in many parts of the third world, complex political
emergencies involving several political, military, and insurgent groups which infringe on
humanitarian space—as we have witnessed in the past twelve years, particularly in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Sudan, Liberia, Congo, Kosovo, Columbia, Palestine, and now Syria—have
become the new framework for international conflict in the ‘War on Terror.’ As a student
of conflict resolution, I believe that this research study will enable scholars of conflict
and dispute studies to begin to investigate the conditions of structural violence that
frustrate individuals from obtaining their basic human needs. For over thirty years, the
world was warned that individuals frustrated from attaining their basic human needs will
be willing to go to “extreme lengths to defy systems in order to pursue their deeply felt
needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (Burton, 1997, p. 19, 1990,
1972). Sites (1973) made the argument that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual
human needs are the key sources of societal order and change. It is my hope that this
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research study will further this dialog and lead to more investigations on structural
violence and the frustration and deprivation of basic human needs, as foundational to
addressing this violent phenomenon of terrorism and the radicalization of young men and
women. To this end, I have developed a conflict model: Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict
Theory—a theory of the efficacy of interventions with the ability to transform conflict
environments (Complex Political Emergencies) into secure environments where people
are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and their families, they are
recognized for their contributions to society, and have a strong sense of self and national
identity.
From the discussions I had with my participants in Kabul, a central desire
expressed by my participants was the need to be heard. They hoped that this research
study would provide them the opportunity to voice their opinions on issues relating to the
war on terror, and their role as Afghan humanitarian aid workers in a conflict that some
have referred to humanitarian aid workers as “force multipliers” (Ferris, 2010). The
feeling was that their voices had been drowned from discussions on civil-military
cooperation, as well as their frustration on how local Afghan NGOs are funded through
the International NGOs. It is my hope, therefore, that the stories of these men and women
will shed light on the dangerous and often life threatening conditions that Afghan aid
workers endure as a result of the war on terror. It is my hope that through better
understanding, more constructive interactions and relationships with Afghan aid workers
will develop.
I am hopeful that this investigation will help us better understand the true
meanings of the past twelve years of war on terror and its impact on humanity. September
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11, 2001 was a ‘moment of change’ that changed the nature of conflicts as the world had
known. Groups of young men of Islamic faith flew airplanes into the World Trade Center
buildings in New York City, killing over 3,000 men and women; such acts of terrorism
that struck New York City, Arlington, Virginia, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania have
significantly and, as many believe, have permanently affected the way Americans view
themselves and the rest of the world. These new conditions are changing the nature of
conflicts and creating a power in-balance, tilting the power balance from the U.S.
Department of State to the Department of Defense—a new phenomenon that has changed
the dynamics of international conflicts by giving rise to conditions that some have coined
the “militarization of aid” (Ferris, 2010). This investigation attempts to provide
understanding of the consequences of this military violation of humanitarian space in
complex political emergencies.
Using the stories of individual interviews and focus group discussions from
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, I have sought to understand how the
war on terror affects and impacts on aid workers and their ability to deliver and provide
desperately needed and lifesaving aid to the young, women, and the old who are often
victims of war and conflict. To this end, I have developed a theoretical model: Otubako
Post-9/11 Conflict Theory—a conflict transformation model that addresses conditions
characteristic of post-9/11 conflict environments with the aim of transitioning post-9/11
militarized contexts into stable, more secure, and sustainable environments. It is my hope
that this study can be replicated in complex political emergencies around the world, and
lead to better and deeper understanding of factors which give rise to destructive processes
in conflict management and resolution (Deutsch, 2011). I invite scholars and practitioners
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of conflict analysis and resolution to join me in implementing and tweaking this new
theoretical framework that promises hope for many in highly undesirable conflict
environments around the world.
Limitations of Study
One of the key factors that limited this research study was what I felt was a
narrow sampling of participants for the study. First, the participation in the study was
limited to Kabul, Afghanistan, for obvious reasons of limited funding and concern for
security. Being an insecure environment, I did not plan to venture into other provinces of
Afghanistan. Even though I received several requests from Afghan humanitarian aid
workers in other provinces who were interested in participating in the study, the risks for
such venture seemed very high to bear with the limited funding that I had for the project.
Second, the study was restricted to Afghan humanitarian aid workers only. It did not
include international NGOs and aid workers from different countries working in
Afghanistan. Also it did not include members of the military, the Afghan government
officials, Afghan communities, and other international communities. I believe that all
these viewpoints would have enriched and broadened the scope of discussions and the
final analysis. However, in this particular study, a central goal was to give voice to the
Afghan humanitarian aid workers with a focus on Kabul. Again, the participation of
Afghan humanitarian aid in other provinces of Afghanistan would have broadened the
scope of the study.
Additionally, using a narrative inquiry, I would have liked to have spent more
interview time with my participants. Possibly, a second or third interview would have
allowed for follow-up questions and more time immersed in my participants’
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environment. My interviews lasted approximately one hour each, and the focus group
discussion lasted two hours.
Due to my limited time in Kabul, I was unable to attend events that my
participants invited me to attend with them. These events would have exposed me to the
different humanitarian services and activities they offered, leading possibly to the
opportunity to meet some of the aid beneficiaries. This would have given me a deeper
understanding of their roles and the different actors they interact with. During my visit to
Kabul, one of the participants had inquired if I was interested in meeting other
constituents. I believe he was referring to the possibility of interviewing Afghan
government officials, local Afghan communities, and some insurgents. Unfortunately, the
scope of my research was quite limited both in funding and in the capacity to execute a
project of such magnitude in an insecure environment.
Another area of limitation was the fact that I did not video tape the interviews and
the focus group. By not videotaping, I missed utilizing the body language and other
nuances that give meanings to the dialog in my analysis. I also believe that the study
would have been more revealing with a video component. However, I am often reminded
that Afghanistan is an insecure environment; mobility and security of individuals
involved in such projects must be of priority consideration.
I believe that I have attempted to faithfully represent and interpret my
participants’ storied narratives. However, like most researchers, I am cognizant of my
biases, points of view, political viewpoints, feelings, and personal experiences that
influence my analysis and interpretation of the study. It is my hope that my research
committee, peer/expert reviews, and participant validations have mitigated some of my
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personal biases. I believe that some of my background experiences, such as growing up in
Nigeria, helped me to understand some of the nuances and sensibilities of my
participants, my hosts, and the context. Ultimately, the main focus of this study is to give
voice to the storied narratives of the humanitarian aid workers who risk their lives every
day to bring aid to needy Afghans in very insecure environments of the war on terror. In
the end, I hope that with them I have been able to shed light for better understanding of
the conditions in complex political environments that give rise to violence against
innocuous humanitarian aid workers through the narratives that my participants and I
have co-constructed together.
Future Recommendations
A key recommendation from this study is for scholars, researchers, and
policymakers to pay particular attention to the frustration and deprivation of individual
human needs as key drivers of social conflicts and the radicalization of young men and
women around the world. I recommend that more studies be done to better understand
these dynamics, rooted in structural violence that are denying and frustrating individuals
around the world from their basic human needs. For this purpose, I highly recommend
my newly developed theoretical framework: Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory of
interventions, which can transform complex political emergencies into secure
environments that promise hope for individuals to obtain their basic human needs of
security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization.
More research is also needed to explore the impacts of war on terror on complex
political emergencies around the world, how the war on terror is impacting on local
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humanitarian aid communities in complex political emergencies, and what can be done to
mitigate risks of violence to aid workers in such insecure environments.
Additionally, I believe that a study on the interactions and relationships between
local NGOs, national NGOs, and international NGOs will shed light on constructive and
deconstructive processes that the humanitarian aid communities have to deal with in the
new global war on terror and offer opportunities for future integration of services.
Lastly, for policymakers, certainly, it will not be a surprise to learn that the war on
terror will not be won by how many bullets and bombs, or how many terrorists are killed
by drones. This idea has been echoed on several occasions by military commanders,
government officials, legislators, and news reporters. As one participant said, when we
take out one terrorist leader, another person is waiting to take their place—maybe this
time, one more brutal than the one that was taken out. The strength of terror was not in
the leadership that was killed, but in the numbers of recruits who are radicalized and
waiting to carry out the acts of terror. Another participant said that we have to find the
“seed of terror” and stop it in its roots. The seeds of terror are the young men and women
who are frustrated and deprived from their basic human needs. We must catch them
before they are recruited and sowed for terror. If individuals are frustrated and denied of
their basic human needs, they will go to “extreme lengths to defy systems in order to
pursue their deeply felt needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes”
(Burton, 1997, p. 19).
Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan still offers windows of opportunities that are fast
closing. The situation in Afghanistan is still hopeful and can still be rectified. I
recommend the following:
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1. Help and lead negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, so that all
the parties are represented at the table.
2. Help and lead negotiations with Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan for peaceful and
possible militarized border control. The goal is to stop interventions from Iran and
Pakistan.
3. Equip and train Afghan military and the Afghan police to be effective and
efficient, so they can defend Afghan borders and secure peace internally.
4. Work closely with Afghan government to improve governance and eradicate
corruption in public offices.
5. Help develop Afghan national infrastructure with local Afghan participation to
build skills and human capacity.
6. Negotiate a long term U.S. military presence to create room for stability and
sustainable economic development.
If Afghanistan is given a five to 10 year buffer from interference from its
neighbors to focus on developing its infrastructures and national economy, it will be able
to develop into a viable and sustainable economy that will provide opportunities for its
young population, so that everyone can contribute to the growth with shared
opportunities for all. An Afghan society that provides opportunities for its young men and
women will no longer be a place to sow the seeds of terror.
Conclusion
I started this research study simply wanting to understand how people with
desperate needs to survive would want to inflict harm on the same people that risk their
lives to bring them the help they desperately need to survive. I have since learned from
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my study that there are fundamental factors that create the conditions which give rise to
such violence and hostilities against Afghan men and women (humanitarian aid workers)
who risk their lives every day to bring desperately needed help to local Afghan families
in insecure environments. Some might argue that these factors go back many decades,
and I believe they will be right to make that argument, but as violent and defunct as the
foundation was, it had not crumbled. When a plumber is commissioned to one’s home to
unclog the sink and mistakenly damages the garbage disposal, now the condition is worse
than when the plumber came into the home. The plumber becomes agitated and
apologetic, and works very hard to make the bad situation right. Now the plumber has to
turn off the water supply to the kitchen to stop the flooding, and the dishwasher is no
longer usable. This is not a sustainable situation for the plumber and the home owner.
The plumber calls the office to report the incident, and the office instructs the plumber to
initiate a service order for a next day replacement at no charge to the customer. It is that
simple: If you break it, you own it (C. Powell as cited in Samuels, 2007, para. 1).
I reflect on an Afghan proverb shared by my participants that when one attempts
to lift a piece of rock, and finds it too heavy to lift; one should just kiss it and leave it in
its place. My participants were suggesting that in 2001, when the U.S. troops came to
Afghanistan, they saw the rock that was heavy to lift, and instead of leaving it in its place,
they decided to intervene and change the status quo. Now, according to my participants,
Afghanistan is “engulfed in flame; they cannot leave until they put out the fire”—just like
the plumber who could not leave the customer’s home without instituting proper
measures to address the new condition in the customer’s home, which was created as a
result of the plumber’s intervention, even though the plumber was commissioned.
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Similarly, the burden of responsibility to correct and restore order in the environment still
rested on the individual or group of individuals who intervened.
The question that Strand (2007) posed in 2007 is still relevant. He wondered why
the local Afghans no longer came out of their homes, excited and happy to see the
international humanitarian aid workers when they arrived at the villages, like they did in
the past—a very simple question, but quite complicated in the reasons why. The question
was simply about what had happened to the trusting relationship developed with the
Afghan communities. What had come between them to cause the mistrust? In this study,
my participants asked similar questions: Why have they become suspicious and now
wonder if we have guns? Why do they now see us as helpers of the foreign soldiers? I
have learned from this study that there were several factors that complicated the
relationships and created mistrust for the humanitarian aid workers, particularly the
Afghan aid worker. It was not simply because of the collaborations with foreign military
forces that made nightly incursions into local Afghan communities and homes to arrest or
maybe kill potential or suspected terrorists, or the collaborations with the PRTs who my
participants claimed were perceived by most Afghans to be corrupt. I believe that over
time, the context that Strand (2007) inquired about had become “harsh.” As a result, the
inhabitants of the context became hardened. My participants said that the Taliban are the
terrorists; however, in the villages where people have no jobs, no opportunities to make a
living and be able to take care of their families, the Afghan government is not able to
provide any services to assist Afghans who live in insecure villages due to the presence
of the Taliban. Suppose the terrorists or the Taliban have access to the people, they
provide them with food, money, and basic needs to take care of their families. My

245
participants argued that the people are going to listen and do whatever the Taliban tells
them or wants them to do. And in some instances, they claim that mothers have been
brainwashed to make the ultimate sacrifices of giving their own sons to jihad, in return
for the help they were told that Allah provided for them. One participant described the
war on terror as “a war of intelligence” and others have called it a propaganda war. Either
way, it is about WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds. The idea was a correct one, but the
implementation was flawed and ill-informed. The WHAM strategy can be reimplemented with better focus. The jihadist and leaders of fundamentalist groups recruit
young men and women who become radicalized through propaganda to give up their
lives. They also convince good mothers and fathers to make the ultimate sacrifices of
giving up their sons and daughters to blow up themselves and innocent people for the
propaganda of a holy war and the reward in heaven (Stern, 2003). The jihadists and
fundamentalists are currently winning this war of ‘intelligence’ or propaganda war
because the rest of the world is fighting with drones and sophisticated military hardware.
The little beggar boys I described in my research context are the jihadists of tomorrow. If
systems in the context do not create conditions that will provide young men and women
pathways to systematically transition from the streets to productive contributors of
society, with opportunities to provide for themselves and take care of their families, this
research study finds that innate human needs are at the core of most conflicts, and they
must be addressed and satisfied if society is to find peaceful resolution satisfactory to all
the parties (Burton, 1972; Sites, 1973). Further, the study finds that Afghan humanitarian
aid workers in Kabul are exposed to risks of danger and violent attacks as a result of the
conditions of structural violence that frustrate and deny young Afghans, as well as their
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families, security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization (Burton, 1972, 1990;
Galtung, 1964).
The only way to win this war on terror is to employ all means necessary,
including “stopping the seed of terror in its root.” As one participant told me, we must
catch them before they are recruited and radicalized into jihad. I believe it all comes
down to the satisfaction of the core human needs. If the conditions in the environment are
denying young men and women their basic needs, and frustrating them from seeking and
attaining these essential basic needs, they are going to seek their basic human needs
elsewhere, even if it leads them into extreme dangers, including death by suicide
bombing (Burton, 1997).
As we ponder on the different conflicts around the world—the sectarian civil war
in Syria; ISIS in Iraq (which are redefining the states of Iraq and Syria as we have known
them); the struggle for national unity and identity in Ukraine; Israel’s and Palestine’s
inability to reach a two-states solution with two nations co-existing side-by-side in peace,
with dignity, and mutual respect for the Jewish State and the State of Palestine; Boko
Haram in Nigeria, which continues to elude Africa’s richest and most populous nation
with inability to provide security for its citizens and protection for young school girls
who are abducted, abused, and sold into sex slavery; and many conflicts around the
world, some just waiting to erupt—I am reminded of people who live in states of siege,
which deny them of the most fundamental human needs, yet they must uphold standards
indicative of the rich and wealthy nations whose basic needs are exceeded daily, yet they
are judged and condemned for displaying feelings of anger and frustration. What this
study reveals is that when people are held in conditions of structural violence that
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frustrate and deny them of their basic, fundamental human needs of security, identity, and
the sense of value and recognition, they will go to the extremes and employ violent
means to satisfy their basic needs (Burton, 1997; Sites, 1973).
My findings from this study have exposed me to new understandings, which have
resulted in a new theoretical framework that I call Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory—a
theory of intervention, which postulates that for interventions to be successful, the
interveners must leave the context in conditions similar to, or better than, the original
conditions that existed at the time of the intervention, otherwise the resulting conditions
will lead to more chaos and insecurities. When the plumber came into a home to service a
kitchen drain, and created conditions that were worse than the original condition, which
existed before the plumber arrived in the home, the plumber could not leave the
environment, which had become unsustainable until he/she was able to institute order and
negotiate a favorable plan of correction. Likewise, when the U.S. and NATO troops
intervened in Afghanistan, and created the insecure conditions of a complex political
emergency, the interveners must not leave the context until the conditions in Afghanistan
are the same or better than the conditions that existed at the time of the intervention.
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Appendix A: Face-to-Face Interview Guide
Interview Questions to Guide the Study
1. Tell me about your experiences – what has it been like?
2. Where do you find the words to begin to describe this war – the impact it’s
had on you, the Afghan community, your family, the aid community?
3. Tell me your story – how did it all begin?
4. Take me inside one of your typical days – you’re bringing aid to people in
desperate need… What happens?
5. How satisfied are you with the work you’re doing now?
6. What is the biggest challenge?
7. As you look back to these experiences, what do you say? Do they have
meaning? Any hope?
8. What is your assessment of your country’s readiness to take over military and
political responsibilities from the U.S. and foreign forces in 2014?
9. How did you arrive at this assessment?
10. What are the challenges facing this country? How do you feel about it?
11. What would you like to say to President Obama?
12. What would you like to say to the American people?
13. What would you say to Afghan people – your country men and women?

Note: During the interviews, this researcher asked follow-up questions as needed for
clarification in order to redirect or expand on topic.
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Appendix B: Focus Group Discussion Guide
Discussion Questions for Focus Group
1. What roles do Afghan Humanitarian Aid Workers, National and Local NGOs and
CSOs play in Afghanistan? Why should people care what they think?
2. The perception is that you are already biased – your whole industry has been built
on the War on Terror, you have benefitted immensely from the presence of the
U.S. and International Forces in Afghanistan – isn’t it understandable, therefore,
why your members overwhelmingly oppose the drawdown of forces in 2014?
3. What are the consequences of a drawdown of U.S. and International Forces from
Afghanistan in 2014?
4. The perception is that the terrorists are not in Afghanistan. Some have argued that
Osama bin Laden was not found and killed in Afghanistan – therefore questioning
the activities of the foreign forces in Afghanistan, if that is so, why maintain the
presence of the U.S. and International Forces in Afghanistan? Why are they
needed?
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